The União Democrática Nacional in the State of Guanabara: An Attitudinal Study of Party Membership

By

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THE UNIÃO DEMOCRÁTICA NACIONAL IN THE STATE
OF GUANABARA: AN ATTITUDINAL STUDY OF PARTY MEMBERSHIP

By

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This study of the União Democrática Nacional in the Brazilian state of Guanabara (UDN-GB), a political party existing from 1945 to 1965, focuses on the UDN-GB identifiers' perceptions of their party and what it represented, and on the relations between the state party and the national organization to which it was theoretically subordinate. A case study of the 1965 Guanabara gubernatorial election is also presented.

Research materials included records of the national UDN and the UDN-GB, election statistics, interviews with party officials, and findings of the author's survey research involving 312 UDN identifiers.

By using the widely accepted definitions offered by Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, it was determined that the UDN was truly a modern, national party and was, in Roy C. Macridis' terms, a comprehensive, open and specialized party.

Within the national UDN the Guanabara state affiliate constituted an important power center, with Brazil's largest concentration of UDN voters. Despite the electoral code, state parties enjoyed virtual autonomy, receiving scant direction from the national headquarters. Such was the UDN-GB's influence that sometimes the national/state

power roles were reversed.

Politically, Guanabara was unique. First, the state--coterminous with the city of Rio de Janeiro--was in the "take-off" phase of economic development, a stage which places severe strains on political institutions. Also, Guanabara, over 97 percent urban and geographically compact, had a sophisticated, highly politicized electorate. Finally, its politics exhibited extreme polarization between the UDN and the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), revolving around the controversial figure of Governor Carlos Lacerda, undisputed ruler of the UDN-GB.

The 1965 campaign to elect Lacerda's successor demonstrated fatal shortcomings of the UDN-GB. The author's pre-election research showed that most rank-and-file UDN identifiers had little idea of the party's history, ideology or political stance and no clear preference for any potential gubernatorial nominee. Lacerdists and anti-Lacerdists, however, evinced marked differences attitudinally, as did varying levels of the party hierarchy (Officeholders, Activists and Sympathizers). Officeholders came from a privileged educational, income and socioeconomic class, and UDN identifiers in general tended to be from the middle class, although a significant number came from the working class. These latter tended to be attracted more by the charismatic Lacerda than by the party itself.

Lack of understanding of party goals by UDN identifiers was seen during the election when, despite Lacerda's efforts to awaken middle class fears of revanchism and communism should the PTB candidate win, the middle class deserted the UDN in large numbers to vote for the opposition. In so doing they were expressing discontent with the national government of President Castelo Branco more than with

Lacerda's administration, generally conceded to have been a progressive one.

The conclusion is drawn that both nationally and in Guanabara internal dissension and communications breakdown between national and state levels seriously hampered UDN electoral chances. In 1965 strained interfactional relations prevented Lacerda's achieving the backing of the state's UDN federal legislators for his candidate. Lacerda's decision to choose a "technician-candidate" would seem to be a tactical error, as was his choice of candidate. Polarization of the electorate gravely damaged UDN chances, but Lacerda himself furthered polarization toward the end of the campaign. Lack of coordination between UDN-GB leadership and the wishes of identifiers partially accounted for the mass desertion to the opposition which spelled defeat for the UDN.

Less than a month later, all political parties were extinguished by the Second Institutional Act, marking the end of an era in Brazilian politics.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The following study deals with the União Democrática Nacional (UDN), a Brazilian political party which existed from 1945 until 1965 when it and all other parties were forcibly extinguished in the aftermath of the military coup of the preceding year. In this work the focus is on one of the so-called "regional" affiliates of the national UDN, that of the state of Guanabara, the city-state coterminous with the city of Rio de Janeiro. For purposes of succinctness the state party will be referred to throughout as the UDN-GB.

Definitions

Lest it be erroneously assumed that Brazilian politics is merely a replica of American or Western European politics, it is advisable to begin a study in the area of comparative politics with certain definitions. To be sure, there are similarities but also very real differences which make investigation of Brazilian political life a unique and fascinating study. Basic to a work of this nature is an understanding of what is meant by the term party.[1]

Before I could profitably begin to research the UDN in earnest it was necessary to determine whether it was truly a political party; as one scholar has aptly remarked, "Not every Latin American group bearing the title 'partido' is really a political party. . . ."[2] The same caveat might equally apply to a group designated união (union).

An operational definition must be found to differentiate a real party from "trends of opinion, popular clubs, philosophical societies, and parliamentary groups."[3]

While there is no dearth of attempts to define what constitutes a political party,[4] no effective consensus has as yet coalesced. As Macridis has pointed out, "There is a plethora of definitions and typologies of political parties and party systems. . . . Confusion and profusion of terms seems to be the rule."[5] The same difficulties are noted by David Apter:

> There are good reasons why political parties are so hard to define. Their genesis is difficult to disentangle from the evolution of the modern society and state; the role of a party often changes substantially as political conditions in a country change . . .; and in developing countries, a peculiar relationship exists between state and society--they are linked together by party solidarity.[6]

Despite the disagreement among political scientists, one widely used model to separate parties from "cliques, clubs, and groups of notables"[7] is that developed by LaPalombara and Weiner. It has four essential elements. It requires, first, continuity in organization, which assures the group's survival beyond the death or defection of any one leader. In this respect the many personalist "parties" of Latin America fall short, and most die with their founder.[8]

By this criterion the UDN qualifies as a real political party. As will be seen in Chapter II, the party had its beginnings in what might be called an "anti-personalist" setting: it arose as a coalition of the anti-Vargas forces which asserted themselves in 1945 after fifteen years of rule by Getulio Vargas. Although the UDN had its own strong personality at the outset in the person of Eduardo Gomes, brigadier of the Air Force and twice presidential nominee of

the União, it overcame the defeats of 1945 and 1950 and Gomes' subsequent retirement from candidacy. The party's organizational strength was sufficient to see it through the lean years from 1950 to 1960, and at no time was the entity in danger of electoral bankruptcy despite its declining percentage of congressional representation during this period.

The second LaPalombara-Weiner standard is that of "manifest and presumably permanent organization at the local level, with regularized communications . . . between local and national units."[9] As will be seen in Chapters III and IV, the UDN was organized and active in every state except Acre, with varying electoral appeal and degrees of success. Communications between national and local levels are discussed in Chapter IV, where it is shown that Brazilian law required the formal subordination of the local unit to the national party. Further evidence of the durability of the UDN is seen in the fact that its headquarters in Guanabara, to take one example, were not ad hoc meeting places secured in anticipation of an upcoming election; for the most part they were either permanent locations belonging to the party itself (sedes próprias) or space leased year-round.

The third measure of a party, according to LaPalombara and Weiner, is the "self-conscious determination of leaders . . . to capture and to hold decision-making power alone or in coalition with others, not simply to influence the exercise of power."[10] Put another way, in the words of Schattschneider, "A political party is first of all an organized attempt to get power."[11] By these standards the UDN qualified as a valid party: it contested every presidential election

during its two decades of existence and fielded candidates for federal and state office in the various states. To be sure, in some cases the UDN simply co-endorsed nominees of other parties, but coalition was a pervasive feature of Brazilian politics during the 1945-65 period. Some observers, in fact, feel that the UDN suffered from its unwillingness to form coalitions more often, thus leaving the PSD-PTB alliance greater latitude in the electoral arena.[12] Although the UDN never achieved a majority in the Brazilian national legislature, the party enjoyed continuous representation in proportions sufficient to guarantee that its interests would be "taken into account" by the administration then in power. Despite the UDN's lack of success in achieving power, its leaders never ceased striving to gain control of the apparatus of government through electoral means--the sine qua non which marks the legitimate political party in a democracy.

The final criterion which sets parties apart from other organizations is "a concern . . . for seeking followers at the polls or in some manner striving for popular support."[13] Obviously this measure of party legitimacy is intimately linked to the preceding one, for in order to gain power in a democratic society it is necessary to employ what Anderson terms "aggregation . . . of consent, electorally tested."[14] In a democracy organized along Western standards this unique power capacity is the only legitimate path to political rule. That the UDN fits the definition is demonstrated in its twenty-year effort to achieve a larger share of the electoral whole; this will be seen in Chapter II in a discussion of the national UDN's constant contending for votes, and in Chapter VIII where a case study is

presented which shows the UDN-GB competing for voter support on the state level.

In summary, the UDN met all four of the LaPalombara-Weiner criteria for partyhood and can not therefore be dismissed as simply a coterie of ambitious politicians, a pressure group, clique or club. It is interesting to note at this point that the UDN, like other Brazilian parties of the post-1945 period, was "extra-parliamentary" in origin.[15] As Duverger has shown, parties which arise largely independently of the groupings in the legislature manifest a perceptibly lessened influence on the part of the legislators.[16] (In the United States the "congressional" and the "national" wings of the two parties have long been the subject of comment; James MacGregor Burns goes so far as to call ours--in his The Deadlock of Democracy--a "four-party" system.) In the case of the UDN, conflict between the national leadership of the party and its congressional bloc was a recurring source of internal strife. In Chapter VII evidence of this is presented in the discussion of the power struggle between Carlos Lacerda and certain members of the Guanabara congressional delegation.

Having determined that the UDN indeed merited the title of political party, let us now turn to an examination of the type of party it was--i.e., its place in a theoretical framework or party typology.

Just as disagreement outweighs accord in the matter of definition of party, so too do we encounter a variety of approaches in the attempt to establish a taxonomy of political organizations. Nevertheless, Macridis has contributed a valuable device for cutting through the confusion by arguing that a typology of parties "should be based

on (a) the sources of party support; (b) internal organization; and (c) the functions they perform and their mode of action."[17]

Support: Macridis suggests parties are either comprehensive or sectarian in this respect. By the former he means parties "that attempt to get as many votes as possible from each and every citizen," while sectarian parties "appeal to a class, a region or an ideology."[18] By this standard the UDN was more comprehensive than sectarian, despite the undeniable fact that, like other Brazilian parties, it enjoyed greater appeal in some regions and among some classes than others.[19] Still, the UDN can be distinguished from a party such as Adhemar de Barros' fundamentally personalistic and São Paulo-based Partido Social Progressista (PSP), which never gained many adherents outside its own state. The PSP was largely atypical of the Brazilian party system, however, for most parties had broader bases of electoral support.

Internal organization: Macridis states that parties may be either closed or open in terms of this aspect; the former have restricted memberships and tight rules for joining, while the latter impose very light or nominal requirements. Whereas closed parties tend to be authoritarian and are directed toward monopolistic control of government, open parties are geared to political pluralism.[20] The UDN and all other legal Brazilian parties were open; only the underground Communist Party (PCB) could be termed closed. It should be pointed out, however, that actual membership in a party was of little importance in gauging partisan strength, and a party with only a few thousand card-carrying members might win hundreds of thousands of votes in a "majoritary" election.[21] As will be seen in Chapter IV, the UDN

national headquarters carried very few names on its rolls, but as Peterson has noted, "on examination the 'inscribed member' becomes a statutory phantasm and not a vital part of party life."[22] It was not even necessary to be a prior member of the party in order to gain nomination as a party candidate for elective office.[23]

Actions and functions: Macridis divides parties into specialized and diffused for purposes of this category.

> Specialized parties stress representativeness, aggregation, policy deliberation and formulation, participation, control of the government for a limited period of time; diffused parties stress integration, total and permanent control, mobilization and institution building.[24]

As will be seen in the following chapters, the UDN was a specialized party, as were all other recognized Brazilian parties. Indeed, the diffused party in Brazil could once again be only the illegal PCB or some other revolutionary cadre. Although the Brazilian microcosm was far from a flawless democracy, it came closer to that ideal than to the totalitarian model; as far as can be determined, no party in the period 1945-65 had as its goal the complete and total domination of the system to the exclusion and extinction of its competitors.

In summary, then, the UDN was an externally created (extra-parliamentary), comprehensive, open and specialized political party.

Now let us look at the party system itself. To a large extent party systems are determined by the characteristics of the parties that make them up. Thus, for example, the system is integrative or competitive, depending on whether the parties therein are sectarian, closed and diffused or comprehensive, open and specialized.[25] As has been shown, Brazilian parties of the 1945-65 period were the latter, which means the party system was competitive.

In addition, the Brazilian party system was a multiparty configuration. By this is meant that not only did more than two parties exist--for after all there are more than a dozen "parties" of varying ideology and importance in the so-called two-party United States--but also that more than two parties had sizable delegations in the legislative body of the nation and the several states. The governors of Brazil's twenty-two states came from at least five parties in the years 1960-65, further evidence of the viability of more than just two groups.

But what kind of multiparty system was Brazil's? LaPalombara and Weiner distinguish between hegemonic and turnover multiparty systems, terminology subsequently adopted by Almond and Powell, among others.[26] A hegemonic system is "one in which over an extended period of time the same party, or coalitions dominated by the same party, hold power," while turnover situations are "those in which . . . there is relatively frequent change in the party that governs or in the party that dominates a coalition."[27] Riggs, incidentally, makes virtually the same distinction, although he calls his systems "non-reciprocative" (LaPalombara and Weiner's "hegemonic") and "reciprocative" ("turnover"). It is difficult to classify the Brazilian party system in terms of hegemony vs. turnover, for various reasons. One is the time factor. As Riggs says;

> Ten or even twenty years is too short a period to establish the characteristics of the system definitely. A "generation," perhaps thirty years, presents firmer proof that a competitive elective system is non-reciprocative. If a regime has been operating for less than thirty years, only an informed guess is possible.[28]

Another difficulty is the fact that Brazil has a presidential rather than a parliamentary system, thereby making the task of determining party influence in government more complex. When a party forms a government or serves in a coalition which forms a government, its relation is much clearer than when it merely fills various cabinet seats in a presidential system. Yet another complicating factor is the existence of the "System," discussed at length in Chapter III: to what extent was it a coalition in the LaPalombara-Weiner sense?

Having stated the formidable obstacles to classifying the Brazilian party system on the hegemonic/turnover scale, let us now attempt the "informed guess" of which Riggs speaks. First, it is clear that the only candidate to the position of "hegemonic party" in Brazil from 1945 to 1965 is the PSD, which elected an absolute majority of both houses of the federal legislature in 1945, as well as the president of the republic, and which continued as the largest party in congress throughout its two decades of existence. Yet it would seem that the PSD fell short of hegemony, at least insofar as that term is applied to parties such as the PRI in Mexico or India's Congress Party. For the PSD twice lost the presidency--in 1950 and 1960--and its portion of the legislative seats declined steadily after starting as a clear majority in 1945.[29] In addition, other parties won governorships with regularity, while in some states, such as São Paulo and Guanabara, the PSD was for practical purposes a minor party. None of this smacks of hegemony in the LaPalombara-Weiner sense. Yet the PSD was certainly the major party in the PSD-PTB coalition which played so vital a part in the operation of the "System" described in Chapter III. In the final analysis, however, it is the way the PSD died rather than the way it

lived which obliges me to place the Brazilian party system in the turnover category: were the PSD truly a hegemonic party, it is unlikely it would have been extinguished as quickly and as finally as happened in October, 1965, when the Second Institutional put an end to all parties then in existence.[30]

Finally, was the Brazilian party system ideological or pragmatic? There is abundant evidence that the UDN, along with other major Brazilian parties, was basically pragmatic in nature. Ideology was vague and its importance was seldom a matter of concern of UDN leaders or rank-and-file. As is shown in Chapter VI in the attitudinal study of Guanabara UDN members, there seems to have existed an inchoate ideology among UDN identifiers and especially among Lacerdists, but it remained largely unexpressed. As for the other major parties, the only ideology of the PSD seems to have been that of winning, while the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) was, as one observer put it, "always more petebista [PTB-oriented] than trabalhista [labor-oriented]." The only "ideology" of the personalist PSP was to elect Adhemar de Barros to whatever office he was seeking, usually governor or president. Among the smaller parties, the Christian Democrats (PDC) placed more emphasis on ideology than did the other parties, while the underground PCB declared its ideology periodically in its widely distributed publications such as Novos Rumos. Overall, the party system in Brazil from 1945 to 1965 was pragmatic rather than ideological.

By the LaPalombara-Weiner criteria, then, the party system was turnover-pragmatic. If their statement is true that "pragmatic parties will tend to move . . . more rapidly when exposed to frequent turnover,"[31] perhaps this helps explain the instability which marked

Brazil's two decades between the ouster of Vargas in 1945 and the demise of political parties in 1965.

In various parts of the following study reference will be made to the criteria established in this introduction in order to test their applicability to the Brazilian political reality and the UDN in operation. Before turning to a brief look at the contents in the following chapters, let us summarize our findings thus far.

The UDN was a political party, of a comprehensive, open and specialized sort. It came into being externally (from outside of any legislative body) and interacted with other parties in a competitive, multiparty system of the turnover-pragmatic variety. The implications of these definitions will become evident in several places in the chapters which follow.[32]

Substantive Topics in Following Chapters

The data in this study were gathered during the author's two stays in Brazil, the first from January of 1965 to May of 1966, the second from October of 1967 through March of 1968.

Sources of information for this study include personal interviews with political leaders and laymen, as well as with newspaper columnists writing on political matters; accounts in magazines and newspapers, especially the leading daily journals in Rio de Janeiro; records of the national UDN dealing with financial affairs and minutes of the official meetings of the national party; books and articles in both Portuguese and English (as well as a few in Spanish); personal observations through attendance at open party meetings, UDN conventions, political rallies and other public functions; and the responses of some three hundred plus udenistas of varying degrees of identification with the party.[33]

The present work is a case study, with the inevitable limitations to which that genre is heir. As is pointed out in Chapter V, it is hoped that this research will offer data and analysis which make some small contribution to a future theoretical construct uniting in meaningful fashion the whole crazy-quilt pattern of Latin American political parties.

Two models offered by students of the Brazilian political scene have been incorporated into this study because of their "goodness of fit" with reality.

The first, based on the writings of the eminent Brazilian academician Hélio Jaguaribe, discusses the relation between economic and political development in various areas of Brazil and provides a satisfactory explanation of why the UDN and other parties evinced such dramatically different ideology from one state to another.

The second model is that elaborated by Jame W. Rowe to explain the complex interplay among political parties between 1945 and 1965--the System. A pragmatic web of political and economic forces, the System stood as a permanent barrier to the UDN in its quest for power. Both the Jaguaribe and Rowe models are discussed in Chapter III.

Briefly, the substantive chapters of the present work are organized as follows. Chapter II presents a short history of the national UDN and recounts the several presidential campaigns undertaken by the party, with special attention given to the 1960 election which brought Jânio Quadros to power.

Chapter III, as has been stated, deals with the two models and attempts to place the national UDN within the larger functioning political system to which it belonged. A state-by-state categorization

of the party is offered, adding to one's appreciation of the unique stresses suffered by the UDN in the "take-off" area of Guanabara.

Chapter IV deals briefly with the formal organizational structure of the national UDN, stressing the concept that statutory limitations on Brazilian parties were largely pro forma insofar as their relations with their theoretically subordinate state affiliates were concerned. The UDN, like other parties made up of a heterogeneous collection of state parties, exercised only nominal control over the state groups despite the provisions of the Electoral Code.

Chapter V turns to the UDN-GB and gives a description of the socio-economic and political background of Rio de Janeiro (Guanabara), a highly urban state with electoral politics of a color and ferocity seldom encountered elsewhere in the nation. The pivotal role of Carlos Lacerda in Rio politics is delineated with special emphasis on the 1960 election in which he became first governor of the new state of Guanabara. Prior to a fuller account in a subsequent chapter, his role as element of polarization in the politics of his state is briefly mentioned.

Chapter VI is a kind of "case study within a case study," the findings of survey research involving 312 respondents which was undertaken in 1965. Respondents are divided into three groups--Office-holders, Activists, Sympathizers--and their attitudes and opinions correlated with various independent variables. Some of the findings are of interest for the light they shed on electoral behavior of udenistas in the 1965 gubernatorial election in Guanabara.

Chapter VII relates the background to that election, from the intricate maneuvering and colorful confrontations at the national UDN

convention in Niterói in late April, 1965, to the naming of Carlos Flexa Ribeiro as nominee of the UDN-GB to succeed Lacerda as governor. Also included is a detailed discussion of the intraparty dissension which marked the exchanges between the national party and the state UDN in Guanabara.

Chapter VIII recounts the fiery and vitriolic campaign to elect Flexa Ribeiro, with some attention to the nominating process whereby the PTB chose its candidate. An analysis of the election results evaluates the effect of real and spurious issues on the voters' decision and assesses the part Lacerda played in the outcome.

Chapter IX offers conclusions about the ultimate failure of the national party to gain a commanding position in Brazilian party politics, as well as the failure of the UDN-GB to establish its primacy in Rio on more than a temporary basis. A final assessment is made of the role of Lacerda in the UDN-GB, the national party and in Brazilian politics as a whole.

Two appendices follow the final chapter.

NOTES

[1] It should be noted at the outset that this discussion of the concept of party is restricted in this context to those groups which seek to gain control of government through democratic means, electorally tested. In other words, the question of totalitarian parties and revolutionary cadres is excluded from consideration in order to avoid unnecessary complication.

[2] Kalman H. Silvert, "A Proposed Framework for Latin American Politics," in John D. Martz (ed.), The Dynamics of Change in Latin American Politics (Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 14.

[3] Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (Wiley, 1963 [originally published in 1951]), p. xxiii.

[4] "To become a 'party' to something always means identification with one group and differentiation from another . . . . What is common to all parties, . . . is their participation in the decisionmaking process, or at least the attempt at and a chance for such a mobilization for action." (Sigmund Neumann, "Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties," in Harry Eckstein and David Apter [eds.], Comparative Politics: A Reader [The Free Press, 1963], p. 351.) In a provocative essay Riggs argues for a structural definition of party as "any organization which nominates candidates for election to a legislature." (Fred W. Riggs, "Comparative Politics and the Study of Political Parties: A Structural Approach," in William J. Crotty [ed.], Approaches to the Study of Party Organization [Allyn and Bacon, 1968], p. 51.) "Essentially party signifies a group of people who hold certain political beliefs in common or who are prepared to support the party candidates, work together for electoral victory, attain and maintain political power." (Michael Curtis, Comparative Government and Politics [Harper & Row, 1968], p. 137.) Almond and Powell, dealing with the party by demonstrating its purposes, employ the functional approach which is widely used in comparative politics, especially in discussing developing nations. They hold that "The political party may be considered the specialized aggregation structure of modern societies. . . . In a competitive system, the party aggregates certain interests into a set of policy proposals, and then attempts to garner a victory at the polls to install decision makers who will use the previously aggregated policy as a basis for rule formation." (Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach [Little, Brown, 1966], p. 102) Apter also deals functionally with party, listing among other elements the following: "to organize public opinion and test attitudes and to transmit these to government officials and leaders. . . ." (David Apter, The Politics of Modernization [University of Chicago Press, 1965], p. 181.) Examples could be multiplied indefinitely, with an inevitable overlapping of both idea and--less frequently--terminology.

[5] Roy C. Macridis, "The History, Functions, and Typology of Parties," in Roy C. Macridis (ed.), Political Parties: Contemporary Trends and Ideas (Harper & Row, 1967), p. 20.

[6] Apter, The Politics of Modernization, p. 181.

[7]Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, "The Origin and Development of Political Parties," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 6.

[8]Nevertheless, there is evidence that some Latin American parties with strong personalist roots do survive the death or political deactivization of their leaders. An obvious example is the Peronista party in Argentina, where "Peronism without Perón" has been evident almost from the date of the dictator's ouster in 1955. To date, however, no Latin American party with deep personalist traditions has overcome the active opposition of its founder as has the Mapai Party in Israel. (As will be shown in Chapter II, Vargas' victory in 1950 was with the tacit co-operation of the PSD despite its nominal opposition to him.)

[9]LaPalombara and Weiner, "The Origin and Development of Political Parties," p. 6.

[10]Ibid.

[11]E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government (Holt, 1942), p. 35.

[12]The PSD-PTB alliance will be discussed in Chapter III as an integral feature of the "System" which characterized Brazilian politics during the period from 1945 to 1965.

[13]LaPalombara and Weiner, "The Origin and Development of Political Parties," p. 6.

[14]Charles W. Anderson, "The Latin American Political System," in Robert D. Tomasek (ed.), Latin American Politics: Case Studies of the Contemporary Scene, 2nd edition (Doubleday, 1970), p. 29.

[15]For a full discussion of the implications of this term, see Duverger, Political Parites, pp. xxx-xxxvii.

[16]This point in made in Duverger, Political Parties, p. xxxv, and in LaPalombara and Weiner, "The Origin and Development of Political Parties," p. 27.

[17]Macridis, "The History, . . . of Parties," p. 20. It should be stressed that this attempt to "type" the UDN is theoretical and not an effort to determine its day-to-day accommodations to political reality. That is, the classification of the party as "liberal," "conservative," etc., is left for the discussion of ideological content in Chapter III.

[18]Ibid.

[19]Considering that national parties arose in great part from the state party organizations which dominated Brazilian partisan politics until the advent of more broadly based parties in 1945, it would be surprising if this were not the case. In Chapter III reference is made to the purely fortuitous genesis of the UDN and PSD in certain states of the interior, based on the historical accident of whether the

leading families happened to be pro- or anti-Vargas.

[20] Macridis, "The History, . . . of Parties," p. 21.

[21] A "majoritary" election is one in which only one candidate is elected (as in a gubernatorial race), as opposed to multi-winner proportional elections (such as for the chamber of deputies.)

[22] Phyllis Peterson "Brazilian Political Parties: Formation, Organization, and Leadership" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1962), p. 278.

[23] Ibid., p. 281.

[24] Macridis, "The History, . . . of Parties," p. 21.

[25] Ibid.

[26] LaPalombara and Weiner, "The Origin and Development of Political Parties," pp. 35-36. In Almond and Powell, Comparative Politics, the reference is found on pp. 119-120.

[27] LaPalombara and Weiner, "The Origin and Development of Political Parties," p. 35.

[28] Riggs, "Comparative Politics and the Study of Political Parties," p. 87.

[29] Naturally all parties founded in 1945 tended to decline in overall percentage of seats in both federal houses as more parties formed and competed for a share of power, but the decline of the PSD from 53 percent of all chamber of deputy seats in 1945 to a mere 29 percent in 1962 was the most dramatic.

[30] In the beginning (early 1966) it appeared that, with military backing, the newly formed ARENA might be the seed of a hegemonic party, but subsequent events have lent scant support to such a hypothesis.

[31] LaPalombara and Weiner, "The Origin and Development of Political Parties," p. 37.

[32] The preceding definitions should not be construed as being the only meaningful work done thus far in the field of parties in general and Latin American parties specifically. However, it was necessary to adopt a criterion from among the many competing and often contradictory models offered by students of party, lest the theoretical framework of the present work become a hodgepodge. Nevertheless, mention should be made of the praiseworthy effort of Peter Ranis in his article "A Two-Dimensional Typology of Latin American Political Parties" (Journal of Politics, August, 1968, pp. 798-832). He divides Latin American parties on the basis of "mobility"--willingness to form coalitions with other parties--and "perception"--the outlook of the party regarding societal problems and their means of solving them. On the mobility

scale parties are further classified as "aggregators," "resistors" or "isolators," while the perception scale yields the subdivisions of "preservator," "innovator" and "rejector" parties. Ranis concludes that aggregator-innovator parties have the best chance of gaining and keeping power through the electoral system because they occupy the highly desirable center position. Brazil, Ranis contends, has never had an aggregator-innovator party on any consistent basis, and he classifies the UDN as aggregator-preservator.

[33] An udenista is one identified with the UDN. The term, when used hereafter, will not be italicized.

CHAPTER II

ORIGINS OF THE UDN

As is well known by students of Brazilian politics, all Brazilian political parties of the period immediately following the Second World War were outgrowths of the Vargas dictatorship in one way or another. Of the three major parties--the Partido Social Democrático (PSD), the União Democrática Nacional (UDN) and the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB)-- two were founded by Vargas (PSD and PTB) and the third arose as a reaction to the excesses of the long dictatorial regime of the wily gaúcho.

From 1937, the date of the Vargas coup which brought into being the so-called New State (Estado Novo) modeled on the corporate state of fascist Italy, until his ouster in 1945, Getulio Vargas allowed no opposition parties to function and ruled by decree; congress was considered unnecessary and dispensable. Thus--with the exception of the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB)--the parties which were formed in 1945 bore different names from the political groupings of eight years before, but in some cases they displayed a strong correspondence in personnel.[1]

In the case of the União Democrática Nacional, the roots of the movement, in an ideological sense, can be found in an earlier coalition which began in 1935, the Aliança Libertadora Nacional (ANL) or National Liberating Alliance. Though not cited in the UDN party

history as an ideological forebear of the party, the ANL encompassed many of the elements and persons who were to figure prominently in the UDN during the very early stages of its development and before it broke up into several factions after the presidential elections of 1945.

The ANL, in the words of one historian, "was able to regiment the democratic forces and realize large mass demonstrations, defining its anti-imperialist position."[2] As will be seen, these positions overlap noticeably with the official stance of the UDN.

The carryover of beliefs from the ANL to the UDN, though nowhere acknowledged in the party documents, is heavy--at least on paper--but its extreme position on certain matters helps explain the reluctance of what was basically a middle class party (the UDN) to identify with it. Thus the tenets of the ANL included:

> ...cancellation of imperialist debts, the assurance of individual liberty, handing over the latifúndios to the workers in the field, the liquidation of feudal and semi-feudal relations.[3]

On July 5, 1935, the Aliança issued a statement which read in part:

> The moment demands of every honest man a clear and definite position for or against fascism, for or against imperialism. There is no middle ground possible, nor justifiable. The Aliança Libertadora Nactional is, therefore, a vast and broad national organization of a united front. The danger which threatens us [and] is growing daily, obliges us . . . to put in first place the creation of a bloc, the widest possible, of all classes oppressed by imperialism, and therefore by the fascist threat.[4]

Another reason that the UDN became understandably reticent in later years about the similarity of aims is the admitted influence of the Brazilian Communists in the Aliança. But it can not be said that the ALN was communist dominated or-oriented, despite the leading role of Luiz Carlos Prestes, head of the PCB since his indoctrination in

Moscow in the late 1920's. Prestes himself stated in 1963 in Novos Rumos that:

> . . . in 1935 the communists already constituted the vanguard force, enlightening and mobilizing the great popular masses. The insurrection of 1935 was not, however, an exclusively communist movement, nor did the insurrectionists expect to install in our country a dictatorship of the proletariat, much less a communist government . . . The communists fought on the side of [the patriots and democrats] against the reactionaries, in defense of democratic liberties, for the progress of Brazil, just as they do today.[5]

As E. Bradford Burns has noted, the ANL program:

> . . . attracted many supporters who did not consider themselves communists but who passionately desired the modernization and development of Brazil.[6]

The ANL may therefore be looked upon as an unforeseen product of the very nationalism which Getulio Vargas consciously promoted and which was to become so readily evident in postwar Brazil. Nevertheless, the Vargas regime could not forget that Prestes, the communist, was honorary president of the ANL and that the organization brought together elements from all strata of society--including members of the higher echelons of the military--and from all parts of the nation. Obviously, the Aliança represented a potential rival power focus which Vargas was loathe to tolerate.

Therefore it came no surprise when the ANL was outlawed in July, 1935, and an intense propaganda campaign launched by the government against all persons associated with it.[7]

As a result of the banning of the ALN, political protest in Brazil became channeled into less parliamentary and more violent outlets. Four months later, in November, 1935, there occurred the unsuccessful putsch in Natal and Recife, followed by a short-lived revolt in Rio itself (November 23, 24 and 27, respectively). Though these uprisings

have commonly been classified as communist-led, the evidence points to a wider popular base, and many of the military officials taking part had never been identified with the PCB or its leaders. The Vargas propaganda assault on these officers, however, succeeded in branding all those who participated in the abortive insurrection as either communists or bandits. Stories circulated telling of legalist generals killed in their beds; the total baselessness of such tales did little to counteract the cumulative effect such horror stories had on the public mind. This incessant repetition--a replica of the Big Lie technique then being practiced so effectively by the Nazis in Europe--helped prepare the public to support the coup which Vargas was to bring about in November, 1937, two years after the failed rebellion in the North.

Thus it was that Vargas closed both houses of congress on November 10, 1937, and began a one-man rule that which would last almost eight years.

But the idea of the Aliança and the broad coalition of forces it represented died hard, and even before the military coup which put an end to Vargas' long reign there had begun to emerge what seemed to be the ideological successor of the defunct ALN--the União Democrática Nacional.

The Founding of Brazilian Postwar Parties

By the end of 1944 it was apparent that the Allies would be victorious in the war and that democratic governments would soon supplant dictatorships in the vanquished nations. In Brazil, Getulio Vargas saw the trend and took steps to prevent its manifestation in his country. In late 1944 he broke with Osvaldo Aranha because of the latter's

enthusiastic support of the idea of a United Nations. It was feared that Aranha's group called Friends of America might "become a rallying point for democratic opponents of the Vargas regime."[8] But the desire of Brazilians for a change was not to be silenced, and Vargas found himself obliged to announce plans for an election. Ironically, the first notice of the upcoming vote was published not in Brazil, but in the New York Times, which headlined "Brazilian Nation to Be Called to the Polls."[9] It was early February, 1945, and soon political activity was evident unlike any the country had seen since the advent of the Estado Novo. Vargas lifted censorship of the press in the latter part of February and political parties soon began to take shape.

The parties quickly coalesced around pro-Vargas and anti-Vargas foci. Vargas himself founded the Partido Social Democrático (PSD), composed mainly of those who had held positions under the Vargas dictatorship ("pro-Vargas state administrators and their state administrative organizations"[10]); the PSD nominated War Minister Eurico Dutra to succeed Vargas. Among the opposition, which had remained inarticulate and disorganized for almost a decade, there was less unanimity of action though no basic disagreement of purpose: to put an end to the Vargas regime. All anti-Vargas elements were welcome, even the communists, and there was no lack of leadership, for the gaúcho strongman had accumulated many enemies during his fifteen years in power.

By the end of February a leading Rio newspaper could report:

> The opposition currents continue in great activity toward the launching next month of a grand coalition which will support the candidacy of Air Brigadier Eduardo Gomes. Its organizers still have not decided if the new association will be called the "União Democrática Nacional" or "União Libertadora." It is not a question, as far as is known, of a national party, but a grouping of local parties, each one keeping its characteristics and

> its personnel, all represented in a large Deliberative Council which will elect an Executive Committee . . . .[11]

The new coalition numbered among its supporters such well known names as Osvaldo Aranha, who had been Vargas' foreign minister; Júlio Prestes, whose inauguration as president had been forestalled by the revolution of 1930; ex-president Artur Bernardes; newspaper magnate Assis Chateaubriand; and Francisco Campos, who had authored the 1937 constitution for Vargas.[12]

On April 7, 1945, the first meeting of the anti-Vargas party was held at the Brazilian Press Association building in downtown Rio, under the presidency of Pedro Aleixo (later a leading figure in the UDN and federal deputy from Minas Gerais). The official minutes of the organizational meeting record the following:

> . . . The delegates of the state parties and of the currents of opinion which congregated to form the "União Democrática Nacional" met, whose names are listed as present in this book.[13]

At the second meeting of the new party, held April 21, the following basic principles were agreed upon by the assembled delegates:

> a. Demonstration of Brazilian freedom of organization of anti-Fascist parties. Free and honest elections.
> b. Freedom of manifestation of thought: in the press, on the radio, in assemblies. Academic and religious freedom.
> c. Combatting any type of racial discrimination.
> d. Immediate adoption of measures against a rise in the cost of living.
> e. Broadening and perfecting social legislation.
> f. Autonomy of labor unions and the right to strike.
> g. Technical and financial assistance to agricultural production.
> h. Raising the rural worker's standard of living. Diffusion, especially among the rural elements, of education. Guarantee by the state of the feeding of needy students. Rural sanitation.
> i. Industrialization of Brazil through governmental initiative, joint government-private initiative, and private initiative [by itself].
> j. Faithful and broad execution of the international agreements such as the Atlantic Charter, Tehran, Yalta, Chapultepec.[14]

This platform was broad enough to appeal to many divergent points of view, and support began to manifest itself from many sources in behalf of the new party. Despite the lack of official party status, which was not achieved until August, the UDN had a name and a candidate--Eduardo Gomes.

Eduardo Gomes was born in 1896 in Petrópolis, State of Rio de Janeiro. As one of the tenentes (lieutenants) he took part in the famous revolt of July 5, 1922, against the government of Epitácio Pessoa and the president-elect, Artur Bernardes.[15] In the words of one eminent Brazilian historian, recounting the uprising of the Copacabana fortress which was the high point of the short-lived venture:

> When the fort was bombed, all but a small group of young officers and men surrendered. The "Eighteen of Copacabana," as they came to be known, came out to fight on the beach, where most of them sacrificed their lives against the powerful government forces.[16]

Out of the unsuccessful revolt, however, came a legend, and Eduardo Gomes became a hero as one of the Eighteen when the 1930 revolution swept away the "old politics" irrevocably. After the revolution he was given a major role in the organization of the National Airmail Service (Correio Aéreo Nacional) in 1931 and in 1935 played a large part in putting down the insurrection in the Northeast. As commander of the First and Second Air Zones (North and Northeast Brazil) he helped the U.S. patrol the waters of the Atlantic during the Second World War. A bachelor, Gomes was considered in 1945 the voice of the anti-getulista element of the military and was respected as a dedicated public servant.[17]

The public certainty that Eduardo Gomes would be the candidate of the forces opposing the getulista legacy brought backing from a heterogeneous array of political persuasions. Although it had not been officially constituted as a party at the time, the UDN indicated in early June its intention to nominate Gomes, and a groundswell of support manifested itself. The Feminine Pro-Democracy Coalition organized and formed the backbone of the Women's Committee of the UDN.[18] A day later another newborn group, the União Socialista Popular (Popular Socialist Union) announced its support. At the first campaign speech given by Gomes, young Carlos Lacerda, "noted figure in the so-called Left Wing of the UDN," spoke as "the União Democrática Nacional initiated the civic campaign with which it proposes to restore in Brazil the democratic principles which oriented it in better and happier days."[19] More than eight thousand people attended a pro-Gomes rally in Belo Horizonte on June 13. On all sides was evident the "electoral lyricism" of which the UDN was born.[20] The Democratic Left (Esquerda Democrática), led by João Mangabeira, announced its support; this group would soon break with the UDN and form a separate party, without withdrawing its backing of the Gomes candidacy.[21]

Excitement continued to mount as the campaign went on. Added interest had been injected by Vargas' statement in March that he himself would not be a candidate, a declaration which gave birth to the Dutra movement. The campaign was heated but orderly as a nation went through the ritual of choosing its leaders electorally for the first time in fifteen years. Alceu Amoroso Lima has described this period by saying that "the UDN was born from a mystique of the middle class."[22] Nonetheless, the mystique was not total, for there began to appear

rumblings and rumors that 1945 could all too easily repeat what happened in 1937--it was feared that Vargas might stage a coup and cancel elections as he had done eight years earlier.

One of the danger signals was the rise of a vociferous pro-Vargas group known as the queremistas.[23] Their goal was to have the dictator cancel the presidential voting and instead preside over a constituent assembly which would draw up a new national constitution; their motto: Constituinte com Getulio. Naturally under such an agreement Vargas could be expected to continue in power. The fears of anti-Vargas forces were enhanced by growing signs of the dictator's displeasure with the progress of Dutra's campaign, which seemingly was going nowhere. Vargas allowed the September 2 deadline to pass without filing his name as candidate, but this did little to ease doubts that the elections scheduled for December 2 might somehow be thwarted by the wily dictator. On October 29 the crisis came to a head. Without consulting military leaders, Vargas appointed his brother Benjamim (who bore the ironic nickname O Beijo--"The Kiss") police chief of the Federal District. The parallel with a similar action preceding the 1937 coup was too plain to be missed. Góes Monteiro, the minister of war, resigned in protest but soon responded to the call of high ranking officers to oust Vargas. With both presidential candidates agreeing to the plan, Vargas' fate was sealed, and on the evening of October 29 tanks surrounded the Palácio Guanabara and Getulio Vargas wrote out his resignation. Two days later he flew into "exile" at São Borja ranch in his native Rio Grande do Sul.

The chief justice of the Supreme Court acted as caretaker president until the winner of the December elections could take over. Meanwhile, on the electoral front, the UDN adherents hailed the fall of Vargas as a vindication of their struggle to redemocratize the nation.[24]

With Vargas out of power, the electoral campaign quickly neared its climax. On the UDN side, there was some danger of a letdown after the deposing of the dictatorship. In the words of one commentator:

> The burden of the campaign now had to rest on the appeal of its candidate and on its stand on substantive questions of political and economic organization. Gomes, the UDN candidate, counted on the support of merchant groups in the principal cities, including the Northeast, as well as some landowners to whom the PSD also appealed. . . .
>
> "Gomes' program stressed the juridical aspects of Brazil's redemocratization. In the area of economics Gomes and the UDN called for a cautious policy of industrialization. They warned against the use of the Bank of Brazil "for the creation of new and the financing of unviable industries." They called for the "collaboration of foreign capital," opposed "protective tariffs" and recommended a "financial cleanup." The UDN platform of August 17 favored protecting industry only if it "were fitted with modern equipment which reduces the cost of production." Herbert Levy . . . stressed the Communist danger and warned that the elite must adapt so as to "assume control of the transformations which have become imperative in our time."[25]

Thus from the outset the UDN placed itself in an ambiguous position vis-à-vis one of the paramount issues of postwar Brazil: industrialization. Given the intimate relationship between desenvolvimento (development)--largely synonymous with industrialization by 1945--and Brazilian nationalism, the UDN was proceeding at its own peril and leaving a chink in its armor which future adversaries might exploit.[26] The UDN was in effect calling for a return to laissez-faire economics after the controlled economy of the Vargas era, "to allow the spontaneous economic forces to operate."[27] The party had no desire, however, to undo the gains made by working class elements and trade unions

(sindicatos) in the period 1930-45.

The election was complicated by the actions of the Communist Party (PCB). Its leader, Luiz Carlos Prestes, had been released after eight years in prison through the general amnesty granted by Vargas in April, 1945, and to the consternation of many, he offered the PCB's support to the queremistas. Vargas' disavowal of electoral ambitions did little to still the clamor of his followers, but when the dictator was ousted at the end of October the PCB had to reassess its position. The party chose a non-communist as its presidential candidate, one Iedo Fiúza, a civil engineer and ex-mayor of Petrópolis. Nominated in mid-November, Fiúza was clearly a "stalking horse" for the PCB; his candidacy was nothing more than the party's attempt to test its national electoral strength. Meanwhile, the PCB ran candidates in numerous states for places in the federal senate and chamber of deputies.

The remaining major political force taking part in the 1945 election was the newly organized Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB), the Brazilian Labor Party. This group was formed by Vargas and was based on the sindicatos which had prospered under the Estado Novo. Such Vargas followers as Alexandre Marcondes Filho, labor minister under the dictator, and Alberto Pasqualini undertook the actual procedural tasks of getting together a party, but the inspiration clearly came from Getulio. The PTB lent its voice to the queremista movement and was left irresolute in the face of the ouster of October 29; some factions favored throwing their support to the communist candidate while others leaned toward Dutra, with a few arguing that the party should opt out of the presidential race altogether. However, when Vargas himself

announced his support for Dutra most members of the Labor Party chose to follow his lead. It was not until November 28, be it noted, that Vargas endorsed his former minister of war.

The UDN made a sincere attempt to win labor support for Gomes, despite the prior claims staked out by the PTB. In so doing the newly formed group was demonstrating one of the prerequisites of partyhood, as defined by LaPalombara and Weiner: it was attempting to maximize its popular support. It was a comprehensive party (in the sense in which Macridis uses the term) from its inception, as might be expected from its having served as the focus of all anti-Vargas sentiments, from highly conservative landowners in some parts of the North and Northeast, to ideologues of various coloration in the urban centers. The UDN quickly attempted to win a share of the labor vote. As early as June, Gomes had told a rally:

> Without union freedom, the goals of the union are defeated, they lose their reason for being. I am . . . in favor of union freedom so that the unions may come to be organs of protection and defense of the workers and not political entities managed at the discretion of the government.[28]

But whatever chance the UDN had of gaining a significant portion of the labor vote was lost when the famous marmiteiro accusation burst into print. According to the most common version, the Brigadeiro was supposed to have said, "I'm not interested in the lunch-basket (marmiteiro) vote." That the story had no factual base did not prevent it from becoming a cause celèbre, and any possibility of the UDN splitting off the labor vote from Dutra was lost permanently.[29]

In summary, election eve found the Brazilian electorate about to choose between the colorless Dutra, official candidate of the

government, and the respected Gomes, whose campaign had "peaked" early and who had lost most of the magic of his anti-Vargas appeal after the president had been removed from office.

By all contemporary accounts the elections of 1945 were open and honest, and some 5.8 million voters went to the polls. Their preference was stated dramatically and unequivocably--the general over the brigadier. Dutra's victory was the most clear-cut in postwar Brazilian history, with 55 per cent of the total vote.[30] Eduardo Gomes had 34.6 per cent and Iedo Fiúza received almost 10 per cent of the votes cast. Dutra carried all states except Piauí, Ceará, Paraíba and the Federal District.

In the Federal District an interesting phenomenon manifested itself in the returns. Gomes won in the District with 38 per cent of the vote, followed by Dutra's 34 per cent. But the unusual feature of the outcome was the 27 per cent taken by the communist candidate Iedo Fiúza.[31] It is reasonable to assume that many of the Fiúza votes came from trade union members who otherwise would have voted for Dutra. In the voting for federal senator the Federal District also showed a surprisingly independent electorate. The two men elected represented widely divergent positions on the political spectrum: Luiz Carlos Prestes and Hamilton Nogueira. Prestes received a total of 157,397 votes and Nogueira was named by 155,491 voters.[32] Prestes, running on the Communist Party ticket, was also elected to a seat in the federal chamber of deputies, which he declined. The UDN candidate, Nogueira won with the support of the Liga Eleitoral Católica (LEC) or League of Catholic Voters. The LEC was especially strong among women voters, who were expressing themselves politically for the first time on a national

scale in 1945.[33] The communists also elected three candidates to the federal chamber of deputies in the District, one of whom--Prestes--declined, as has been mentioned above, in order to take a seat in the federal senate. Perhaps the biggest surprise, however, came in the contests for aldermen (vereadores) in the Federal District.[34] Of a total of fifty seats the PCB took eighteen, twice as many as the PTB or UDN, both of which elected nine vereadores. Significantly, the PCB won these seats without the appeal of a "big name" candidate like Prestes or Getulio Vargas; Vargas helped elect dozens of candidates in several states by lending his prestige to the PTB slate. On the UDN side, the 1945 election saw the political debut of a young journalist who was to figure prominently in Brazil's political future: Carlos Lacerda, whose 34,762 votes were nearly three times the number taken by any other candidate for alderman.[35]

Although the UDN had lost the presidential race, the party could take consolation in the knowledge that its raison d'être had been fulfilled: Vargas no longer ruled Brazil, though the coalition of politico-economic forces which he had put together had elected his successor. As early as July, 1945, the news had appeared that the UDN planned to remain a permanent part of the political scene by organizing under electoral statutes as a party.[36] Whether or not it bore the rubric officially, there was no doubt the UDN was already a party. In the terminology of Macridis it was a "specialized" party, for it restricted itself to those traditional functions associated with parties in a democracy--e.g., it had mobilized and aggregated consent of millions of voters, albeit in a losing cause; it had nominated candidates, many of whom were elected at all levels of government; it had

articulated the interests of the anti-Vargas forces throughout the country. What the UDN was not was a "diffused" party with a powerful world-view or a doctrinaire ideology. It was not a revolutionary cadre despite its beginnings in a clandestine environment; if it conspired, it was to win votes, not to overthrow the regime. Throughout its existence the UDN would continue in its general pattern as specialized party, though some of its members would occasionally yield to the temptation to resort to a coup in order to undo the unfavorable results of an election.

The results of the congressional voting held concurrently with the presidential election demonstrated the necessity of the UDN's continued existence: the party had become the leading opposition group in the congress. The results (in number of seats held in the chamber of deputies):

PSD	151
UDN	77
PTB	22
PCB	14
PR	7
Others	15

In the federal senate the PSD held twenty-six seats, the UDN had ten, and other parties held a total of six.[37] The União Democrática Nacional patently had been selected by the people to fill the role of the opposition in the PSD-Dutra administration. One of the party's founders and its first historian, Virgilio A. de Mello Franco, stated his views unequivocally in a book published the year following the elections:

> It is difficult to convince [anyone], whoever he may be, that the victory of . . . Dutra was not the last victory of the dictatorship. There does not remain for me, therefore, the least doubt that by collaborating with his government we are collaborating with the remnants of the Vargas consulship and, as a consequence, consolidating it.[38]

Other leaders argued, however, that the necessity of preserving the newly won democracy dictated the party's cooperation with the Dutra government. Among these "conciliators" was Juracy Magalhães, who stressed the obligation of the party to take part in the government in order to insure freedom, further democracy and safeguard fiscal responsibility.[39] In the end, the UDN accepted two cabinet positions under Dutra, one of them that of minister of foreign affairs (Raul Fernandes).

Despite the UDN's major role in the congress and its positions in the cabinet, the party was still "externally created," in the sense Duverger employs the term. That is, it had arisen extra-parliamentarily --from a groundswell of popular sentiment rather than from an informal agreement of legislators which later became institutionalized--and this fact would shape in great part the future course of the UDN. Throughout its twenty-year life the party would find itself facing disputes centering around the question of leadership, with the congressional wing and the national wing seldom seeing things the same way. In the first few years, of course, the party leadership was largely synonymous with its congressional representation, but by the mid-1950's the fight for control between Carlos Lacerda (himself sometimes a member of the chamber of deputies) and the congressional wing had become more apparent, and during Lacerda's term as governor of Guanabara the dispute was public knowledge. Chapters VII and VIII of the present work discuss this point at greater length.

The Second Gomes Campaign

As Dutra's term drew to a close, the UDN found itself divided as to the question of the party nominee to contest the 1950 presidential

election. By the early part of 1950 it became evident that Getulio Vargas planned to run for the office and that the military would offer no impediment to his plans.[40] The UDN was divided into two factions, one of which argued that to beat Vargas it would be necessary to find a modus vivendi with the PSD, the second which felt the party owed Eduardo Gomes another try at the presidency. The latter group held that the conditions in 1945 had been abnormal and that the subsequent return to a more usual state of affairs would produce a Gomes victory. The "temporary conditions" to which this argument referred included vestiges of government control over labor unions and insufficient education on the part of the populace.[41] By 1950, supposedly, those evils had abated.

The other wing of the party felt, however, that Gomes lacked the necessary electoral appeal to compete with Getulio Vargas and attempted to arrive at a coalition with the PSD. One source made the following rather prophetic observation about the schism within the party:

> Regardless of what decision is made, many udenistas predict a gloomy future for their party. There is a strong feeling that the PSD offer of coalition is nothing more than fine talk masking plans to take over the party once an interparty accord is definitely reached. . . .[42]

The complex interparty maneuvers of the first half of 1950 centered around the state of Minas Gerais. The UDN had elected Milton Campos governor of Minas in 1947 and as a result he played a major role in the search for a "Mineira Formula" which would unite the PSD and UDN behind a presidential candidate. Minas Gerais felt it had a right to nominate the next president--based on its size, its wealth and twenty years spent out of power--and politicians within both the

USN and PSD busily sought a means of bringing the two parties into agreement.[43] The First Mineira Formula was the initial attempt by the PSD to resolve the impasse. The PSD of Minas offered four names to the UDN--all pessedistas and all mineiros--and asked the party to choose the most acceptable. The four were all rejected as unviable for lack of popular support in sufficient proportions to confront the threat of Vargas' candidacy. Thus the First Mineira Formula ended in failure.[44]

At a subsequent meeting held in March, 1950, in Belo Horizonte national leaders of the PSD and UDN were still unable to find common ground. Three major splinter groups emerged from the meeting. One offered the name of Nereu Ramos, another insisted on a mineiro, and a third (from São Paulo) wanted a paulista such as Cirilo Junior, president of the chamber of deputies. The meeting adjourned without having achieved a consensus.

Prior to the Belo Horizonte conclave the UDN had put forth a Second Mineira Formula, namely the ticket of Fernando de Melo Viana, federal senator from Minas and a PSD member, and Milton Campos; this was rejected by the PSD. The pessedistas then proffered another proposal: that the PSD, UDN and PTB present a frente única (united front) candidate in the 1950 election. The UDN, however, refused to participate in such a proposal, which in reality had little chance of actualization.

At a meeting of the UDN national directors various propositions were aired regarding possible party standard-bearers. The name of war minister Canrobert da Costa was mentioned, along with others. The backers of Eduardo Gomes, however, pointed out that since March 1 Gomes

had been campaigning openly as candidate of the Movimento Nacional Popular (MNP) and that there was evidence of widespread support for his candidacy. To the negotiation-weary party directors Gomes seemed the best man to maintain a semblance of party unity, and in mid-April the UDN nominated him to run as its presidential candidate in the December elections. Gomes accepted the following day and a national convention to nominate him officially was held on May 12, 1950. The UDN had not nominated a winner, but at least it had avoided a paralyzing schism within the party.

In June Getulio Vargas accepted the presidential nomination of the PTB. The PSD, which still contained many getulistas from five years earlier, chose pro forma a little known candidate from Minas Gerais, Christiano Machado, but it soon became apparent that the real contest would be between Vargas and Gomes.

The popular appeal of Gomes had evidently not grown appreciably during the five years since his first try at the presidency. Although his candidacy and the UDN as a party continued in favor with most elements of the middle class, his popularity with the urban working class had, if anything, diminished since 1945. This was due in part to the thoroughgoing political recruitment carried out among trade union members by elements of the PTB. By 1950 politization of the workers was far more advanced than had been the case in 1945.

There were other factors which made the 1950 campaign a good deal more difficult for Gomes than had been the preceding one. For one thing, Vargas enjoyed immense prestige and popularity not only with the public but also--and more important in the short run--with the political leaders in the various states, many of whom had achieved their

political start under Vargas' dictatorship. The tacit support given Vargas by many PSD members was another plus factor for him and made Gomes' task that much harder. Unlike the latter period of his dictatorial regime, when Vargas' Brazil was part of "that--not very numerous--group of authoritarian states which operate successfully without a government party,"[45] the postwar period was marked by Vargas' reliance upon legally structured party organization to further his political ambitions. Thus both the PTB, which nominated him in 1950, and the PSD, which aided his chances by virtually "going fishing" during the campaign, were of immeasurable help to Vargas in his drive to win democratically the office he had occupied for so long as an autocrat. To be sure, Vargas' popularity was such that in all likelihood he could have won as the nominee of an ad hoc party (witness the small role party was to play in the election of Jânio Quadros in 1960), but his job was made easier by the official or tacit backing of the parties.

Meanwhile, in terms of party image the UDN had during its first five years of existence acquired the epithet of lenço branco or "white handkerchief" which was still current among its detractors in 1965. Lenço branco was a slighting reference to the large number of lawyers and professional men in the party.[46] In addition, the image which Gomes personally projected was less attractive than the kindly, paternal aura which surrounded--and was cultivated by--Getulio Vargas, "o pai do povo" ("father of the people"). Gomes tended to communicate in tones more appropriate to a military review than a political rally, something which had been less noticeable in 1945 when his opponent was also a solider. "The Brigadier at heart was an authoritarian," said

one long-time student of Brazilian politics.[47] The same observer made the following comments on the 1950 presidential election campaign:

> I was shocked in 1950 by the absence of a program of social reform on the part of the Brigadier. I asked him his opinion of the favela [slum] problem in Rio. He answered, "Send them all back to the interior!" Gomes thereafter arranged for others to draw up a social program for him, which he then "advocated" half-heartedly.[48]

As in 1945, the opposition candidate had the support of most of the country's major newspapers, but unlike 1945 the Communist Party ordered its followers to cast blank ballots. (The PCB had been outlawed in 1947.) As the election date approached, in several states an understanding arose between the PSD and the PTB whereby the latter lent its support to a number of PSD gubernatorial candidates in exchange for sub rosa aid to Vargas' campaign in those states.[49] In one state, Pernambuco, a strange alliance came into being between Vargas and the UDN, the party whose very reason for existence was to oppose getulismo. In Pernambuco the PSD refused to drop Christiano Machado and ally with Vargas, whereupon the latter joined forces with the UDN under the leadership of João Cleofas, udenista candidate for governor. "One could hardly have found greater proof of the non-doctrinal character of parties in the economically backward states."[50]

Demonstrating that he had lost none of his characteristic astuteness during the five-year period away from the seat of power, Vargas geared his campaign to the local exigencies and told the people what they wanted to hear:

> In Minas Gerais he was the sober statesman, in Bahia the eloquent disciple of Ruy Barbosa's liberalism, in the Northeast the champion of a crusade against the drought.[51]

Despite a barrage of publicity and propaganda in favor of Gomes which appeared in the mass media--largely sympathetic to the Brigadier--Getulio Vargas enjoyed connections throughout the country which could come only with the exercise of power and the prominence of one who had been in the public spotlight for a decade and a half. Knowing Brazil intimately and sensing where its political mother lode lay, Vargas was able to strike a responsive chord in the people as neither Gomes nor Machado could.

The results of the election were surprising only in their one-sidedness. Getulio Vargas, who five years earlier had left the presidential palace against his will, was the overwhelming winner, with nearly 49 per cent of the total vote; Gomes was a distant second with almost 30 per cent, while Machado polled a mere 21.5 per cent.[52] Since Machado's campaign had not been on a national scale, confined in the main to his electoral redoubts in Minas Gerais, his poor showing was to be expected. He did not carry a single state.

Gomes' Two Campaigns Compared. As Map I shows, in neither election did Gomes demonstrate nationwide electoral strength, and in all but three states (including Minas Gerais, which he won in 1950) Gomes' percentage was less in his second race than in his first. This can be understood in light of (1) the greater popularity of his opponent in 1950 compared to that of his adversary in 1945, (2) the presence of a third major party candidate in 1950 to fractionalize the vote, (3) the greater organizational skill of Vargas as compared to either Gomes or Dutra, especially as seen in the growth of the PTB between 1945 and 1950 and the concomitant rise in trade union strength, and (4) a kind of disillusionment with the Brigadier which distinguished his second



MAP I

THE BRIGADEIRO AS VOTE-GETTER: A Comparative Summary of His Campaigns for the Presidency

State carried by Gomes in 1945 only

State carried by Gomes in 1950 only

State carried by Gomes in both elections

Percentages show increase (+) or decrease (-) in Gomes' portion of 1950 voted compared with that of 1945

campaign from his first; in 1945 he was the hope of a nation weary of war and dictatorship, and the enthusiastic choice of his party, but in 1950 he was a once-beaten compromise candidate.

Although he stumped the country in both campaigns, although he had the support of most of Brazil's major newspapers, and despite the backing offered by his party--these factors notwithstanding, Gomes was unable to overcome two large handicaps in 1945 and 1950. The first was organizational, the second personal.

In 1945 Gomes lost primarily because the in-party PSD had control of the political apparatus which generates support and manifests itself in votes--patronage, state governorships (interventores appointed by Vargas), governmental agencies and bureaus--and because the nationwide political network that Vargas created on the base of state parties was able to function smoothly even without Vargas. Dutra himself was a colorless candidate even compared to the rather strait-laced Gomes, and dissatisfaction was expressed in the PSD with his method of campaigning throughout the race, but nevertheless the ex-minister of war won rather handily. That this was the doing more of the party rather than Dutra himself can be verified by recalling that the PSD won an absolute majority in both houses of congress in the 1945 election.[53]

In 1950 Gomes did not have to contend with the organizational problem just described, for the PSD was a party caught in a schism.[54] On the other hand, it may be supposed that almost any candidate other than Vargas would have lacked the appeal necessary to divide the PSD in so dramatic a fashion. Thus even had Vargas not run in 1950 Gomes would have faced in all likelihood a formidable challenge from a candidate of a united PSD, possibly in coalition with the PTB. When Vargas

chose to run in 1950 he effectively vitiated the organizational superiority of the PSD while simultaneously bringing to bear the machinery of his own PTB and making use of hundreds of informal alliances and friendships scattered throughout Brazil. Furthermore, Vargas enjoyed a charisma which overshadowed the more limited appeal of Eduardo Gomes, hero and sole survivor of the Eighteen of Copacabana.

Had the UDN as a party learned anything electorally between 1945 and 1950? Possibly, although the outcome of the presidential contest does not in itself demonstrate it. Bearing in mind, however, that Gomes was in reality a compromise candidate in 1950 one can conclude that the UDN had indeed learned the important political lesson of cutting its losses; in face of the Vargas candidacy, Gomes emerged as the one man who could carry the party banner without rending the UDN into warring factions. That his campaign was foredoomed was less important than the knowledge that the party would continue intact.

That the UDN had progressed electorally between elections is shown in the results of congressional balloting in 1950. In the chamber the UDN increased its delegation from seventy-seven seats to eighty-one (while the PSD dropped from 151 to 112), and in the senate races held to choose a third senator from each state the UDN captured four seats.[55] Thus the party advanced in terms of congressional representation in spite of a second successive loss by its presidential standard-bearer. Eduardo Gomes had twice rendered meritorious service to his party, and after 1950 he was "retired" to the position of president-emeritus of the UDN, a position which he still held in 1965 when the party ceased to exist.

By this time the nature of postwar Brazilian political life had clearly begun to assert itself. The decline in PSD representation and the rise in seats held by the UDN and PTB pointed to a multiparty configuration instead of a simple two-party competition based on the PSD-UDN axis. As already shown, events as early as the end of 1945 signaled the coming of a multiparty system in Brazil, when numerous splinter elements began to separate from the "united front" which the UDN had hoped to represent in the battle against the heirs of the toppled Vargas regime. After 1950 there could be no doubt that at the very least three parties (PSD, UDN and PTB) would compete for the lion's share of power, with various smaller parties occasionally taking a tiny bit for themselves as well. (In the following chapter there is discussion of the manner in which the multiparty system which emerged was able to accommodate itself to the exigencies of often conflicting desires for the nation's scarce values.)

Vargas' victory was not greeted with resignation in all circles of the UDN. Some elements of the party looked upon the ex-dictator's triumph as the undoing of the very raison d'être of the UDN, which had been formed in 1945 in reaction against the man who had now been vindicated at the polls. Soon after the results of the balloting became clear the UDN began a movement to prevent Vargas from taking office, arguing that the constitution of 1946 demanded an absolute majority of the presidential winner and that in the absence of such a majority of the total vote Vargas should not assume the office. The noted constitutional lawyer Aliomar Baleeiro, a member of the chamber of deputies, led the fight against Vargas.[56] The dispute was appealed to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, which was to meet in December to

decide the issue. But before that body could convene, Carlos Lacerda and other figures of the UDN began issuing statements--obviously aimed at swaying the military--declaring that Vargas planned to reinstate his dictatorship upon gaining power.

The question thus was taken swiftly from the legal to the political sphere, for although Vargas had been elected by the people, it would ultimately be the armed forces which would determine whether he would take office. Both the president, Eurico Dutra, and his war minister had stated their intention to abide by the decision of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), but the power question was still unresolved. Vargas counted with one powerful ally among the generals, Newton Estillac Leal, president of the Military Club.[57] In mid-November Estillac told a meeting of the Club that Vargas would indeed take office as scheduled, "in effect, warning the Tribunal not to honor the juridical arguments of the UDN."[58] When Baleeiro attempted to counter with claims that Vargas had downgraded the army during the Estado Novo he met with a strong rebuff from ex-War Minister Góes Monteiro, the man who had deposed Vargas. It became evident that the UDN could not count on the armed forces to pull its electoral chestnuts from the fire should the party's petition with the TSE fall through.

Meeting in December, the TSE concluded that the 1946 constitution called for a "majority" (plurality) and not an absolute majority of the votes and that Getulio Vargas and João Café Filho were hence president-elect and vice president-elect, respectively.

For its part in the controversy the UDN could count little but a sullied reputation and an undesirable reinforcement of its image as a party of <u>bacharéis</u> (lawyers). Despite the popular adage that "the only

sin in Brazilian politics is losing," there was a widespread feeling that the UDN was trying to use a technicality to deny the people their mandate. Lacerda's attempts to bring in the military to deny Vargas the fruits of victory won him the epithet of golpista (one who tries to instigate a golpe or coup), a term which was to hound him throughout his political career.

Thus began a decline for the UDN which was to last until the party itself ceased to exist. For the next decade the UDN would be unable to find a candidate of sufficient national appeal from within its own ranks to challenge the PSD and the PTB for the presidency.

LACERDA AS COUP-MAKER

Cartoonist Jaguar sees the UDN leader as an unsympathetic figure assiduously cultivating an evil-looking coup-plant

FIGURE I

Not until the emergence of Carlos Lacerda as undisputed front-runner in the 1960's did the UDN nominate for the highest office one of its own.

In the congressional elections of 1954 the UDN suffered reverses in its congressional delegation, dropping from eighty-one seats to seventy-four. This may or may not have been the result of the emotional reaction to the suicide of Getulio Vargas six weeks before; in any case, the gain for Vargas' PTB was small--five seats.

The Távora Campaign

As presidential elections approached in 1955 the UDN found itself without an attractive candidate. After the PSD nominated Juscelino Kubitschek, popular governor of Minas Gerais, and a rump convention of the same party, dissatisfied with the "too liberal" Kubitschek, named Etelvino Lins of Pernambuco, the UDN also endorsed Lins, a former governor of his state but little known outside the Northeast. When Adhemar de Barros, ex-governor of São Paulo, also entered the race the UDN saw that the paulista candidate might draw votes away from Kubitschek and give the UDN nominee a better chance. The party subsequently withdrew its ratification of Lins and nominated General Juarez Távora, a former tenente and anti-getulista. Távora, a member of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), had that group's nomination also, and "his endorsement by the UDN [indicated] that party's fear that its own label lacked sufficient appeal in a national election."[59]

The opposition to Távora was a redoubtable coalition of the PSD, with its electoral strength in the rural areas, and the PTB, with its growing power in the urban centers. Kubitschek had as his running mate João Goulart of the PTB, political protégé of the late Getulio Vargas,

who had committed suicide in 1954. In the UDN pessimism ran high faced with this formidable ticket, and Carlos Lacerda, now a federal deputy, called for a military coup to "reform" Brazilian democracy, thereby furthering his reputation as a golpista.

The election of October 3 pitted the colorful Kubitschek against the moralistic Tãvora and the outspoken Adhemar de Barros. The latter, running on his own PSP ticket, could be expected to draw urban votes from the PSD-PTB coalition, though he himself was conceded small chance in the balloting.

The results were surprising in their closeness. Kubitschek won 36 per cent of the total valid votes, Tãvora 30 per cent, and Adhemar de Barros 26 per cent. Kubitschek's triumph, by slightly more than half a million votes out of 8.6 million valid votes cast, was attributable to his remarkable showing in Minas Gerais, where he led his nearest opponent by 430,000 votes.[60] João Goulart defeated the UDN's Milton Campos for the vice presidency by 200,000 votes.

Noting that the Brazilian Communist Party had endorsed Kubitschek and Goulart, Carlos Lacerda called once again for a military takeover to avoid an election won with Red ballots. His plea for a coup was answered, but it served to insure Kubitschek's taking office, not the reverse. The UDN would have to wait till 1960 for its chance at the top office. . . .

The Quadros Campaign

Jânio Quadros burst upon the Brazilian political scene with a force unrivaled by any candidate since the death of Getulio Vargas. The strange set of circumstances which interwound the fate and future



MAP II

FRIENDS AND NEIGHBORS EFFECT IN THE 1955 ELECTION

State carried by Távora

Távora's percentage of the vote is shown for the states he won.

of the UDN with this mercurial and enigmatic figure represents a noteworthy period in the party's incessant struggle to find a place in the political sun. No discussion of the UDN would be complete without some mention of the relation between Quadros and the party which adopted him as its presidential candidate in 1960 and lived to rue the decision.

Quadros is invariably described by political commentators as having a "meteoric" career in Brazilian politics. For once the overworked metaphor is correct, for a meteor falls rather than rises. The fall of Jânio Quadros was fully as spectacular as his climb to the pinnacle of popularity--and its repercussions for the nation are still being felt. Quadros single-handedly set off the political-constitutional crisis which characterizes the Brazilian scene today. The fact that the UDN had willingly collaborated in his rise to power was yet another factor in the party's declining prestige in the 1960's.

The year 1960 marked the coinciding of Quadros' drive for the highest office in the land and the UDN's dilemma in searching for a suitable person from within its ranks to carry the party banner. In another year the odd alliance which tied a basically conservative party (albeit with not inconsiderable currents of leftist and nationalist feeling) to a political maverick who boasted of his suprapartisan sentiments--in a year other than 1960 such a wedding of political fortunes would not likely have taken place. But 1960 represents a minor watershed in party politics in Brazil.

Public repudiation of the existing political parties was becoming increasingly apparent in Brazil by late 1959. In that year the voters of São Paulo had elected Cacareco, a rhinoceros, to the city council--

an obvious attempt at collective expression of dissatisfaction with the status quo. In a poll conducted less than a month before the presidential elections in 1960, one of Rio's leading newspapers reported that 77 per cent of the respondents said they would rather vote for the vest candidate even if supported by the worst party than vice versa.[61] Furthermore, there were features of a structural nature which precluded any real party answerability to the electorate:

> The electoral laws combined an unusual form of proportional representation with provision for unlimited electoral alliances between parties, features conducive to the extraordinary unaccountability of legislative politics in Brazil. Allowed to pick only one Federal Deputy and one state legislator from a ballot commonly containing several hundred names from the state at large, the voter was already virtually doomed to an irrational choice; the fact that the name appeared on a party list was of little help, since that list might be sponsored by an electoral alliance of up to half a dozen parties, with no indication of the party adherence of the individual candidate. In such a system, each candidate is in a sense campaigning not only against the candidates of other lists, but against those of his own list as well. Once elected, he could switch to still another party bloc in the chamber. Deputies, operating in this system of profound irresponsibility, have been likened . . . to "four hundred Sputniks, each in individual orbits: neither parties nor voters can control them!"[62]

Jânio Quadros, then, appeared to many to be the right man at the right moment; his rise coincided with the decline of the parties, and whatever political group could take advantage of his immense popularity stood to reap great electoral gains. The three major parties had not given the Brazilian public what it wanted and were blamed in greater or lesser degree for the corruption, inefficiency and obstructionism which stigmatized politics in that country.

As a Brazilian writer has stated:

> In 1959 the three major political groupings in the nation, PSD, USN and PTB, found themselves confronted with a great problem, that of offering a candidate in the presidential elections of

> 1960 who would meet the people's demands for economic, political and social renovation.
>
> For the PTB and the PSD the launching of a candidate of that type would not be easy, for both the parties were already participating in the Government, thus appearing before the public as responsible for its administrative acts.
>
> As the the UDN, the problem was practically the same, given the fact that the presence of the PTB and PSD in public life was a consequence of [the UDN's] alienation from the Brazilian economic and social reality since . . . 1945.[63]

In other words, the UDN could not expect to win the 1960 election by default, despite the unpopularity of the PSD-PTB coalition. It would have to present a candidate who offered more appeal to the masses than either Eduardo Gomes or Juarez Távora.

Jânio Quadros seemed to be that man. Jânio da Silva Quadros was born in the state of Mato Grosso in 1917. He spent most of his adult years in São Paulo, where his public life began in 1945 when he was elected city councilman, representing a working-class district and running under the banner of the Christian Democrats (PDC). From that point on Quadros was to devote a decreasing percentage of his time to the practice of law and teaching Portguese and geography in high school--his erstwhile professions--and embark on the road which would culminate in his occupying the Palace of the Dawn in the nation's capital.

In 1950 Quadros was elected state deputy from São Paulo, still under the rubric of the PDC. In 1953, running as a dark horse, he defeated an eight-party coalition, including the state political machine, to become mayor of São Paulo, largest city in South America. One year later he resigned to run for governor of the state of São Paulo, richest and most industrialized of Brazil's political divisions. Again he was taking on, David-like, the Goliath of entrenched

interests and a formidable machine headed by Adhemar de Barros, a veteran politican dating back to the Vargas dictatorship. "His election . . . was another on personality, not party support, since he was the official candidate of only two small parties."[64] At the end of his gubernatorial term in 1958 Quadros ran for and won a seat as federal deputy from the neighboring state of Paraná, representing still another party (the PTB).[65] "His real goal," remarks one authority, "was the presidency, however, and he never bothered to appear in the Congress."[66]

Virtually all sources agree that Jânio had acquitted himself well as governor of São Paulo, fulfilling his campaign promises to "sweep clean" the corruption and waste which had marked previous administrations. His campaign symbol, a broom, was to reappear in 1960 when he once again pledged a thorough housecleaning, this time in Brasília. Many Brazilians agreed that:

> . . . behind the flamboyant exterior there is apparently a powerful capacity for organization. Quadros is generally conceded to have given São Paulo an honest and efficient administration while governor.[67]

The UDN by 1959 had lost three successive presidential elections, twice with its own candidate, once by borrowing a candidate from the PDC (Távora). It had begun to show signs of developing what could be termed an "opposition complex"[68] and badly needed to back a winner. But it was far from a settled question whether such a winner could be found in the ranks of long-time udenistas.

In 1958 Carlos Lacerda had stated his preference unequivocally for a well known name from among the founders of the party:

> The salvation of Brazil does not depend on a man but on the acts of the parties. The problem of the presidential succession must

> be seen in partisan terms. If it depended on me, the candidate of the National Democratic Union . . . would be Sr. Juracy Magalhães.[69]

But a year later the voters' rebellion had begun to manifest itself and it became increasingly apparent that the UDN had no candidate strong enough to attract widespread support on a national basis; it would have to look outside party ranks. Lacerda backed off from Magalhães and stated that "The UDN's road to [the presidential palace] goes first through the home of Sr. Jânio Quadros."[70] From that time onward Lacerda was to be the main advocate of Quadros as UDN nominee for president.

Juracy Magalhães, however, felt that the Quadros candidacy would be counterproductive, if not ruinous, for the UDN. Jânio, he argued, was not a loyal party man--of <u>any</u> party--and he would only serve to split the UDN even further. Certainly there was no lack of evidence to support the contention that Quadros was a maverick who had no desire to tie himself down permanently with party bonds. One source noted that:

> Although Senhor Quadros is nominally a Labor party member, he actually is an independent, who has reached national prominence as a reformer of both the administrative corruption and the financial disorder which plague Brazil.[71]

And another authority stated that "Quadros' political record stood as proof that he could in no way be characterized by party label but was clearly a mugwump."[72]

Juracy Magalhães refused to withdraw his "candidacy to candidacy" and thus plunged the UDN into yet another of its schisms. The issue would perforce be resolved at the national convention, which would officially choose the party candidate for president.

In January of 1959 Quadros received a boost when the National Directorate of the UDN approved his candidacy under strong urging from Carlos Lacerda. This made much more probable the eventual naming of Jânio as standard-bearer of the party, although Magalhães' aspirations still represented a possible source of intraparty dissension.

In April, 1959, Jânio received the presidential nomination of a small party under those banner he had run before, the National Labor Party (PTN). This obliged the UDN to take an official stance vis-à-vis Quadros as candidate, for the PTB had already opted for the candidacy of Marshal Henrique Teixeira Lott, architect of the preventive coup which allowed Juscelino Kubitschek to assume power after his election. For the next six months the UDN would be torn by internal dissent as Carlos Lacerda and José Magalhães Pinto pushed Jânio's candidacy despite the continued opposition of Juracy.[73]

On the 18th of October the PDC nominated Quadros as its candidate for chief executive of the nation, with Fernando Ferrari as his running mate.[74] Quadros was now nominee of three small parties: PDC, PTN and the Partido Libertador (PL). With the organizational backing of a major party like the UDN, Quadros' election was virtually a certainty, given the previously mentioned discontent of the electorate and Jânio's record as reformer in São Paulo. But a UDN divided against itself, even with Quadros as its candidate, could not be an effective vehicle for aggregation of consent. Quadros might win, but for the UDN it could only be a Pyrrhic victory if it furthered the incipient split between pro-Lacerda and anti-Lacerda forces within the party. Thus as the party nominating convention approached, the UDN dilemma became clear: it could nominate a respected partisan figure

(Juracy) and lose, or it could choose a man who termed himself "above parties" (Jânio) and win.

On November 8, 1959, the UDN national convention was held in the Palácio Tiradentes in Rio de Janeiro, in the chamber of deputies hall. The tension of the moment has been recorded by a first-hand observer:

> Within the party, which represented hope for many Brazilians dissatisfied with the politico-administrative leadership imposed by the PSD-PTB axis, would take place [that day] the denouement of a dispute whose result would decide the destiny of the country.
>
> The great hope of the people . . . rested in the person of Jânio Quadros. Anxiety and anguish gripped everyone. Out of that convention would come either the greatness of Brazil, with the victory of Jânio Quadros, or the defeat of the UDN by offering to the people a candidate with few possibilities of defeating the Lott-Goulart ticket and its enormous electoral following inherited from the leader of the working masses, President Getulio Vargas.[75]

UDN national president José Magalhães Pinto, who along with Lacerda had been among the most ardent and influential backers of Quadros, called for the voting to begin at 4:30 p.m. By the time Jânio arrived in Rio from São Paulo less than two hours later, he had already been nominated by the assembled delegates, with 205 votes against the eighty-three for Juracy Magalhães.[76] Chosen as running mate was Leandro Maciel, ex-governor of Sergipe, then Brazil's smallest state.

Juracy, in an action which won the respect of party members throughout the UDN, rose to the occasion and refused to carry the struggle further now that the delegates had expressed their unmistakable preference. In a call for party unity immediately after the balloting he stated:

> I would like to say that I did everything I could to defeat Sr. Jânio Quadros. I made use of all the democratic and loyal weapons at my disposal, but in this instant in which I learn of my defeat, I have left only the hope that the chosen candidate may

make good use of the confidence which the UDN has placed in him.[77]

Pandemonium greeted the nominee when he arrived at the convention hall; after fifteen years of frustration it appeared that the UDN had backed a winner. But the joy was to prove short-lived: on November 27, less than three weeks later, Jânio Quadros withdrew from the presidential race.

The immediate cause of his removing his name from the ballot was Quadros' dissatisfaction with his vice presidential nominees. Maciel, official candidate for the UDN, was little known outside the Northeast and was generally considered rather lackluster. On the other hand, the PDC vice presidential nominee, Fernando Ferrari, was both well known and a proven vote-getter. The leadership of the UDN, however, had no desire to see Ferrari appear at Jânio's side at comícios (rallies) lest he overshadow the colorless Maciel. An impasse between UDN and PDC resulted. Quadros, disturbed at the dissent generated by the question, directed a letter of resignation to the national presidents of the four parties which had nominated him, telling of his decision to withdraw in the face of his inability to unite the parties behind him. If he could not unify the parties, Quadros argued, how could he hope to unite the nation after the election?

A modus vivendi was worked out among the several parties whereby the UDN vice presidential nominee was considered the official running mate of Quadros and the PDC would not take part in Quadros' public meetings, Ferrari conducting his campaign separately.[78] Quadros withdrew his resignation.

It was at this juncture that Lacerda began to argue that Maciel was a liability and endangered Quadros' chances against the Lott-

Goulart ticket. Lacerda proposed the name of Milton Campos, who had been the UDN vice presidential candidate in 1955, collecting 3,384,000 votes. As a former governor of Minas Gerais and a respected figure easily identifiable with the party, Campos offered electoral advantages missing in the little known Maciel.

The touchy question of the relation between Jânio and his two running mates continued until June of 1960 and caused severe interparty disagreement. At one point the Christian Democrat Party threatened to withdraw its support from Carlos Lacerda--himself actively engaged in a race for governor of the newly created state of Guanabara--unless he refrained from his open criticism of Fernando Ferrari.[79]

On June 9, 1960, the National Directorate of the UDN met and replaced Leandro Maciel as the party nominee for vice president, substituting Milton Campos. At that time Lacerda stated that Campos had been chosen because of:

> his proven moral and intellectual courage, his modesty and lack of [selfish] ambition, his fidelity to the democratic cause and the struggle against corruption.[80]

The nomination of Campos did not further good relations between the UDN and the PDC, for the latter rightly feared that Campos might attract votes from Ferrari and allow the re-election of João Goulart as vice president. Certain PDC elements of São Paulo sent up a trial balloon in September testing UDN reaction toward the withdrawal of Campos as candidate, but the reaction was resoundingly negative.[81]

The 1960 presidential campaign is both one of the most interesting national elections in Brazil's period of "experiment in democracy" (1945-64) and the most unlikely configuration of political roleplaying

yet seen in that country's colorful history. In the words of one writer:

> It was difficult to dissipate the feeling that the two chief candidates had by some mischance simply wound up with the wrong parties in the contest. Matched against the fiery vehemence and color of the "conservative" candidate [i.e., Quadros] was Field Marshal Henrique Teixeira Lott supported by the . . . PSD and the . . . PTB. . . . Lott is an elderly, dour, deadly serious figure who radiates discomfort in public appearances. The campaign caricatures and "intimate" press accounts of his life and character seemed bent on painting him as having no spark of human warmth. The were larded with such adjectives as obstinate, moralistic (he neither smokes nor drinks), unbending, uncomplaining, severe, plainspoken, robotlike, somber, rigid. His most endearing personal attributes by all indications were the facts that he is 20 times a grandfather and is fond of roses.
>
> Quadros has built a political career on the basis of a direct appeal to voters of all classes. His supporters believe him to be a fervent admirer of Abraham Lincoln; his critics profess fears that the man is driven by a dangerous Messiah complex . . . Through a candidate of the conservative UDN, supporting free enterprise, a balanced budget, and the creation of favorable conditions for foreign investors in Brazil, he also courted the Leftist and nationalist vote. . . .
>
> The only candidate in the three-cornered race that escaped the schizophrenic pressures of Brazilian politics was Adhemar de Barros. . . . Unencumbered by party or program, he was simply himself, a legally qualified citizen with a firm desire to be president.[82]

The campaign was marked by Quadros' constant effort to aim his appeal directly at the voters, exclusive of party affiliation. Time and again was stressed the fact that Quadros' broom was the symbol of a man, not of any party. His brief resignation, which had forced the capitulation of the UDN, had left it clear for all to see:

> . . . how completely the UDN was dependent upon Quadros; it further dramatized Quadros' political independence for those voters who had come to view the whole party structure with contempt.[83]

Juscelino Kubitschek had enjoyed traditional political popularity; Jânio Quadros had that mysterious undefinable something called <u>charisma</u>.

> Supported almost exclusively for his charismatic style, . . . he used the parties . . . merely as labels . . . or as occasional allies (in his postulation for the Presidency, at which time he joined forces with the . . . UDN).[84]

Possessed of a quality which allowed him to place himself "above" the parties which nominated him, Quadros could enjoy the luxury of taking advantage of the main chance, in whatever form it might present itself. In 1960 it appeared in the guise of the so-called Jan-Jan movement, which urged the voters to split their ticket and vote for "Jânio and Jango." Quadros did nothing to discourage such manifestations of downgrading party affiliation.

The 1960 election was not devoid of issues, but in retrospect it seems that issues played a relatively small role in determining the electoral behavior of the majority of voters.

"Until a few days before the election," states one student of Brazilian politics, "Lott had no program to present to the voters, and not until the last minute was a 'development program' for Brazil released by his advisors."[85] Lott throughout the campaign failed to come down decisively on certain key questions which otherwise might have become pivotal issues. In this respect, however, his chief opponent was also not above reproach. As Bonilla has put it, "There were issues in abundance . . . [but] what was absent was a sharp definition of men or parties on distinctive sides of these issues."[86]

Among the principal issues which marked the campaign were the following: the rampant inflation which had marked the last part of the Kubitschek administration, aggravated by the extremely costly construction of Brasília; corruption, waste and inefficiency at all levels of government, especially the federal; an independent foreign policy for Brazil and the question of nationalism (Quadros made a visit to Cuba

during the campaign, something Lott refused to do); the role of foreign capital, especially U. S. capital, in the future development of the country; the neglect into which education, health services and welfare had fallen; and the lamentable rate of differential growth between regions as well as between industry and agriculture.[87]

Quadros himself argued the need for a balanced budget and the necessity for a favorable investment climate for foreign capital, two points which squared well with the traditional UDN position. But at the same time he pledged to develop the lagging agricultural areas and maintain a high growth rate in the overall economy, difficult feats to achieve without a concomitant rise in the amount of money in circulation--a highly inflationary measure.

Demands of nationalism obliged Quadros to alter his previously stated opposition to Petrobrás, the national oil monopoly. Now he came down firmly against any foreign participation in production and exploitation of Brazilian oil.

> His dynamic campaign style convinced many, including even some nominal Lott supporters who were advocates of developmentalist-nationalism, that his orthodox views on economics were inherited ideological baggage which he would soon jettison.[88]

In the long run, however, Quadros' views on domestic questions of nationalism were far less important than his ideas on the foreign front--i.e., the creation of an independent foreign policy for Brazil.[89]

In face of the conflicting and at times self-contradictory claims made by both sides, it is no wonder that the Brazilian voter tended to vote in 1960--as in other years--more on the basis of personality than on any systematic analysis of the issues. This phenomenon, pervasive

in Brazilian politics, is worth discussing at some length, for it is fundamental to an understanding of the interaction between parties and candidates in the period 1945-65.

Political analysts have long pointed to the importance of the concept of personalismo, the placing of individual loyalty to a political figure above that of organizational loyalty, as fundamental to an understanding of the Latin American system. In Brazil, the mass appeal of Getulio Vargas and the popularity of Juscelino Kubitschek attest to the role of personalismo in the politics of that nation, though both employed the existing party framework (in 1950 and 1955, respectively) in terms far more compatible with tradition than did Jânio Quadros, who dealt with all parties in a rather cavalier fashion. Quadros, it has been said:

> . . . approximated charismatic leadership, which denies in principle all established forms of power. This charismatic leadership is radical, since it is a call to obedience and dedication toward the leader's person.[90]

Throughout his political career Quadros "maintained an arrogant and distant attidude toward the parties and an authoritarian-charismatic position toward the masses."[91] During the 1960 campaign:

> In the eyes of his followers, Quadros seemed to assume miraculous powers. For every problem there was the answer of Jânio's dynamic personality, symbolized by the slogan which preceded him on the campaign circuit: "Jânio's coming!"[92]

The Brazilian electoral system itself bred dependence on the personality of the candidate rather than the party which he ostensibly represented. As already mentioned, the plethora of parties and the ease with which electoral alliances (coalitions) could be formed vitiated any chance the average voter might have of encouraging party responsibility. In addition, there was no provision in the election laws for

party preference statement when the voter registered, thereby making party primaries impossible in Brazil.

> Only the Communist and Christian Democratic parties had a consistent ideology and program. The former was illegal; the latter was still too small to have a broad impact on the electorate.[93]

Since most voters were independents, candidates with strong personalities tended to have an advantage over less colorful politicians, and as a result party affiliation was played down.[94] When there was no suitable candidate from within a party it was quite common to go outside party ranks to seek such a man. The UDN, for example, did so in both 1955 and 1960, and in the latter year the PSD-PTB chose a non-party man as their candidate.[95] Small wonder that, in the words of a noted Brazilian political thinker, elections were little more than "plebiscites" in which the issues were the personalities of the candidates rather than substantive questions of public policy.[96]

Presidential elections were set for October 3, 1960. On the eve of that date, although Quadros was accorded a good chance, the common feeling was that:

> . . . the PSD-PTB alliance, supported by the left, was invincible . . . not only because of the force it had in the large urban centers, but also because of the party structure of the PSD, the great party of <u>coronelismo</u> in the states.[97]

But when the votes had been counted, Jânio Quadros had scored one of the most lopsided victories in Brazilian political history, winning 48.2 per cent of the valid votes. His 5,636,623 total put him far ahead of Lott's 3,846,825 and Adhemar de Barros' 2,195,709 and he carried the major states of São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul and Guanabara.[98]

That Quadros' victory was a personal achievement and not a result of his aligning himself with the UDN can be seen in the results of the race for vice president. The Jan-Jan movement had apparently borne fruit: João Goulart was re-elected vice president.

> This, besides being one more proof that the victory had been exclusively Jânio Quadros', would come to have a fundamental importance in the history of the next five-year period, for it is beyond dispute that if the vice president elected had been Sr. Milton Campos Brazil's history since the resignation of . . . Quadros would have been different.[99]

Campos ran more than a million votes behind Jânio, with 33.8 per cent of the vote compared to Goulart's 36.2 per cent. As evidence that the vice presidential race produced far less interest than the Quadros-Lott confrontation, it is noteworthy that 14 per cent of the votes for the second position were either blank or void.[100]

Once in power, Quadros discovered that charisma, while a formidable tool for winning elections, was no match for the ingrained traditions which obliged each president to fight for the powers which theoretically the constitution vested in the chief executive but which were largely determined by the legislature and/or the bureaucracy.[101] The combined votes of the opposition in congress were more than enough to thwart any program which the new administration might attempt to push through against the wishes of that bloc. It is one thing to be "above parties" when seeking the votes of a disillusioned public; it is another to need the ratification of those selfsame parties for a legislative program.

On July 25, 1961, the congress met in joint session to sustain or overturn Quadros' veto of an important bill, first submitted by his predecessor Juscelino Kubitschek, which would give job security


RIO BRANCO
44.4
terr.
25.8
39.0
AMAPÁ
terr.
8.5
43.4
37.8
AMAZONAS
37.5
14.5
PARÁ
43.8
23.8
MARANHÃO
24.1
15.3
CEARÁ
38.2
37.0
R.G.N.
50.0
36.2
PARAÍBA
46.9
38.2
PERNAMBUCO
43.6
31.4
ALAGOAS
SERGIPE
44.2
41.8
ACRE
48.4
5.1
22.2
RONDÔNIA
13.5
terr.
MATO GROSSO
48.1
38.8
GOIÁS
39.4
29.8
BAHIA
43.6
37.2
40.1
38.6
MINAS GERAIS
45.6
34.0
ESP. SANTO
35.7
32.5
R.J.
GUANABARA
41.8
30.1
SÃO PAULO
52.6
47.0
PARANÁ
49.8
36.9
SANTA CATARINA
43.2
33.4
RIO GRANDE DO SUL
42.8
11.7
*BRASÍLIA
34.3
26.0
MAP III
QUADROS AND CAMPOS COMPARED
Percentages for each, by states, in the 1960 presidential and vice-presidential election
Carried by both candidates
Carried by Quadros only
Carried by neither
Figures show percentage of vote won in each state by Quadros and Campos. Quadros' percentage is always the larger of the two.

(estabilidade) to the employees of NOVACAP, the autarchy responsible for the construction of Brasília. By a vote of 201 to seventy-two, with nine abstentions, the legislators overrode the veto, handing Quadros a humiliating defeat.[102] The UDN, nominally the government party, joined the opposition in large numbers.

Quadros, the man without a party, the overwhelming choice of his countrymen for president, found himself the victim of a pecularity of the Brazilian electoral code. He was forced to deal with a recalcitrant legislature which reflected the political reality not of 1961 but of 1958, the year in which the legislators had been elected. Given the huge mandate accorded him in October of 1960, had Quadros possessed a party machine to which to lend his own immense popularity and had 1960 been a congressional election year, it is quite possible that he could have fashioned a legislative majority or at least the core of a solid coalition, rather than the minority UDN which purported to be the official party and never was.[103] As Quadros discovered, his real power base lay in the conservative middle classes, augmented by those from lower socio-economic groups attracted by his dynamic force of personality. When he began to introduce bills dealing with such politically dangerous topics as agrarian reform, limitation of export of profits and anti-trust legislation,

> . . . the conservative representatives who had supported him began to absent themselves from the chamber of deputies, for it was hard to elect a President and a few days later begin to oppose him.[104]

The trials and frustrations to which Jânio Quadros was subjected during his brief seven months in office are largely beyond the scope of the present study. They include, however, the following: the

reaction engendered by the increased consumer prices resulting from his ending government subsidy on paper, wheat and petroleum; Quadros' quixotic attempt to legislate morality by outlawing cockfights, restricting horse races to weekends and prohibiting bikinis in beauty contests; the elimination of "moonlighting," a near necessity for many civil servants beset by pressures of inflation; and the emotional reaction to his recognition of the Soviet Union and several East European nations, coupled with his awarding Brazil's highest civilian decoration to Ernesto "Che" Guevara.[105]

As Quadros' program diverged more and more from the nebulous but nonetheless emotionally meaningful beliefs of the UDN--centering, for lack of a firmer base, around vague anti-communism--his support by the party which had nominated and elected him became ever more tenuous. Ironically, the UDN, which had taken Quadros into its collective bosom, was to provide the immediate source of his downfall: Carlos Lacerda.

Although Quadros' decorating of Guevara had aroused a furor--including a denial by the military that he had been officially awarded the medal at all, since it was done without the knowledge or consent of the chiefs of staff--his policy of recognizing and soliciting trade with the communist bloc was less controversial, since the president couched his appeal in terms of Brazilian nationalism and economic development. Brazil, he argued, in order to achieve its rightful place in the world must carry on trade with all nations--"material interests know no doctrine," Quadros stated.[106] If this was done, continued Quadros, all Brazilians would enjoy a higher standard of living.

Despite his protestations of sound economic and nationalist interest in establishing diplomatic and trade relations with the communist bloc nations, Quadros met with solid opposition from conservative elements of the Church. Padre Calazans, a federal senator who had supported Quadros during the campaign, cut all ties with the president in an impassioned speech on the eve of the resignation, saying that "Politics is carried out with less whiskey, less cinema, less of other things."[107] From the pulpits of churches rang out denunciations of Quadros' honoring an avowed atheist with the Southern Cross. Lacerda had found an ally in his campaign against the man he had struggled so indefatigably to elect just ten months earlier.[108]

On the night of August 24, 1961, just seven years to the day after the suicide of Getulio Vargas, Lacerda went on television to denounce Quadros. He accused Oscar Pedroso D'Horta, the minister of justice, of planning a coup, which he (Lacerda) had been invited to join. The justice minister strongly denied the charge, although Quadros' own statements at a later date indicated that he had visions of himself as a Brazilian de Gaulle, rising above the meaningless political parties and unifying his country as the ex-general had done in France.[109] It is highly unlikely, however, that the Brazilian congress would ever have given such power to Quadros; only through a coup of some sort, tolerated if not instigated by the military, could such an institutional restructuring have taken place.

The following day, August 25, 1961, Jânio Quadros resigned his office, thus curtailing the developing crisis but plunging the nation into an even greater quandary, one whose end is not yet in sight. The five-year period which came to a close on January 31, 1966, which

would have ordinarily been the final day of Quadros' administration, was to see four presidents, the advent of parliamentarianism, a successful revolution and the extension of Castelo Branco's term for an extra year.[110]

Thus the short, unhappy tenure of the UDN as a party of the government came to an abrupt conclusion. Within a week João Goulart was installed in the presidency and the PSD-PTB coalition was once again in the ascendancy, the System back in power, and the UDN returned to its customary--some would say more natural--position as outsiders and opposition.

Having examined the history of the UDN in its unequal struggle to gain political power, let us now turn to the question of the overall system in which the UDN was obliged to operate, in hopes that analysis will yield a greater understanding of why the UDN could never achieve its goals.

NOTES

[1]It should be noted, however, that the Integralistas, a fascist party headed by Plínio Salgado, disbanded after the war, having been thoroughly discredited by an abortive coup attempt in 1937 and by the defeat of European fascism. Salgado later became leader of the Partido de Representação Popular (PRP).

[2]Nelson Werneck Sodré, História Militar do Brasil (Civilização Brasileira, 1965), p. 254.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Quoted in Sodré, História Militar, p. 255.

[5]November 21, 1963.

[6]E. Bradford Burns, Nationalism in Brazil: A Historical Survey (Praeger, 1968), p. 75.

[7]The best account of the terrorism and coercion which this anti-Aliança effort entailed may be found in Sodré, História Militar, pp. 255ff.

[8]Jordan M. Young, The Brazilian Revolution of 1930 and the Aftermath (Rutgers University Press, 1967), p. 92.

[9]Reported in the Jornal do Brasil of February 3, 1945, p. 5. The news was later confirmed and promulgated to the Brazilian people. The American "scoop" was apparently due to Vargas' desire to make a favorable impression on A. A. Berle, the recently arrived United States ambassador, by emphasizing his devotion to democratic procedures; thus the "leak" to the Times.

[10]Phyllis Peterson, "Brazil: Institutionalized Confusion," in Martin Needler (ed.), Political Systems of Latin American (Van Nostrand, 1964), p. 473.

[11]Jornal do Brasil, February 27, 1945, p. 6.

[12]Campos would later write the First Institutional Act, proclaimed by the victorious revolutionary regime in 1964.

[13]Livro de Atas dos Trabalhos dos Partidos Estaduais e Correntes de Opinião que se Congregaram para Formar a U.D.N. - 1945 -. This is the handwritten book of minutes of the meeting. I was kindly permitted to examine and quote from the book by D. Yolanda Silva Bento, executive secretary of the UDN.

[14]Jornal do Brasil, April 22, 1945, p. 6.

[15]A good résumé of the ideas and influence of the tenentes can be found

in Sodré, História Militar, pp. 198ff. Other good native accounts include Hélio Silva's two works 1922: Sangue na Areia de Copacabana (Civilização Brasileira, 1964) and 1926: A Grande Marcha (Civilizaçao Brasileira, 1965). Robert Alexander's article "Brazilian Tenentismo" (Hispanic American Historical Review, May, 1956) is also valuable, as is John Wirth, "Brazilian Tenentismo in the Brazilian Revolution of 1930" (Hispanic American Historical Review, May, 1964).

[16]José Maria Bello, A History of Modern Brazil, translated by James L. Taylor (Stanford University Press, 1966), p. 246.

[17]After his two unsuccessful tries at the presidency, Gomes became Minister of the Air Force in 1954, retiring in 1961 with the rank of Air Marshal (Marechal-do-Ar). He became Air Force minister again after the 1964 coup.

[18]Jornal do Brasil, June 12, 1945, p. 6. Although women had received the franchise in 1932, the 1945 election was their first opportunity to cast a ballot for president.

[19]Ibid., June 17, 1945, p. 6.

[20]This strikingly descriptive phrase is from Alceu Amoroso Lima, interview of April 13, 1966, in Rio de Janeiro.

[21]Other factions split off from the UDN in 1945 also, though continuing to offer their support to Gomes' campaign. These included the Partido Republicano (PR), Adhemar de Barros' PSP, and Raul Pina's Partido Libertador (PL), according to one of the founders of the UDN. (Interview with José Prado Kelly, October 21, 1965, in Rio de Janeiro.) According to Aliomar Baleeiro, UDN federal deputy from Guanabara, the right wing of the UDN formed the PR while the left wing became the Partido Socialista Brasileiro (PSB), both minor parties in the state by 1965. (Interview of August 31, 1966, in Rio de Janeiro.)

[22]Interview with Alceu Amoroso Lima, April 13, 1965, in Rio de Janeiro.

[23]The name derived from the group's slogan, "Queremos Getulio" (We Want Getulio).

[24]Comprehensive accounts of the last days of the Vargas regime can be found in Thomas E. Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964: An Experiment in Democracy (Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 48-53, and in John W. F. Dulles, "Post-Dictatorship Brazil," in Eric Baklanoff (ed.), New Perspectives of Brazil (Vanderbilt University Press, 1966), pp. 3-12.

[25]Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, p. 60.

[26]For a discussion of the relation between industrialization and nationalism in modern Brazil, see Burns, Nationalism in Brazil, pp. 80-89.

[27]Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, pp. 59-60.

[28]Jornal do Brasil, June 14, 1945, p. 6. In reality it is doubtful whether the sindicatos would desire such "freedom" from government interference as Gomes advocated if it meant simultaneously the loss of governmental paternalism which had fostered the movement through such devices as obligatory deduction of union dues from each worker's paycheck.

[29]According to Aliomar Baleeiro, the marmiteiro slur was the creation of Hugo Borghi, one of the queremistas within the PTB. Baleeiro, like other long-time udenistas, denies that Gomes ever made such a statement or anything resembling it. (Interview, April 10, 1966, in Rio de Janeiro.)

[30]Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, Dados Estatísticos: Eleições Federal, Estadual e Municipal Realizadas no Brasil a Partir de 1945 (Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1950), p. 11. Hereafter cited as Dados Estatísticos: 1945. No other president has ever received more votes than the combined total of his opponents since 1945.

[31]Ibid.

[32]Ibid., pp. 37-38.

[33]According to Hamilton Nogueira, another UDN federal deputy from Guanabara, the party offered one senatorial seat to the LEC and he was named to run for the position. Nogueira, an M.D. and author now in his seventies, is a noted Catholic layman who founded the Dom Vital Center in Rio, an association of Catholic intellectuals. In 1965 he was one of only five UDN deputies who lent their names to the opposition MDB party in order to help provide a structural base for a two-party system after the Second Institutional Act abolished the UDN and all other parties. (Interviews of September 1, 1965, in Brasília, and April 2, 1966, in Rio de Janeiro.)

[34]The Federal District, unlike the states, had vereadores rather than state deputies and a prefeito (mayor) instead of a governor, although the duties of both were similar to those of their counterparts outside the District. In 1960, when Brasília became the national capital, the Federal District was converted into the State of Guanabara and elected its first governor; from 1960 on the vereadores were called state deputies and their unicameral legislative body the Assembléia Legislativa (Legislative Assembly).

[35]Dados Estatísticos: 1945, p. 115.

[36]Jornal do Brasil, July 10, 1945, p. 6.

[37]Dados Estatísticos: 1945, pp. 15, 20.

[38]Virgilio A. de Mello Franco, A Campanha da U.D.N. (1944-45) (Zélio Valverde, 1946), p. vii.

[39]For a first-person account of this question see Juracy Magalhães, Minha Vida Política (José Olympio, 1957), p. 187.

[40]Lourival Coutinho, O General Góes Depõe (Coelho Branco, 1955), p. 496.

[41]These arguments were first espoused by Gomes himself shortly after the 1945 election. See his book Campanha da Libertaçao, published in São Paulo in 1946, for a collection of his speeches during that campaign.

[42]Hispanic American Report (December, 1949), p. 35.

[43]The PSD itself was split in Minas Gerais also, one faction arguing that the party should seek a coalition with the PTB and support Vargas, while the other looked toward an entente with the UDN. (Dulles, "Post-Dictatorship Brazil," pp. 18-19.)

[44]One of the proposed candidates was Israel Pinheiro, later elected governor of Minas Gerais in 1965.

[45]Karl Lowenstein, Brazil Under Vargas (Macmillan, 1942), p. 146. Lowenstein's study is still one of the best treatments of the Vargas government up to 1942.

[46]Interview with Aliomar Baleeiro, April 10, 1966, in Rio de Janeiro.

[47]Interview with Alceu Amoroso Lima, April 13, 1966, in Rio de Janeiro.

[48]Ibid.

[49]For those interested in campaign oratory, Vargas' speeches in the 1950 contest are in his book A Campanha Presidencial (José Olympio, 1951).

[50]Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, p. 78.

[51]Ibid., p. 79.

[52]Dados Estatísticos: 1950, p. 15.

[53]In the chamber of deputies the PSD held 151 of 286 seats; in the senate, twenty-six of forty-two positions. (Dados Estatísticos: 1945, pp. 15, 20.)

[54]However, Vargas did enjoy the support of Adhemar de Barros' PSP, "the strongest and best organized political machine in Brazil, controlling one of the major political centers [São Paulo]." (C. H. Haring, "Vargas Returns in Brazil," Foreign Affairs [January, 1951], p. 311.)

[55]Dados Estatísticos: 1950, pp. 26, 37.

[56]Baleeiro felt that either of two alternatives might be resorted to in order to resolve the problem--either allowing the congress to select the new president, which would have admitted of the possibility of a PSD-UDN alliance to prevent Vargas from taking power, or the scheduling of a run-off election between the top two contenders. The latter choice would of course have afforded little chance to Gomes. (Interview with

[57]The Clube Militar or Military Club is a benevolent and social order for army officers and has its headquarters in a building on Av. Rio Branco in downtown Rio. It has traditionally been the meeting place for "political" generals and the scene of many intrigues. In general, the club's elections are closely watched as an indicator of currents within the military. Air Force and naval officers have their own clubs but their prestige is much less than that of the army officers' group. For a résumé of the activities of the Military Club during the period between October, 1950, and January 31, 1951, when Vargas took office, see Sodré, História Militar, pp. 313-316.

[58]Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, p. 102. Estillac was appointed Vargas' war minister in January, 1951.

[59]Ibid., p. 146.

[60]Dados Estatísticos: 1955, p. 12.

[61]Correio da Manhã, September 23, 1960, p. 1.

[62]Rowe, "The 'Revolution' and the 'System,'" Part II, American Universities Field Staff Reports, pp. 6-7.

[63]Mário Victor, Cinco Anos que Abalaram o Brasil (Civilização Brasileira, 1965), p. 34. Hereafter cited as Victor, Cinco Anos.

[64]Hispanic American Report (December, 1960), pp. 744-745. The two parties were the PTN and the PSB.

[65]At this time there was no provision calling for "electoral domicile" of a candidate to be the same state in which he was seeking office.

[66]Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, p. 188.

[67]Frank Bonilla, "Jânio Vem Aí: Brazil Elects a President," in Robert D. Tomasek (ed.), Latin American Politics: 24 Studies of the Contemporary Scene (Doubleday, 1966), p. 468.

[68]Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic, Political Trends in Brazil (Public Affairs Press, 1968), p. 62.

[69]Quoted in Victor, Cinco Anos, p. 38.

[70]Ibid., p. 39.

[71]New York Times, November 8, 1959, p. 34.

[72]Hispanic American Report (December, 1960), p. 745.

[73]Although Lacerda attempted to placate Juracy with the offer of the vice

presidential nomination, the governor of Bahia showed little interest in the proposal, without rejecting it out of hand.

[74]Ferrari, founder of the small Renovating Labor Movement (MTR), was a native of Rio Grande do Sul and as a PTB federal deputy had been author of important labor legislation, including a law which limited the economic power of foreign firms. Splitting with the Labor Party, in 1958 he was the most-voted federal deputy in the country. He died in a plane crash in 1963.

[75]Victor, Cinco Anos, p. 47.

[76]Ibid. The decision was never in doubt once the voting began. Most of Juracy's support came from the Northeast, his native region.

[77]Ibid., p. 49.

[78]A useful summary of this period can be found in Castilho Cabral, Tempo de Jânio e Outros Tempos (Civilização Brasileira, 1962). Cabral was head of the Movimento Popular Jânio Quadros (MPJQ), the only function of which was to promote the political ambitions of Quadros. Upon assuming power, however, Quadros was to disdain the MPJQ along with other political groups in his attempt to deal directly with the people.

[79]Victor, Cinco Anos, p. 66.

[80]Ibid., p. 67.

[81]Ibid.

[82]Bonilla, "Jânio Vem Aí," pp. 469-470. This remains the best account of the 1960 Campaign in terms of giving a "feel" of the electoral battle which preceded Quadros' impressive victory.

[83]Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, p. 190.

[84]Francisco C. Weffort, "State and Mass in Brazil," Studies in Comparative International Development, Volume II, No. 12 (1966), p. 191.

[85]Reisky de Dubnic, Political Trends in Brazil, p. 103.

[86]Bonilla, "Jânio Vem Aí," p. 473.

[87]Ibid.

[88]Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, p. 191.

[89]Burns, Nationalism in Brazil, p. 94.

[90]Weffort, "State and Mass in Brazil," p. 192.

[91]Ibid.

[92]Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, p. 192.

[93]Reisky de Dubnic, Political Trends in Brazil, p. 103.

[94]For an example of this, see below (Chapter VIII) how the gubernatorial election in Guanabara in 1965 was marked by a constant non-reference to his partisan affiliation by the UDN candidate.

[95]This is not to imply, however, that Lott was by any means a colorful or dynamic candidate (he was not). It is meant to point out the fact that from within the PSD-PTB ranks in 1960 there was no person with national stature who possessed the desirable traits already enumerated.

[96]A. A. de Mello Franco and Raul Pila, Presidencialismo ou Parlamentarismo (José Olympio, 1956), p. xxiii.

[97]Jornal do Brasil, January 30, 1966, p. 12.

[98]Dados Estatísticos: 1960, p. 13.

[99]Jornal do Brasil, January 30, 1966, p. 12.

[100]Dados Estatísticos: 1960, p. 13.

[101]For a discussion of the System and Quadros' efforts to overcome it, see below, pp. 92-93.

[102]Victor, Cinco Anos, pp. 203-209.

[103]Of course some will contend that the constitutional provision for staggered elections is a deliberate attempt to prevent just such a charismatic-populist manifestation as the Quadros phenonmenon from gaining control of both branches of the government simultaneously and is therefore a legitimate safeguard. The argument fails to take into account, however, that Brazilian history has demonstrated many instances of the need to safeguard the free expression of the people from elitist and other minority elements which have sought to overturn it through coups; to date there have been relatively few examples of the abuse of power gained through free election, then used to curtail civil liberties and personal freedoms. In any case, it is undeniable that the staggered election system allowed a balky congress to frustrate the legislative program of even such a highly popular president as Quadros and that at times--such as the parliamentary period under Goulart (September, 1961, to January, 1963)--an impasse developed whereby virtually no legislation of consequence was passed.

[104]Jornal do Brasil, January 30, 1966, p. 12.

[105]Jânio Quadros and A. A. de Mello Franco, "O Porquê da Renúncia," Realidade (November, 1967), p. 29.

[106]Jânio Quadros, "Brazil's New Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs (October, 1961), p. 19. This article was written and Quadros approved the English translation prior to his leaving office.

[107] Victor, Cinco Anos, p. 294.

[108] Though an analysis of Lacerda's motives in heading the opposition to Quadros--whether through personal conviction, anger at having been cut off from access to federal decisionmaking processes, honest fear of the president's seeming drift toward accommodation with the communist bloc, or simply opportunism in sensing an issue on which his own ambitions could be furthered at the expense of Quadros--though such an analysis is beyond the scope of this study, it should be pointed out that Lacerda's moves did not meet with unanimous approval even within the moderate wing of the UDN. Magalhães Pinto, for example, stated just a day before Quadros' surprising exit from the political scene that he felt it "dangerous" for responsible public figures like Lacerda to cast "intranquility and suspicion on the constituted authorities" and that in its last convention the UDN had voted in favor of the Quadros policy, including its foreign aspects. "I consider the international orientation of President Jânio Quadros correct," concluded the governor of Minas Gerais. (Quoted in Victor, Cinco Anos, pp. 295-296.)

[109] See pp. 92-93 for Quadros' own version of what his intentions were and how the resignation was necessary to achieve them.

[110] Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, pp. 202-204, analyzes the reasons behind the eagerness of the congress to accept Quadros' resignation despite the unpalatable alternatives of chaos, Goulart in the presidency or military takeover. He contends that, although the anti-Quadros opposition had not yet crystallized, the chief executive had antagonized several important elements in the political equation, including the traditional politicians, the bureaucracy, the industrialists and merchants, the labor leaders, the military officers and even the UDN itself.

CHAPTER III

THE BRAZILIAN POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM: 1945-65[1]

By the time of their extinction as political entities in October, 1965, the Brazilian parties--or at least the three major ones--had achieved a kind of uneasy equilibrium, but not a degree of stability which could prevent recurring crises within and between the groups. Some parties tended to live from crisis to crisis, according to their critics, while others were able to maintain a continuity of personnel, leadership and orientation over relatively long periods.

By 1955, the year of Juscelino Kubitschek's election as president of Brazil, one could discern several patterns of regional support for the three large parties--PSD, UDN and PTB. In the following years these trends continued in most of the states, although extraneous factors such as intraparty disagreements and local personality clashes could and did affect the result of a given election at either state or local level.

The Relation Between Economic and Political Development

Brazilian party politics--and the outcome of elections--can not be interpreted nor understood on a simple monolithic basis. Rather, analysis must take into account the complex interplay between economic and social forces in the various regions of the nation and the effect they have on partisan strength. Although some authorities have argued that

there are in reality "two Brazils,"[2] one can make a sound case for dividing Brazil into three categories based on the regions' stage of economic development. The three stages are: (1) the traditional, (2) the "take-off," (3) the mature and developed.

Applying these designations to the several geographic regions of Brazil one finds that the first, or "traditional," stage encompasses the northern states, the Northeast, most of the Central-Western area and part of the backlands of the Central-Eastern area. (See map on following page.) About 40 per cent of the population lives in this region.

The portion comprising the "take-off" area includes the major part of the Central-Eastern plus the zone around Recife in the Northeast. Roughly 25 per cent of the people of Brazil are found in this area.

The third area, that of "mature development," consists of the southern states (Paraná, Santa Catarina, Rio Grande do Sul), São Paulo and its zone of influence (mostly in the southern part of Mato Grosso), and the industrial area centered in Belo Horizonte in the state of Minas Gerais. This third region claims approximately 35 per cent of the population.

Of particular interest for the purposes of the present study is the pivotal position occupied by the Central-Eastern region.

> The spinal column of the system of the three areas is represented by the Central-Eastern region, in the take-off stage [etapa de despegue hacia el desarrollo], halfway between the stagnation of the traditional zone and the rapid growth of the southern zone.[3]

As will be shown, the take-off stage is a difficult one for a society or region, possessing neither the negative stability of stagnation nor

MAP IV

"THE THREE BRAZILS": Regional Differentials in Economic Development

Traditional stage

"Take-off" or transitional stage

Mature and developed stage

(Based on Jaguaribe, "Las Elecciones de 1962 en el Brasil")

the coveted equilibrium attained by the fully developed economy. Some of the political manifestations peculiar to such a system will be discussed in Chapter V, when the politics of the state of Guanabara is analyzed.[4]

In the three areas there arises a political configuration independent of party, assuming one of four forms. These four currents are "seignorial conservatism, clientelism, national-progessiviam, and liberal conservatism."[5] The relation between the stage of economic development and the prevailing political orientation in Brazilian states is striking, although no perfect correlation exists.

Seignorial conservatism, the dominant political current in such rigidly stratified areas as the cane-producing regions of the Northeast and the grazing regions of the Central-Western states, is found in decidedly underdeveloped, tradition-oriented societies (or subsocieties). Rural in character, these societies are run by an agricultural or cattle-raising oligarchy concerned primarily with maintaining the status quo and its own favorable position therein. In such localities there has been declared an unofficial moratorium on social change. This pattern of politics, once fairly common in the pre-1930 period, came to assume far less importance after the revolution which brought Getulio Vargas to power, and by the end of World War II and the advent of the new political parties it was found only in the limited areas mentioned above.[6]

Clientelism, while not truly a political or social ideology, expresses itself in Brazil through

> . . . pragmatic mobilization, without another deliberate feeling which transcents the pure business of politics, of the groups

> [solidaridades] founded in interests which require the exercise of power in order to be attended to.[7]

A further definition of clientelism would include the idea of

> . . . personal rulership on the basis of loyalties that do not require any belief in the ruler's unique personal qualifications, but are inextricably linked to material incentives and rewards.[8]

Although clientelism works well in a stratified society, it is more common in less rigidly structured societies than those characterized by seignorial conservatism, for it assumes the existence of a directing elite with some organizational and recruiting talents. The modus operandi of clientelism is patronage, commonly termed empreguismo in Brazil, an economic force of great potential in an underdeveloped area.[9] Clientelistic politics was the most common type found in Brazil from 1945 to 1965, prevailing in all three major parties in the traditional economic areas and in two of the three (PSD and UDN) in take-off areas. It was only in the fully developed economic regions that other modes predominated in all three major parties (see below).

Despite the clientelist current preponderant in both the PSD and UDN in take-off areas, in overall terms of ideological influence within these areas a third current must be considered--national-progressivism. A more ideologically based source of political action than either of the previously discussed forms, it is a rather broad school of thought ranging "from the several modalities of socialism to the diverse forms of progressivist capitalism."[10] For nearly a decade (1955-64) the "thought center" of developmentalist nationalism was the Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros (ISEB), or Higher Institute of Brazilian Studies. Established in 1955 by the central government, the ISEB offered courses and carried out investigations dealing with economic

development.[11] Among the distinguished faculty were Cândido Mendes (author of Nacionalismo e Desenvolvimento--Nationalism and Development), Hélio Jaguaribe (who wrote O Nacionalismo na Atualidade Brasileira--Nationalism in the Brazilian Present) and Nelson Werneck Sodré, whose output in fields from history to literary criticism must be termed prodigious. One of the self-appointed tasks of the ISEB was to formulate an ideology of nationalism for Brazil, and this led to a split in the ranks of the faculty which eventually divided both the ISEB and the nationalist movement. Basically, the question resolved itself into one of means rather than ends; the moderates such as Jaguaribe felt that development could best be achieved by judicious use of foreign capital with suitable controls, while the radical nationalists felt that only a socialist orientation with nationalization policies could meet the country's needs. After 1959 the radicals, led by Sodré, gained the upper hand in the ISEB, which led to the resignation of such moderates as Jaguaribe and Cândido Mendes.[12] The more extreme elements in control from 1959 on were to give the ISEB a far-leftist coloration which some critics termed communist-influenced, and it caused small surprise when the organization was dissolved following the 1964 revolution. Later a politico-military inquiry board (IPM) investigated the ISEB and arrested some of its leading figures for "subversion."[13] The National Student Union was another body abolished after the coup of 1964 for alleged subversive activities. Since 1964, therefore, the national-progressive elements in Brazil have been largely without a spokesman, though most politicians claim to be nationalists and many make appeals to nationalist sentiment.[14]

The unifying factors in the divergent wings of the national-progressive school are nationalism, development and social reform, with the first of these generating the greatest degree of consensus since it is the force which most readily cuts across class lines. Development is the major concern of the bourgeoisie and of the right wing of the national-progressivists because

> For the proletarian class pure and simply development is only admissible as a condition and prerequisite to which it aspires immediately, social reform, the slogan under which the left wing of national-progressivism mobilizes itself.[15]

In other words, the ends (development) for the right-wing branch of national-progressivism become the means in the view of the left wing, and vice versa. Conversely, social reform is acceptable to the conservatives within this school of thought so long as it lends itself to more rapid and far-reaching expansion of the economy--i.e., development.

The final current of thought characterizing the Brazilian political milieu of 1945-65 was liberal-conservatism, which dominated in the economically mature parts of the country. Those states like São Paulo which seem to have found the magic formula for continued economic growth are, quite naturally, the ones most concerned with safeguarding it from external and internal threats. From this arises a commitment to representative institutions as a guarantor of individual civil and property rights, and pro-democratic sentiment marks both the large middle class and the rather prosperous working classes, both of which have a vested interest in maintaining the system which has satisfactorily provided them with an ever rising standard of living. As one writer has stated, "[industrial] workers . . . a privileged place with

respect to the overall urban popular masses of the country."[16] Both authoritarian modes of life and socialistic alternatives have little appeal in states with a mature and developed economy, and those adopting a liberal-conservative position are noted for their vociferous opposition to communism. Cosmopolitism and a commitment to free enterprise are further features of this ideological current, shared by both middle class and workers.[17] Surprisingly, workers in the southern states of Brazil--especially in São Paulo--were notably indifferent, even hostile, to class-based appeals, and it was in the take-off areas--in particular in the urban centers such as Rio and Recife--that such efforts to evoke class feeling among operários met with the greatest success.[18]

In summary, the Brazilian economic reality--a three-fold division into traditional, take-off and mature areas--gives rise to four basic adaptive modes or currents (some of which can be termed ideological), operating independently of the political parties.[19] Yet the parties must deal with each current on a state level and attempt to reach an understanding based on the givens of the political microcosm. The disparity between ideological currents and party organization has long been noted by students of the Brazilian scene, and the result of the separation of the two planes was a type of regional differentiation of party along the lines already mentioned. Specifically, it meant that the UDN in a traditional state like Ceará would in all likelihood contrast sharply with the UDN of a developed state such as Santa Catarina, São Paulo or Rio Grande do Sul. Study of the several state UDN groups shows this to have been the case in the majority of instances.

Map V on the following page shows this relation in graphic form. It can be seen that the UDN tended to take on a clientelistic form in most of the nation, but in the industrialized South the party assumed a liberal-conservative stance in keeping with the general political outlook of the area. That this adaptive process was not an isolated phenomenon peculiar to the UDN is evident in the posture of the other two major parties, for the PSD was also clientelistic in the traditional areas and liberal-conservative in the developed states. The PTB, generally felt to be the most ideologically oriented of the three large parties, was basically clientelistic in the traditional zones but national-progressive in the take-off and mature areas.[20]

Emergence and Predominance of the "System"

Within this framework of economic development of a three-fold nature, the actual day-to-day workings of the party system unfolded, parties acting and interacting as each attempted to maximize its political advantage. The balance of power which evolved in postwar Brazil among the contending political parties was complex, flexible and tenacious.[21] Dating from the Vargas dictatorship, it continued through the rule of every president from 1945, close of the fifteen-year rule of Getulio Vargas, to 1965, when the parties on which the delicate balance depended were extinguished. With impersonal obstinancy it resisted the efforts of even the popular and charismatic Jânio Quadros to change it. The pragmatic (as opposed to "ideal" or "theoretical") interaction of political and economic forces which shaped the Brazilian answer to "who gets what, when and how" has been called by one observer "the System," a useful term which will be employed in the present analysis. As a model of the politico-economic



MAP V

PREDOMINANT CURRENTS IN THE STATE UDN PARTIES (c. 1965)

L liberal-conservative

C clientelistic

S seignorial conservative

N national-progressive

* territory--not included

** not included because UDN was not organized in Acre

arena during the period from the Estado Novo to the military coup of 1964, it helps render comprehensible a complex era in Brazil's "experiment in democracy."[22] Though the União Democrática Nactional never occupied a central position in the System--indeed the UDN had to fight the System incessantly during most of its two decades of existence--it is important to understand how the System operated so that the UDN's customary place as "outsider" can better be appreciated. First of all, despite the dominant position occupied by the PSD in the System, that party was not hegemonic as LaPalombara and Weiner use the term. (See Chapter I.) The electoral alliance between the PSD and the PTB was a powerful instrument in generating votes, but it was not invincible. On occasion the UDN--or even an independent such as Jânio Quadros--would defeat the machine. In the state of São Paulo the alliance was overpowered by the organization of the PSP and Adhemar de Barros. Nevertheless, the System worked often enough to cause the UDN not infrequently to call for a reshuffling of the political cards--i.e., military intervention such as followed Kubitschek's victory in 1955. Whether the UDN would have joined the System had it been invited is a moot question--the age-old antipathy which separated it from the two "tainted" creations of Getulio Vargas made such an accommodation impossible. According to some, it was despair at ever overcoming the System which convinced the party to nominate Jânio Quadros in 1960 instead of a candidate from the udenista ranks, such as Juracy Magalhães.

Basically the System arose during the latter stages of Getulio Vargas' long rule, specifically after his corporatist state based on the Italian Fascist model was given juridical existence through the

constitution of 1937--though technically the document never received the necessary ratification because a plebiscite was never held to allow the public to accept or reject it. The System was Vargas' means of allowing limited accomodation or realignment--and thus providing an escape valve--within the existing framework of mutually recognized power contenders[23] while forestalling social and political reform of a fundamental nature. Always informal and non-institutional, the System turned on two techniques: anticipation and co-optation.[24] By anticipating the demands of a potential political opponent and offering concessions before the issue was joined, Vargas was able to undercut the adversary's position. Thus by bending like the willow rather than resisting like the oak, Vargas could maintain the upper hand at the relatively small cost of "generally limited and formalistic" concessions.[25] The second technique, co-opting individuals or even entire parties from the opposition, is far from unique to Brazil, but the pervasiveness and effectiveness of the practice can be seen in the (ideologically) unlikely coalition between the PSD and the PTB which held the electoral balance of power for almost two decades. It was this union of strange bedfellows which Carlos Lacerda dubbed "an alliance between the traders and the ragged."[26]

Vargas was able to engineer the establishment of the System by avoiding a confrontation between the various power contenders thanks to his policy of giving with one hand while taking with the other. Thus, for example, the "semi-revolution" of 1930 was able to transfer the major voice in the decisionmaking process from the traditional agrarian sectors to the new emerging industrial centers; in like fashion Vargas was later able to foster the rise of an urban labor union

movement without awakening the wrath of the industrialists. "Paternalism was ingeniously transplanted from the countryside to urban, middle-class, and industrial activities."[27] Governmental activism in the economic sphere marked Vargas' accommodative methods: agriculture was kept content by subsidization of coffee prices, while manufacturers enjoyed a protective tariff on many of their products. Urban workers won a host of unions without struggle, presented to them through government fiat, but unions which did not act as agents for collective bargaining--for this would have alienated factory owners and middle class consumers--but rather as social welfare organizations, intermediaries in the paternalistic relation between state and worker. Yet while urban operários[28] were achieving these gains, their employers were placated by the fact that a single nationwide confederation of unions similar to the AFL-CIO was not established, though this could easily have been done during the period in which Vargas ruled by decree.[29] And while urban labor was unionized through government initiative, agricultural workers were pointedly excluded from labor legislation and no attempt was undertaken to foster their organization; thus were landowners kept satisfied during the Estado Novo despite agriculture's drop in income vis-à-vis the other sectors of the economy.[30]

After Vargas fell from power in 1945, the System did not disappear; it became more firmly entrenched and even institutionalized. Though the Estado Novo was abolished and free elections returned after fifteen years' absence, the System continued to anticipate and co-opt. One of the major features of Vargas' labor legislation, the Consolidation of Labor Laws (C.L.T.) was maintained intact. The C.L.T. provided

for an eight-hour day and minimum wage (which varies from state to state) and created the union tax, a check-off device whereby each worker--union member and non-member alike--pays one day's wages to the union. But the trade union movement in the post-Vargas period continued a handmaiden of government, and

> . . . by 1963, twenty years after the C.L.T., there were only about 1,500,000 organized workers in 1,800 unions, out of a work force of around 25 million. Above all, the exclusive, government-sponsored brokerage unionism of the C.L.T. stifled opportunities for an independent labor movement to arise in Brazil.[31]

The redemocratization of Brazil did not make the System obsolete; rather it

> . . . added features to the formal liberal-democratic structure which in practice almost guaranteed the viability of an informal substructure in the hands of dominant interest groups. . . . The electoral laws combined an unusual form of proportional representation with provision for unlimited electoral alliances between parties, features conducive to the extraordinary unaccountability of legislative politics in Brazil.[32]

Confusion resulting from being allowed to vote for one congressional candidate from a list of hundreds, coupled with the fact that any one aspirant might be backed by an array of parties sufficient to make his own partisan affiliation invisible, make the Brazilian chief executive truly the only politician with a "national constituency."[33]

The president, then, served perforce as a focal point for those elements outside the System who desired something more than politics as usual in light of the tremendous challenges confronting Latin America's largest nation. The president therefore became a rallying point for those who demanded <u>reforma de base</u>--basic reform--and every chief executive after Vargas ran on a platform more or less reformist in nature. But an activist president must soon run aground on the

rocks of a legislature founded on the System--if he attacks it frontally. Juscelino Kubitschek (1955-60) implemented his "developmentalist" plans to give Brazil "fifty years of progress in five" by going around the System:

> Kubitschek preferred to work outside the regular bureaucracy and party channels, creating new autarchies and administrative devices to get things done, and thus avoiding the immobilism of the "System" without confronting it.[34]

But Kubitschek also left the System virtually as he found it, attempting no fundamental restructuring of the power contenders.

Jânio Quadros, elected in 1960 on the strength of his pledge of "a clean sweep of corruption, favoritism, and inefficiency in government,"[35] discovered to his regret the system impenetrability of an obstructionist congress when he took office in 1961, and it led to his downfall. Explaining in an article of his own authorship why he resigned the presidency, Quadros indirectly indicted the System:

> Jânio Quadros became convinced, then, that truly there was at work a fundamental contradiction in the institutional system: on one hand there was the way of the Presidency of the Republic; on the other, the organized legislative power expressed by the political parties. A President who aspired to link himself effectively to the people had to direct himself necessarily to the same people in a true plebescite, above the parties fragmented by their impotence to galvanize the great political and social necessities and for that very reason destitute of program. . . . [For] while the presidential election was by plebescite, universal, direct and secret, . . . the Legislative branch was atomized by the proportional party vote, lacking a national program. In these conditions, upon taking office, if the President wished to propose profound reform legislation he would find, inevitably, a Legislature subdivided into theoretically national parties, but in practice multiplied or splintered in their regional, state or municipal expressions--stamped with personalist claims.
>
> Quadros' reasoning was the following: first, the resignation; second, the succession gap would open--given the fact that the military forces would not allow João Goulart, then far away in China, to take office, and therefore the country would be headless; third, either there would arise a formula through which

> he himself would emerge as [holder of a clear mandate], but within the new institutional setup, or else, without him, the Armed Forces would take it on themselves to establish that new regime, it falling to some other citizen . . . to preside over the country under a new, viable and operative scheme. Since, after all, what mattered was institutional reform, not the individual or individuals who promoted it, whether he sacrificed himself or not, the essential would be attained.[36]

As events subsequently proved, Quadros' reasoning was less than wholly accurate, but his analysis of the impasse created by legislative-executive conflict is sound. As Rowe has put it:

> A basic problem of any Brazilian president is simply that of gaining effective control of the Federal machinery, even if he has a large electoral mandate and personal charisma. The "System" has built-in methods of keeping the President relatively impotent in spite of the impressive powers vested in him by the Constitution.[37]

With his resignation Quadros thrust Brazil into a constitutional crisis which continues to the present. Contrary to his expectations, the System survived his leaving office, but Quadros had set in motion a process which was to bring about the downfall not only of the System but of the democratic institutions which had marked political intercourse for twenty years.

Although when João Goulart (popularly known as Jango) took office it appeared that the System had been restored after seven months of the Quadros interregnum, Jango was to prove himself incompetent to juggle the many elements which made up the System. The internal strains which had characterized the System since its inception culminated in the three-year period of tension and directionlessness ended by the coup of March 31, 1964. Runaway inflation, unfavorable balance of payments, wage demands, suspicions of communist infiltration, unauthorized strikes and finally Jango's countenancing a sit-down mutiny by sailors--all these contributed to the breakdown of the System. At the end,

> The "System" of conciliation, payoff, and pure maneuver--barren of ideas or convictions regarding national purpose--could no longer govern, even by doing nothing.38

The military takeover which ended the Goulart regime affected the totality of the party spectrum, needless to say, but in the initial stages--i.e., until October, 1965, and the Second Institutional Act--the UDN suffered far less than any other major party. The major role that party leaders such as José Magalhães Pinto and Carlos Lacerda played in persuading the armed forces to intervene made the UDN the natural beneficiary of the coup which overthrew the PSD-PTB coalition whereby Goulart ruled and the PSD "conciliated."39 In the wave of cassações (cancellation of political rights) which followed the revolution of 1964, congressmen, judges and other officeholders lost their mandates for alleged "subversion" or "corruption." Although all parties of the "Big Four" (PSD, UDN, PTB, PSP) suffered from the purge, "the PTB was by far the hardest hit."40 The UDN escaped very lightly in both this and subsequent purges, and it was not until the Costa e Silva regime that it lost a truly national figure to cassação: Carlos Lacerda.41

The military regime soon discovered that it is more difficult to manage a nation's economic, social and political progress than it is to overthrow an unpopular president. First item on the agenda was what was termed "political pacification" of Brazil by the establishment of a parliamentary majority--or failing that, a workable plurality--once the so-called "repressive" stage of the revolution had passed. (See the ironic comment by cartoonist Fortuna, following page.) After the expiration of the Institutional Act which had empowered the

FIGURE II

"The repressive phase is over. Now we're in the constructive phase."

revolutionary government to suspend political rights and exercise wide discretionary powers, a modus operandi must be found whereby the Castelo Branco administration could wield power in at least a semblance of democratic fashion. For this a legislative base would be needed; in short, a "party of the revolution" had to be created.

The only possible sources of the support needed for such a group were the PSD and the UDN. The PTB had been reduced in strength through the Institutional Act, and the resentment within Labor Party ranks as an aftermath of the revolution and its subsequent anti-PTB measures (as seen by Party leaders) precluded large-scale adherence among PTB followers to any political organization designed to buttress the revolutionary regime. No "party of the revolution" could count on the numerous small parties which made up the minor congressional delegations, for they were both few in number and diverse in ideology--hardly a base on which to form a solid foundation of allegiance. Thus by a process of elimination, the PSD and the UDN came into sole consideration.

The Partido Social Democrático was unacceptable to the military rulers for several reasons, but ideology was not one of them. As any observer of Brazilian politics is aware, the chief difference between the PSD and the UDN was not one of ideology, not even at the time of the parties' formation in 1945. In the interior states the landowners had opted for one of the two parties largely on the basis of their pro- or anti-Vargas feelings,[42] and nothing since 1945 had occurred to polarize the two parties--unlike the UDN-PTB polarization in states like Guanabara. Both the PSD and the UDN would have been ideologically satisfactory as the nucleus of a party of the

revolution.[43] The trouble with the PSD lay elsewhere than in its officially stated set of beliefs: the party was inextricably tied up in the public mind with the old order (the System) which had been ousted on March 31, 1964. Not only was the PSD felt by many to be the perpetual party in power--it had, after all, continued in office despite the fall of its founder, Getulio Vargas, in 1945--but its past record of willing collaboration with the PTB weighed heavily against it. The frequent PSD-PTB coalitions in many states placed both parties at sword's point with the UDN, clearly marking the latter as the opposition party to the pre-1964 regimes. To allow the PSD, then, to serve as the mainstay of the party of the revolution would open the military rulers to justifiable cries of betrayal from those who looked to it to establish a new order--i.e., to destroy the System.

There was yet another powerful reason which prevented the PSD from fulfilling the role of handmaiden to the revolution. A ghost walked the land, and until he was exorcised there would be no end to the misgivings within the hard liners of the military. The phantom which disquieted the army was Juscelino Kubitschek, at that time over 5,000 miles away on a lecture tour through the United States and Europe. Though JK had lost his political rights in the post-revolution purges, he was still an electoral force to be considered. He himself could not run, but his followers had not disbanded.[44] If the PSD were asked to form the core of the new party, it was conceivable that a condition of its agreeing to do so would be amnesty for Kubitschek, who still had many adepts within the PSD. A Kubitschek restored to full political efficacy would be a tremendously strong magnet attracting those who were demanding direct election of Castelo's successor in

1966, and there could be little doubt that Kubitschek would be the favorite in such a contest. Even if the PSD did not impose restoration of Kubitschek's political rights as a quid pro quo, the central place that the PSD would occupy within revolutionary ranks would still serve to fortify JK's bargaining position. For these and other reasons, therefore, the PSD was out. The party's support would be welcome, but not as a sine qua non of the party of the revolution.

Thus it was, almost by default, that after twenty years in the political desert, the UDN entered the Promised Land of power. Though in the past the party had occupied various ministries in PSD administrations and had in general collaborated rather than obstructed, it had always been looked upon--with some notable exceptions such as the governor of Guanabara--as "the loyal opposition." In 1965 the União Democrática Nacional achieved a dominant position in congress for the first--and last--time.

On March 25, 1965, the new grouping was installed in Brasília. The name chosen for the organization was the Bloco Parlamentar Revolucionário (BPR), or Revolutionary Parliamentary Bloc. Within the BPR each party was allowed to keep its identity and organizational setup. In a speech to BPR congressmen President Castelo Branco marked the occasion as "a great event not only for the revolution, but also for parliamentary history in Brazil."[45]

Of the 184 members of congress officially joining the BPR, the breakdown by party was:

UDN.....87
PSD.....48
PSP.....16
PDC.....11
PTN.....10

PRP.....4
PR.....4
PST.....1
PRT.....1
PTB.....1
Unaffiliated.....1

Of the Guanabara delegation, five of the six UDN deputies--Adaucto Cardoso, Aliomar Baleeiro, Arnaldo Nogueira, Cardoso de Menezes and Hamilton Nogueira--joined the BPR, with only maverick Amaral Neto holding out.[46] In addition, another twenty-two members of the PTB indicated their intention to buck their party and affiliate themselves in the near future. This brought the total membership to 206, but the UDN faction within the Bloco was still larger than the combined total of PSD and PTB. All told, udenistas made up over 40 per cent of the incipient party of the revolution.

Noting that all but half a dozen UDN deputies had joined the as yet unofficial BPR--it had not yet been officially christened the parliamentary voice of the revolution--one newspaper editorialized:

> Since the strange group formed itself through extra- and anti-parliamentary processes and since it has nothing revolutionary, it would be better in actuality to call it the Bloc of Udenista Action.[47]

The UDN vision of power was to prove a mirage, however. In the first place, a parliamentary majority had never in and of itself been the road to effective power in post-Vargas Brazil; if anything it had been the power to obstruct but not to build. In the Brazil which emerged after the 1964 revolution, congress had a much smaller role in the meaningful decisionmaking process than before.

In the second place, the victorious leaders of the military coup had reasons for not wishing the UDN to pre-empt the position as party

of the revolution. Foremost among these was the fact that the officers were basically apolitical or at least non-partisan; they wished theirs to be the revolution of all the people, not just of one party.[48]

By making the UDN the party of the revolution, moreover, the military leaders would be handing over control to civilians, especially to Carlos Lacerda, who was considered anathema among hard line officers. In the period from the overthrow of João Goulart until the abolition of political parties there was a strong sentiment among the military that the country should not yet be turned back to civilians. In the words of one authority:

> The army was expected to follow historical tradition and return to their barracks after the revolution. Their failure to do so . . . resulted in a widening gulf between the civilians and the military . . . .[49]

Finally, the UDN was not able to consolidate a position as party of the revolution because of the inherent divisive tendencies which had marked the party since its inception and which had become accentuated as the UDN split into pro-Lacerda and anti-Lacerda factions.[50] To quote one student of Brazilian politics:

> The UDN had never played a decisive role in the politics of Brazil, and the 1964-65 period was no exception. It was still an undisciplined, highly individualistic party. The exclusivistic, intellectual elite, joined to other members with different industrial, commercial and land-holding interests, made for a heterogeneous group without a unified approach to the country's problems.[51]

A house divided against itself cannot stand; a party divided against itself cannot provide the cohesive parliamentary support necessary for a revolution purporting to represent all the people. Five months before the abortive BPR experiment, President Castelo Branco had voiced the following plaint about the UDN's lack of internal

consistency:

> This party is really terrible. In the Senate it gave me the leader of the Government (Daniel Krieger) and the leader of the Opposition (João Agripino). In the House, the UDN gave me the leader of the Government (Pedro Aleixo) and the leader of the Opposition (Herbert Levy). And as if that were not enough, it also gave me a leader of the Opposition outside the Congress, [namely] Lacerda.[52]

The failure of a party of the revolution to emerge in the aftermath of the military takeover was easily foreseeable, given the party makeup of the Brazilian political system. As previously stated, only the PSD or UDN could have formed the basis for such a revolutionary party, but the former was unsuitable because of its identification with the ancien régime and the continued popularity of Juscelino Kubitschek, while the latter proved unworkable because of its internecine strife and the prominent position enjoyed by Carlos Lacerda.

It became clear, then, as the revolution entered its second year that none of the existing parties was suitable and that a restructuring of the partisan framework would be necessary. Out of the decision to do this would come the Second Institutional Act and the death of all existing political parties.

NOTES

[1]This section draws heavily on the analysis of Hélio Jaguaribe, "Las Elecciones de 1962 en el Brasil," Desarrollo Económico (January-March, 1964), pp. 607-630.

[2]The celebrated phrase comes from the work by Jacques Lambert, Os Dois Brasis (The Two Brazils), published in Rio de Janeiro in 1959, in which the author draws a stark contrast between the highly industrialized areas such as São Paulo and those still under traditional economic modes such as the North and most of the Northeast.

[3]Jaguaribe, "Las Elecciones de 1962," p. 610.

[4]The only other major Brazilian city presently in the take-off stage is Recife, capital of Pernambuco, which like Rio de Janeiro is noted for hard-fought and emotion-charged politics, displaying a degree of polarization comparable to that of Guanabara. Unfortunately, an analysis of the Recife electorate is beyond the scope of the present study.

[5]Jaguaribe, "Las Elecciones de 1962," p. 611.

[6]In Acre, which became a state in 1962, one might expect seignorial conservatism to arise out of the economic backwardness of the area, but this was not the case: "The inhabitants were so poor, scattered, and isolated that even the clan-type politics based on a few powerful families . . . did not flourish, and no very discernible or lasting pattern of territorial politics existed until 1946. . . ." (James W. Rowe, "Stirrings in Acre," American Universities Field Staff Reports [September, 1966], p. 4.)

[7]Jaguaribe, "Las Elecciones de 1962," p. 612.

[8]John Duncan Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics," American Political Science Review (June, 1970), p. 415.

[9]For example, in Acre Rowe spoke with leaders of the MDB who foresaw defeat in the upcoming congressional election because the ARENA controlled the government and its source of employment and other economic benefits, which in that remote area assumed large proportions in influencing a voter's decision.

[10]Jaguaribe, "Las Elecciones de 1962," p. 612.

[11]Burns, Nationalism in Brazil, p. 102.

[12]A concise summary of the ISEB's activities can be found in Burns, Nationalism in Brazil, pp. 102-105.

[13]Over a year later the IPM was still in session. Its leader, Col. Gérson da Pina, lamented the fact that Alvaro Vieira Pinto, "the one [person] most responsible for the ISEB," had fled into asylum in Bolivia and could not be reached for prosecution. (Jornal do Brasil,

May 28, 1965, p. 7.)

[14]In a poll of congressmen taken by a leading magazine in 1967, several questions with nationalist content were asked. To the query "Do you believe in participation of foreign capital in journalistic enterprises or in Brazilian radio or television?" 87 per cent replied they did not. Some 70.3 per cent saw the nationalist movement as "healthy and opportune," while an overwhelming 97.6 per cent opposed any plan to internationalize the Amazon basin. ("Como Pensa o Congresso," Realidade [December, 1967], pp. 30-42.) Burns cites a 1960-61 poll which showed that only seven per cent of urban Brazilians could be classified "avowed nationalists," but 89 per cent of national legislators answered in the affirmative the question "Do you consider yourself a nationalist?" (Burns, Nationalism in Brazil, p. 110.)

[15]Jaguaribe, "Las Elecciones de 1962," p. 612.

[16]Weffort, "State and Mass in Brazil," p. 191.

[17]Jaguaribe suggests that cosmopolism arises in the middle class from the obvious necessity of foreign capital if development is to continue at its rapid rate, and in the working class from the fact that many of the workers have foreign origins, either immediate (first generation) or more remote. In São Paulo such immigrants were mainly Italian. On the question of commitment to private initiative, he conjectures that the proletariat supports it because of the greater bargaining power and resultant higher standard of living of many workers compared with the status of civil servants working in the bureaucracy under government patronage. (Jaguaribe, "Las Elecciones de 1962," pp. 613-614.) A Mexican economist, however, argues that the urban workers are content with the status quo because they, like the industrialists and the bourgeoisie, are beneficiaries of a system of "internal colonialism" whereby the traditional economic areas of the nation are exploited in a sort of mercantile arrangement redounding to the favor of the urban centers. The large cities, in his view, fill the role of the mother country in overseas colonialism. (Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Seven Fallacies About Latin America," in James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin [eds.], Latin America: Reform or Revolution? [Fawcett World Library, 1968], pp. 13-31.)

[18]In Chapter VIII there is some discussion of this question.

[19]As evidence of this independent relation the observer can note the relative smoothness with which the abrupt change from multiparty to nominally two-party politics was made in Brazil in 1965-66. In most areas the PTB simply became the MDB, while the UDN and PSD adhered to the ARENA, naturally with individual exceptions on both sides. It should be remembered, however, that the changeover did not entail any modification of the basic economic stage in which a given state found itself, and therefore the ideological currents remained fundamentally the same despite the switch in party nomenclature.

[20]Jaguaribe, "Las Elecciones de 1962," p. 615.

[21]The following analysis is largely derived from James W. Rowe, "The 'Revolution' and the 'System,'" American Universities Field Staff Reports (July, August, 1966). Hereafter cited as Rowe, "System."

[22]This phrase is borrowed from Skidmore, who used it as subtitle to his study Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964.

[23]The term is that used by Charles W. Anderson in his analysis of the Latin American political system in Chapter 4 of his excellent Politics and Economic Change in Latin America (Van Nostrand, 1967).

[24]Rowe, "System," Part II, p. 1.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Ibid., p. 2.

[27]Ibid., p. 3.

[28]"The highest skilled groups more frequently identify with the working class (classe operária), and the semi-skilled and unskilled workers more frequently with the labor class (classe trabalhadora). . . . Operário, although it also refers to a worker, implies a higher degree of urban sophistication. It is more often used by radical groups. . . . Nowadays militant groups are more likely to use the word operário than the thoroughly established, and slightly conservative-tinged, word trabalhador." (Neuma Aguiar Walker, "The Organization and Ideology of Brazilian Labor," in Irving L. Horowitz [ed.], Revolution in Brazil [Dutton, 1964], pp. 254-255.)

[29]Rowe, "System," Part II, p. 5.

[30]Ibid., p. 4.

[31]Ibid., p. 5.

[32]Ibid., p. 6.

[33]Of course the same may be said of the president (and vice president) of the United States, but in the U. S. there is a degree of party responsibility which, while far from absolute, is virtually unknown in the Brazilian system. Whereas crossing party lines is extremely rare among incumbent legislators in the U. S., Wayne Morse and Strom Thurmond notwithstanding, in Brazil it was quite common prior to the party reforms initiated by the revolutionary government after 1964.

[34]Rowe, "System," Part II, p. 12.

[35]Bonilla, "Jânio Vem Aí," p. 469.

[36]Quadros and Mello Franco, "O Porquê da Renúncia," pp. 33-34.

[37] Rowe, "System," Part II, p. 7. The difficulties of Brazilian presidents in achieving control of the federal bureaucracy recall the frustrations experienced by President Eisenhower when he first took office. Eisenhower, accustomed to the military chain of command, had to learn that in great part the powers of the highest office are those of persuasion. For an elaboration of this point, see Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power (Wiley, 1960).

[38] Ibid., p. 15.

[39] Ibid., p. 14.

[40] Peterson, "Institutionalized Confusion," p. 477.

[41] Jânio Quadros, purged in 1964, can hardly be considered a UDN politician, for reasons already presented. Until Lacerda, the last major opposition voice left with political rights, was silenced the UDN had not lost any politician comparable in popularity or national stature to the PSD's Kubitschek or the PTB's Goulart or Brizola.

[42] Bonilla, "Jânio Vem Aí," p. 479. In an example of the applicability of this thesis, Vamireh Chacon, discussing the 1962 elections in Pernambuco, called the PSD-UDN alliance "very logical" because of the identity of economic interest between the two, diverging only in political details and then generally owing to family or município jealousies. (Vamireh Chacon, "Pernambuco," in Themistocles Cavalcanti and Reisky Dubnic [eds.], Comportamento Eleitoral no Brasil [Fundação Getulio Vargas, 1964], p. 215).

[43] Even a long-time militante (extreme activist) of the UDN, José Prado Kelly, told me: "The programs of the UDN and the PSD are similar, but their origins differ, for the PSD originated out of the Estado Novo. They also differ in style--the PSD is more opportunistic, though I must admit the UDN has its opportunists now too." (Interview, October 21, 1965, in Rio de Janeiro.)

[44] In an interview with the ex-president in February, 1968, I asked him (and his wife Sara) if there was any substance to the rumor that she would run for governor of Minas Gerais in 1970, to succeed Israel Pinheiro. Significantly, Sra. Jubitschek answered, "I don't know yet." (Interview, February 17, 1968, in Rio de Janeiro.)

[45] Correio da Manhã, March 26, 1965, p. 3.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid., March 13, 1965, p. 6.

[48] Reisky de Dubnic, Political Trends in Brazil, p. 66.

[49] Jordan M. Young, "Brazil," in Ben G. Burnett and Kenneth F. Johnson (eds.), Political Forces in Latin America, 2nd edition (Wadsworth, 1970), p. 567.

[50]Lacerda had already been officially designated the party's presidential candidate for the elections to be held in 1966, so the intraparty dissension which marked 1965 was all the more dramatic, for the UDN had failed to close ranks after the nomination.

[51]Resiky de Dubnic, Political Trends in Brazil, p. 66.

[52]Quoted in Resiky de Dubnic, ibid.

CHAPTER IV

FORMAL ORGANIZATION OF THE UDN

In subsequent chapters a discussion of the actual operation of the state UDN in Guanabara and a case study of the 1965 gubernatorial election will be presented, but first it is necessary to examine the formal organizational base of the national party--replicated almost totally in its state affiliates--in order to arrive at an appreciation of the differences between legalistic formalism and the actualities of daily political life in the party.

It is worth discussing the structure of the party in order to test whether the LaPalombara-Weiner criteria of continuity in organization and permanent organization at the state and national level apply to the UDN. As will be shown in this chapter and elsewhere, the UDN was indeed possessed of continuity and permanency, both at the national level and among its several state affiliates. The UDN-GB was among the most active of the state affiliates, as might be expected because of its strength in Guanabara and the national prominence of its leader, Carlos Lacerda.

Hierarchical Structure of the UDN

As in any group, no matter how democratically constituted, the effective power to determine policy for the organization as a whole was in the hands of a relatively small number of people in the national party.[1] Thus, for example, the real presidential nomination was made

by the party leaders, while the national UDN convention served as little more than a rubber stamp.

According to Title II, Article 6 of the UDN statutes, there were three national party organs: the National Convention, the National Directorate, and the National Council.[2] In these bodies supposedly rested the plenary power to carry out the will of millions of UDN supporters throughout the nation, including both official party members and those who voted for the party without joining it.

The National Convention, called the "supreme deliberative organ of the Party," was made up of delegations consisting of:

1. incumbent members of the National Directorate;
2. UDN officeholders in the national senate or chamber of deputies;
3. delegates from the various states on the basis of one for each 25,000 votes for the party in the last federal election;
4. delegates from the various states on the basis of dividing the total UDN vote in that state in the last federal election by one-twentieth of the total vote in that election--thus, for example, if the total vote cast in a state were 500,000 and the UDN vote 100,000, the latter figure would be divided by 25,000 (one-twentieth of 500,000 = 25,000), resulting in four UDN national delegates from that state;
5. one delegate per state from each of the following state organizations:

    a. the state convention
    b. the regional directorate
    c. the regional council
    d. the municipal conventions
    e. the municipal directorates[3]

In the case of coalitions which present an obstacle to the computation of the UDN vote in a given state in the last election, Title II, Article 7, § 1 states that the most recent federal election in which the party did not form an electoral alliance would be used as basis for the calculation of delegates. However, even if the UDN in a state failed to win the necessary votes for at least one delegate under

provisions (3) and (4) above, it still had the right to send one person in each category (§3). Delegates in these two categories were selected in secret vote by the respective state conventions, made up of representatives from the various municípios in the state.[4]

The powers of the National Convention included the following:

1. To elect the members of the National Directorate, the party president, the president and vice president of the National Council, as well as other national UDN officials;
2. To amend party bylaws and program;
3. To lay down general policy to be followed by the UDN nationally;
4. To judge the competency of actions of the National Directorate;
5. To nominate candidates for president and vice president of Brazil;
6. To decide on any question of extinction of the party, its fusion with another political group, and the disposition of its financial resources.[5]

The National Convention had two types of meetings: ordinary and extraordinary--i.e., scheduled and unscheduled. The ordinary convention was held in alternate years, usually in March or April. If the convention failed to obtain a quorum at that time it could be rescheduled and still be considered ordinary. The extraordinary meetings could be called by the National Directorate or by petition of one-third of the state directorates. At these meetings the same delegates who represented the states at the previous convention continued in that capacity unless replaced by the state directorate.[6]

The National Directorate of the UDN consisted of one member for each state, plus one representative of each "national Department" such as students, workers and "social action," created by the National Directorate. Each state or department submitted a list of three names, the most voted becoming the Directorate member and the others first and second alternate. All Directorate members enjoyed a two-year term.[7]

The leaders of the party in both senate and chamber of deputies were ex-officio members of the Directorate and had a vote in that body, while ex-presidents of the national UDN were non-voting ex-officio Directors.[8]

Its powers, enumerated in the UDN statutes, are numerous--one indication that the National Directorate rather than the National Convention was where most real decisions affecting the party nationwide were made. Among the prerogatives of the National Directorate were the following:

1. To convoke and set the site of the National Convention;
2. To establish its own rules of procedure and those of the party secretariat;
3. To carry out the decisions of the Convention;
4. To recognize the state directorates, limiting itself to ascertaining that electoral laws had not been violated or the provisions of the party bylaws circumvented;
5. To create, in consultation with the National Council, party administrative or "partisan action" departments;
6. To ratify the procedural rules of the state directorates;
7. To convoke at least twice yearly the National Council;
8. To authorize the registration of candidates under provisions of the electoral code;
9. To convoke, occasionally, state conventions;
10. To dissolve, by a two-thirds vote of all members, any state directorate and appoint a three-man junta to handle the state party affairs until a new state leadership group could be elected;
11. To create technical committees;
12. To choose the party treasurer and replacement for any Director or alternate who died or resigned.[9]

Meetings of the National Directorate were closed to the public and only under unusual circumstances could a non-UDN member gain access. Members of the state directorates, however, were allowed to attend National Directorate meetings held in the national capital unless otherwise specified as closed.

The National Council was composed of seventy-five members elected by the National Convention, the incumbent presidents of the state

directorates, plus one delegate from each of the following: the state convention, the regional directorate, the regional council, the municipal conventions, and the municipal directorates.[10] Not more than four nor fewer than two members from each state were permitted on the Council, chosen from a seven-man list submitted by each state organization and following the election procedure for choosing the National Directorate. The term of office was two years.

The National Council served in a sort of watchdog capacity vis-à-vis the National Directorate, one of its principal duties being to "examine annually the accounts of the Party and report thereon before they are submitted to the National Convention."[11] Other than this, the Council seemingly had little effective power.

Relations Between National and State Party Organizations

Title III of the UDN statutes lays the structure of the state parties in a hierarchical arrangement whereby each level--state, município, or district--replicated the setup of the national party. It is of little interest to go into details concerning how delegates in each level were chosen; suffice it to say that all three subordinate levels, with the exception of the district (a division of the município), must have a convention, a directorate and a council. The district directorate, chosen by enrolled UDN members, had from five to thirty members and chose the delegates to the municipal conventions.[12]

The motive behind the UDN's seeming concern with such organizational fine points was its necessity of conforming with the Electoral Code,[13] which intended to insure the national scope of political parties by certain minimum requirements of numbers and distribution

through several states. Decisions of the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) and the statutes of the various national parties, both major and minor, clearly subordinated the state organizations to the national hierarchy, vesting in the latter the ability to abolish the state directorates if necessary. On paper, then, the national headquarters would seem to exercise a good deal of control over the activities and aims of the state organizations, and such was the intent of the laws relating to recognition of political parties by the TSE. In reality, however, UDN state parties enjoyed virtual autonomy in truly substantive questions facing them, as can be seen in the discussion (Chapter VIII) of the UDN-GB and its altercations with the national UDN leaders during the 1965 gubernatorial campaign in Guanabara. As one source has put it:

> Once a regional [i.e., state] directorate is organized and given official approval, the controls of the national organization--in spite of the statutory provisions--in actuality cease, except for very rare instances. The power to dissolve a regional directorate is very rarely used.[14]

Ernâni Sátiro, UDN national president in 1965, reported that he knew of no instance where a state UDN directorate had been removed from office, despite deep differences of opinion with the national office.[15]

Another area in which the national party had theoretical but seldom exercised power over the state groups was in the question of electoral alliances. Here, "national directorate interference in regional organization decisions is even rarer."[16] In 1965, for example, the UDN ran coalition candidates in eight of the eleven gubernatorial races--forming alliances with as few as one and as many as five other parties--and in no case was there interference from the national UDN, according to the party president.[17]

Electoral laws also empowered the national party leadership to ratify selection of candidates running under the party banner in the several states, whether the candidacy was statewide in scope or confined to a *município*. Like the prerogative of approving coalitions for the state affiliates, this power was seldom if ever used by the major parties. If it ever took place in the UDN, none of the officials to whom I spoke was aware of it, nor is there any record of such an occurrence in the files of the national party headquarters in Rio de Janeiro.

A last instance of the statutory subordination of state organizations to the national party is that of finances. Although the Electoral Code provided for obligatory contributions by state parties to the national organization to help pay operating expenses and the like, this was honored in the breach rather than in the observance. The UDN, like the PSD, PTB and PSP, did not include in its statutes any stipulation calling for such donations by its state affiliates.[18] In fact, Title VI, "Of Party Finances," in the UDN statutes deals exclusively with technical procedures by which the party and its organs met with the legal obligation of rendering accounts to the TSE.[19] Article 52 states that the party's patrimony will be made up of "contributions, assistance or donations received for that purpose."[20] Seemingly implicit in the party statutes, through their lack of mention of required contributions from the state organizations, is the idea of reliance upon individual donors and UDN officeholders for the aforementioned patrimony. Thus, despite the clarity of the law, the UDN--along with several other parties, both major and minor--did not require its state organizations to contribute to the maintenance of

the national party. Queried about this, one UDN national official told me:

> Frankly, it would hurt the party more than help it if we made this demand on the regional organizations, none of which has any money to spare. In some states it's all they can do to keep their office open.

Needless to say, this led to complete financial independence of the state parties from the national organization to which they were theoretically responsible. Despite legal provisions laid down in the Electoral Code and supplemented by interpretations of the TSE, in practical terms neither the national UDN nor the state affiliates depended on each other for financial support. The UDN-GB, for example, knew that in 1965 relations between Carlos Lacerda, its acknowledged leader, and the national party were far too strained for the latter to offer more than moral support--if that--in Flexa Ribeiro's struggle to overcome the PSD-PTB coalition in that state.

The foregoing demonstrates the wide divergence between theory and practice in Brazilian politics in the period 1945-65 insofar as laws regulating national parties and their state affiliates are concerned. Although all state parties of the UDN professed to subscribe to one set of principles, in reality they were autonomous in terms of selection of candidates, use of party funds gathered in the state, methods of campaigning, etc. To employ a less than perfect but nevertheless useful analogy, the Brazilian system was much closer to the American than to the British; as in the United States, the various state parties united only during presidential election years to make a fight for the big prize--the executive mansion.

One can not, therefore, talk about centralized "control" of the state parties in Brazil, either in the UDN or the other national parties. The national headquarters might lend support of a moral nature to a state party candidate, but it could not dictate his selection against the will of the powerholders in that state group. Thus, for example, in 1965 no one on the National Directorate of the UDN had urged the name of Flexa Ribeiro as gubernatorial candidate in Guanabara prior to his being nominated; in fact, several other names were put forth by members of the national directing body. Nonetheless, when the exigencies of the political situation had been assessed, it was Flexa--backed by the powerful support of Carlos Lacerda--who represented the UDN in that race.[21]

To pursue the analogy between American and Brazilian parties a bit further, just as in the United States, there was at this time a great disparity in the ideological orientation of the several state parties which answered to the name udenista. Although a state-by-state analysis of the prevailing liberal/conservative division is beyond the scope of this work, it is worth citing the views of a French observer of Brazilian politics to illustrate this point.

> In the North and in Minas Gerais, the União Democrática Nacional . . . represents the middle class in their struggle against the oligarchy; in Rio de Janeiro [i.e., Guanabara], it is the party of the petit bourgeoisie, who feel challenged by the communists; in São Paulo, it is the party of the planters against the industrialists. The [official] program of the party, however, does not vary from place to place.[22]

Thus, to discuss UDN ideology on a national scale tends to become an exercise in formalism, for the beliefs espoused in the party constitution were no more binding on the state affiliates in a practical sense

than, say, a party platform adopted at a national party convention in the United States.

The question of the relationship between the national UDN and its state parties has been summed up by one observer as follows:

> . . . In the case of all the major controls which the legal or statutory provisions have attempted to assign to the national organizations to permit them to order the political activities of their regional sections, they have been in by far the majority of the cases either ignored or, as in the case of the financial requirements, openly violated. Of all the parties the PRP seems to present the greatest degree of centralization, but even that is only relative. With reference to national-regional relations the most common reply of all the respondents [to the survey] was that the national organization took no part in regional matters since the regional sphere enjoyed "autonomy" in the state sphere. Respondents in twenty-seven of the seventy-seven regional sections specifically employed the word "autonomy" in characterizing their state section's relationship with their party's national organization. Nine others utilized the terms "no controls" or "no interference," and six others characterized the relationship with the terms "liberty" or "independence." Thus a total of forty-two of the seventy-seven specifically characterized the relationship with these terms, and it can be stated without hesitation that it was implied in the terminology of almost all the other responses.[23]

The "autonomy," "liberty" or "independence" referred to above is an apt term to describe the relationship which prevailed in 1965 between the national UDN and its state parties. One UDN federal deputy candidly called it "partisan anarchy," referring to the less than cordial dealings between the national UDN leadership and the UDN-GB under Lacerda.

National Party Finances

Although political parties attract the greatest amount of attention in the relatively short periods when active electoral campaigns are in progress, the major expenses of a party are in reality the day-to-day overhead for such necessities as rent for the party headquarters and salaries for the personnel who maintain the national office. In the case of the UDN the situation was somewhat more favorable, for it

owned the entire floor of the office building in downtown Rio which housed the party headquarters. By renting out the extra space on its floor the UDN was able to defray operating expenses. As will be seen below, the income from this property, although not great by U. S. rental standards, was adequate for the needs of the party because of the small scale of its operations. Nowhere did one get an impression of wasted resources while observing the party's day-to-day transactions.

Expense money for high party officials was at a minimum, for as in other parties "the top officials are wealthier than their party and pay most expenses out of their own pockets and themselves contribute to the party."[24]

Sources of revenue for the UDN were rather circumscribed, more so than for a party like the PSD which had so many officeholders in congress that it could afford the luxury of splitting the legislators' obligatory donations fifty-fifty between the national directorate and the deputies' regional directorate.[25] In the UDN the minimum contribution from each enrolled party member--officeholder or not--was fifty cruzeiros in 1965, at which time there were 1850 cruzeiros to the dollar. It is not reported whether a member failing to contribute his 2.7 cents monthly suffered any penalty.[26] At the time, after two decades of party existence, the UDN had only about three hundred dues-paying members--exclusive of officeholders--on its books. And this despite the fact that the UDN was, as has been pointed out in Chapter I, an "open" membership party as defined by Macridis. There were no elaborate or esoteric prerequisites for joining the party, nor any period

of apprenticeship or acolyte service prior to "full" membership. On the contrary, the day one joined the UDN he gained all the privileges of any other member. Card-carrying udenistas, then, were only the tiniest tip of the iceberg which represented the hundreds of thousands in Guanabara and millions across the nation who voted with the party. The dues they paid were for all practical purposes inconsequential. Obviously this source of funds was extremely limited, although some of the members of course contributed far more than the minimum. Nevertheless, no party can survive merely through the donations of a few "fat cats," and the UDN was no exception. The major source of funds, then, came from those holding office under the UDN rubric. This monthly assessment was deducted from the official's pay by the Brazilian government and sent directly to the party headquarters. In 1965 it came to Cr$6000 per month. A third source of income, for which no figures are available, was money from special contributors, either regular members or officeholders. More will be said about this below. Fourth, the UDN received Cr $250,000 per month in rent from space owned in the building in which it was housed--specifically, an adjoining office on the fourth floor of Rua México, Nº 3 (directly across the street from the American embassy--a coincidence which gave rise to many jibes among anti-UDN activists, especially in the student class). Fifth, the party from time to time received contributions from non-members; again, no figures were available.

If the above gives the impression that the national UDN was run on a shoestring, that is correct. The office of the party was ample but not huge, comfortable but far from luxurious. It consisted of an anteroom where the secretary worked and an inner room where the party

president had his desk and which was used for meetings of the National Directorate. The anteroom was furnished with an ancient wooden desk, a venerable leather sofa, several straight-back wooden chairs, a refrigerator and two telephones. Also in view were filing cabinets which held the party's records. In the inner room the most prominent articles were a long table with perhaps a dozen chairs around it, the president's desk, and a huge mural depicting the famous scene along Capacabana beach in 1922 when the "Eighteen of Copacabana" left the fortress at Pôsto 6 to face the army of the republic. Eduardo Gomes became a nationwide figure as a result of surviving the army's attack in that ill-fated revolt. During the several months that I visited the UDN headquarters with regularity, the only time there were more than four or five persons on hand was when the National Directorate was in session, meetings naturally closed to the public.

I have no reason to doubt the authenticity and reliability of the data supplied me by the party secretary, for it was readily apparent that the UDN national office served at best as a clearinghouse, not as a center from which decisions were regularly handed down for the party nationwide. Its expenses were few and covered by the small contributions and revenue listed above. In the absence of a UDN candidate for national office (president or vice president), the party had no campaign expenses; each state party was left to its own monetary resources. Donations to state parties were quite rare and intended to help the party weather a financial emergency (e.g., to help set up new state headquarters after a fire destroyed the old), not to fund a political race in that state. As an example of the low overhead of the national party, during the ten months in which I observed the UDN

national headquarters in action its office staff never exceeded three persons, of whom only D. Yolanda was full time.

The above sources of money, however, were not sufficient in times of national campaigns, for the party had an obligation to support its standard-bearer, assuming he was a party candidate. At such times special fund-raising commissions were established. When there was a party candidate, D. Yolanda emphasized, the national headquarters worked hard to drum up national backing for him. This was the case in the vice presidential campaign of Milton Campos in 1960 and in 1945 and 1950 when the Brigadeiro made his two tries at the presidency. For Juarez Távora in 1955 and Jânio Quadros in 1960, however, the UDN merely "cooperated," in the words of the executive secretary. For the Campos campaign, Lucio Adaucto Cardoso was put in charge of fund-raising.

Although each state party had its own budget--independent of the national office, which never asked for an accounting of the state party finances unless bankruptcy occurred--the UDN sent electoral materials and propaganda to all state parties during a national campaign. The national office worked only for the presidential and vice presidential nominees; candidates to the senate and chamber of deputies were the responsibility of themselves and the several state parties.

The total national party expenditure for four presidential races, according to D. Yolanda, was:

1945--no record because the party had not yet been officially chartered by the TSE;
1950--Cr$5.5 million spent on electoral propaganda;
1955--no record because Távora was not a party candidate;
1960--no record because Quadros was not a party candidate.
(The cost of Milton Campos' 1960 vice presidential campaign to the UDN was Cr$6.6 million).

If the above figures seem incomplete, it must be kept in mind that between 1945 and 1960 only Eduardo Gomes was a true party candidate of the UDN, the other two presidential aspirants (Tavora and Quadros) receiving the support of the party for reasons of practicality or necessity more than from the UDN's sympathy with their ideals or reverence for their person. It is understandable that no records were kept of the 1955 and 1960 races, but the outlay for Milton Campos' 1960 shot at the second spot will serve as a gauge of the involvement of the national party financially.[27]

Another reason that no great effort is made in keeping accurate and complete records of campaign expenses by the national party headquarters is the absence of laws limiting the expenditures of individual politicians in furtherance of their campaigns. In practical terms the only limit on money spent seemed to be the willingness of the officeseeker and his backers to fund his campaign.[28] Brazilian election campaigns are costly by local standards, though not approaching in absolute terms the expense of a similar campaign in the United States. Brazilian law during the period 1945-65 tended to accept the near impossibility of regulating how much money a candidate spent to get elected, concentrating instead of guaranteeing that there would be no "abuse of economic power" by the winning candidate after taking office. Thus the electoral law obliged the victor to present prior to taking office a list of all his financial holdings, which was compared with another list compiled when he left office. Obvious discrepancies made him liable to criminal prosecution.

In summary, the expenses of the national UDN in a normal year were slight: salaries, office supplies, stationery, postage,

utilities, etc. In a campaign year expenditures were heavier and included political propaganda, emergency contributions to state parties, and gifts to charitable organizations.[29] In addition, every two years--more often in the case of Extraordinary conventions--the party incurred the cost of holding a national convention. Income was also rather restricted, coming mainly from dues of officeholders and gifts from friends of the party, but it was always sufficient to meet expenses, despite the fact that the $100-a-plate meal is unknown in Brazil.

NOTES

[1]This phenomenon is part of what has been called the iron law of oligarchy, and it is no surprise that the UDN conformed to what seems to be a universal process of group interaction.

[2]Estatuto da União Democrática Nacional (Mimeographed, 1957). This is the amended form of the original party bylaws as approved by an Extraordinary Convention held November 23, 1957. (Hereafter cited as Estatuto.)

[3]Estatuto, pp. 2-3. The word municipal as used in the Brazilian context is a translation of the adjective pertaining to município, a political division much closer to the concept of "county" in the United States than to "city."

[4]Phyllis Peterson, who has done the definitive study in English on the pre-1965 Brazilian political parties, states that in this particular the UDN was one of only three national parties--the others being the PDC and the PSB--to offer a "slightly greater measure of internal democracy," for in the remaining parties the state directorate chose the delegates to the national convention. (Peterson, "Brazilian Political Parties," p. 178.)

[5]Estatuto, p. 3.

[6]Ibid., p. 4.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Peterson says that the UDN was the only party which provided that its national officers--president, secretary and subsecretary--were ineligible for re-election. (Peterson, "Brazilian Political Parties," p. 181.)

[9]Estatuto, pp. 4-5.

[10]Ibid., pp. 5-6.

[11]Ibid., p. 6.

[12]Ibid., p. 12.

[13]Brazil's Electoral Code has had a complex history since the creation of national parties in 1945. The first real guidelines were set down that year by the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral in its booklet Partidos Políticos: Instruções (Imprensa Nacional, 1945), where it states (p. 3) that "only parties of national scope can be registered." Major revisions were made in 1950, which may be found in Código Eleitoral. Lei No. 1.164 - de 24-7-50 (Imprensa Nacional, 1950). Law No. 2.550 of July 25, 1955, brought about an automatic purge of deceased voters and those who had changed residence by its requirement that voter registration cards carry a photograph of the registrant. In the

following year further minor modifications were made by Law No. 2.982 of November 30, 1956, and thereafter small changes were introduced into the Code in 1957; these may be found in Lei No. 3.3328 - de 4-12-57 (Imprensa Nacional, 1958). The Code then underwent no major revisions until after the revolution of 1964. In that year the statutes were altered to make registration of minor parties more difficult, but this had little effect on the UDN and other major parties. The amended law may be found in Código Eleitoral. Lei No. 4.737; de 15 de Julho de 1965 (Imprensa Nacional, 1965). Of course the most fundamental change in the Electoral Code was introduced on October 27, 1965, when the Second Institutional Act abolished the UDN and all other existing parties, followed quickly by legislation setting up a two-party system by fiat.

[14]Peterson, "Brazilian Political Parties," p. 221.

[15]Interview with Ernâni Sátiro, April 17, 1966, in Rio de Janeiro.

[16]Peterson, "Brazilian Political Parties," p. 224.

[17]Interview with Ernâni Sátiro, April 17, 1966, in Rio de Janeiro.

[18]Peterson, "Brazilian Political Parties," p. 227.

[19]Estatuto, pp. 16-17.

[20]Ibid., p. 16.

[21]See below, Chapter VII.

[22]Roger Bastide, Brasil: Terra de Contrastes, translation of the French Brésil: Terre des Contrastes by Maria de Queiroz, 1959, p. 244. Also quoted in Charles Wagley, An Introduction to Brazil, p. 265.

[23]Peterson, "Brazilian Political Parties," p. 229.

[24]Ibid., p. 230.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Source for much of the data dealing with UDN finances is D. Yolanda Silva Bento, who was executive secretary of the UDN during its entire period of existence (1945-65). D. Yolanda very kindly permitted me to examine the books of the party and supplied the information regarding expenditures. As UDN president Ernâni Sátiro remarked to me during an interview, "D. Yolanda knows more about the operation of the party than anyone else alive."

[27]Naturally Cr$6.6 million is only a fraction of the total spent in the effort to elect Campos. The candidate himself spent a great deal, as

did the several state parties, especially his home state of Minas Gerais.

[28]This is not to imply that other countries where so-called "corrupt practices" laws exist, as in the United States, are in reality much stricter than Brazil. Whereas in the U.S. such expedients as multilevel committee setups, hidden contributions and other questionable methods are often used to circumvent the law, in Brazil a more realistic approach prevailed in the period 1945-65. Nonetheless, an outright attempt to buy votes--or even the accusation of same--can generate a major scandal, such as the dispute which centered around the IBAD. Perhaps the greatest effort made was to insure that foreign interests did not finance Brazilian parties, an action specifically prohibited in the organic law of parties: "It is forbidden for the parties to receive, directly or indirectly, a contribution . . . from any foreign person or entity." (Código Eleitoral . . . e Lei Orgânica dos Partidos Políticos, p. 70.)

[29]These contributions to charity, which were always "small," according to the executive secretary, were routed through the UDN's Social Action Department until this organ was shut down in 1960.

CHAPTER V

THE UDN IN GUANABARA: PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

Before turning the focus of this study from the national UDN to the functioning of one of its most colorful and controversial state affiliates--the UDN-Guanabara--it is of interest to examine briefly the question, "Was the União Democrática Nacional truly a national party?" That is, did it operate primarily out of a state or regional stronghold as did the São Paulo-based PSP of Adhemar de Barros, or did the UDN look for support to all or most parts of the nation?

In simple terms of its party representation in the legislative bodies of Brazil, the UDN must be considered to have been a political entity of national scope. During its twenty years of existence the party alternated between second and third (after the PSD and sometimes the PTB) in number of deputies and senators occupying seats in the federal congress, and for a brief time (approximately April through October, 1965) came to be nominally the most important party during the time of the BPR (see above, pp. 98-101).

Though the UDN was stronger in some states than in others, the same statement can be made of any of the parties then in existence. Even the powerful PSD made few inroads into the state of São Paulo, thanks to the efficient machine of Adhemar de Barros and the personal popularity of Jânio Quadros prior to his resignation in 1961. The UDN was present at the state level in all parts of Brazil, with the exception of Acre, which became a state only in 1962 and quickly

divided into PSD and PTB factions.[1] The party's fortunes of course fluxuated with the vicissitudes and intrigues of local politics, and in some cases the highs and lows the party from one election to another could be startling.[2]

Despite the nationwide statutory existence of the UDN as a party, examination of the period 1945-62, dates for which full statistics were available at this writing, reveals several dominant regional trends in the following of the party and points up the nature of its electoral strength from one state to another. Such analysis will help determine whether the UDN should be considered to have been a regional party or one of real national status.

A look at election results for the period cited shows that, in terms of congressional representation, the UDN was not a regional party, as contrasted with the PSP which found its mainstay in the single state of São Paulo. Although the Northeast was a stronghold of UDN support throughout its existence, party acceptance by the electorate was far from identical from one state to another in that region. For example, though the UDN did well in Rio Grande do Norte from 1945-62 by electing three senators and twice emerging as the state's largest party delegation in the national chamber of deputies, in the neighboring state of Pernambuco the UDN's fortunes were definitely on the downswing during the period, a decline which continued until the revolution of 1964 and the purges of the Pernambuco statehouse and legislature. To be sure, the UDN did enjoy a strong following in the Northeast in general, but in the most populous state of that area, Pernambuco, the PTB had risen to challenge successfully the position once held by the União. Of the six-state area usually denoted as the

Northeast,[3] the UDN held a plurality of the state's federal deputies over 50 per cent of the time in all but Pernambuco, where it was never to achieve that great a proportion. In other areas of the country the UDN also enjoyed significant, albeit not overwhelming, electoral strength. In Mato Grosso, one of the coronel-dominated states, the UDN elected four senators during the period--the only state in which it was able to do so--and dominated the Assembléia Legislativa for four consecutive elections. By way of contrast, in the contiguous state of Pará, which shares many economic and social features with Mato Grosso, the UDN never won as many as 20 per cent of the seats in the Assembléia.[4]

In considering the question of the overall appeal of the UDN in the states, we must distinguish between two indices of a state's size--absolute population on one hand, and the number of eligible voters on the other. The two are not matched on a one-to-one basis for various reasons, among which the most salient is the high rate of illiteracy in some states and in the nation as a whole--estimated at roughly 50 per cent in 1965.[5] The tables which follow show in summary form the extreme effect this literacy requirement had on Brazilian elections during the years 1945-62. Peterson, of whose data these tables represent an extention and updating, remarks that:

> A comparison between the United States, a democracy of notoriously low voter turnout, and Brazil . . . [shows that] as a percentage of the total population, the Brazilian voter turnout is less than half that of the United States in presidential elections.[6]

Whereas in the U. S. turnout/population percentages hover around 35 per cent, in Brazil from 1945 to 1962 they ranged from a low of 13.4 per cent to a high of slightly over 20 per cent (see tables).

TABLE I

REGISTERED VOTERS AS PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL POPULATION, 1945-62

Year	Population	Registered voters	
		No.	Pct.
1945	46,124,225[a]	7,459,849	16.2
1947	46,124,225[a]	7,710,504	16.7
1950	52,645,579	11,455,149	21.8
1954	56,998,000	15,104,604	26.5
1955	58,383,000	15,243,450	26.1
1958[b]	63,101,627	13,771,521	21.8
1960	66,302,000	15,543,332	23.4
1962	75,246,000	18,528,847	24.6

[a]For both elections the estimated population is that of January 1, 1946.

[b]Last year for which Peterson had data.

TABLE II

TURNOUT PERCENTAGES IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS, 1945-62

Year	Electorate	Voters	
		No.	Pct.
1945	7,459,849	6,200,805	83.1
1947	7,710,504	5,454,111	70.7
1950	11,455,149	8,254,989	72.1
1954	15,104,604	9,890,475	65.5
1955[a]	15,243,450	9,097,014	59.7
1958	13,771,521	12,678,997	92.0
1960[b]	15,543,332	12,586,354	81.0
1962[b]	18,528,847	14,727,221	79.6

[a]Last year for which Peterson had complete data.

[b]Includes Brasília.

TABLE III

VOTER TURNOUT AS PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL POPULATION, 1945-62

Year	Population	Voters	
		No.	Pct.
1945	46,124,225[a]	6,200,805	13.4
1947	46,124,225[a]	5,454,111	11.8
1950	52,645,579	8,254,989	15.7
1954	56,998,000	9,890,475	17.4
1955[b]	58,383,000	9,097,014	15.6
1958	63,101,627	12,678,997	20.1
1960	66,302,000	12,586,354	18.9
1962	75,246,000	14,747,221	19.6

[a]For both elections the estimated population is that of January 1, 1946.

[b]Last year for which Peterson had data.

This lack of correspondence had important ramifications for the Brazilian political process, especially in the state of Guanabara. (See below, p. 141.)

In 1960 the five largest states in terms of total population were:

São Paulo.....11.6 million
Minas Gerais..... 8.8 million
Bahia..... 5.9 million
Rio Grande do Sul..... 5.2 million
Pernambuco..... 4.3 million

Guanabara, with 3.2 million, was eighth largest state in 1960. However, the picture changes sharply if we examine the states from the standpoint of number of eligible voters:

São Paulo..... 3.4 million
Minas Gerais..... 2.1 million
Rio Grande do Sul..... 1.4 million
Guanabara..... 1.1 million
Bahia..... 0.9 million

Pernambuco drops to seventh on this scale. Guanabara's jump to fourth place is explained by the fact that the city-state enjoyed the nation's highest ratio of voters to total population--34.14 per cent, compared with 29.23 per cent for São Paulo and 15.75 per cent for Bahia. Thus Guanabara was a veritable mine of votes, a fact which--combined with the small territory covered by the state and its history as national capital for almost two centuries--helps explain the extreme condition of politization of the populace. Obviously campaign propaganda in Rio is more effective on a vote-per-cruzeiro scale when the total percentage of eligible voters is to great and the turnout rate is as high as 90 per cent in 1960.[7]

Given the distinction, then, between absolute population and large concentrations of voters, let us consider the UDN's appeal to the electorate of the "large" states.

Of the five states with the largest number of voters, the UDN never achieved political domination on a semi-permanent basis in any of them. In two of the five--São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul--the party was virtually shut out by the commanding position occupied by its rivals.[8] In Bahia and Minas Gerais the UDN fared better but still was unable to maintain consistent voter support from election to election. In Bahia the party elected a plurality in the Assembléia in 1947 and in 1945 had sent the largest delegation to the chamber of deputies, but thereafter the UDN was never able to gain more than a third of the Assembléia. In Minas Gerais there had existed a sharp struggle ever since 1945 between the UDN and the PSD for control of the state. The high water mark of the União came in 1950 when it elected twenty-one of seventy-two members of the Assembléia Legislativa and sent twelve UDN deputies to the chamber of deputies. After 1950, however, party fortunes were not as good, a decline that coincided with the rise to power of Juscelino Kubitschek, first as governor, then as president of the republic (1955-60). In Minas, however, unlike the other large states already discussed, the UDN managed to make a strong comeback after the end of the JK era when Magalhães Pinto became governor and led a fierce campaign to elect a sizable number of udenistas to the Assembléia. Magalhães was largely successful in his attempt, for the number of UDN deputies rose from eleven in 1958 to twenty-six in 1962, mostly at the expense of the PSD; the PTB, its strength focused in the industrial center Belo Horizonte, remained constant at twelve positions.[9]

In Guanabara, the fourth largest concentration of votes in the nation, the UDN and the PTB quickly established themselves as the major political parties after the overthrow of the Vargas dictatorship, with the Labor Party having an advantage due to the large number of workers organized in the Federal District, while the UDN relied at first on anti-Vargas sentiment and later on the fairly large middle class in Rio. The PTB was able to elect a clear majority of the delegation to the chamber of deputies--nine of seventeen--in the balloting of December 2, 1945, and it was not until 1958 that the UDN was to pull ahead of its rival in this respect. In that year the UDN sent six of the Federal District's seventeen representatives to the chamber and because of extreme fragmentation in the Assembléia was able to become the plurality party within that body, winning eight of the fifty openings.[10] To apply the definitions presented in Chapter I of this work, by 1958 the political system in the Federal District had unmistakably veered in the "turnover" direction, with the UDN and the PTB struggling for control but with little likelihood of either one establishing permanent dominance ("hegemony"). Since the local party system in the Federal District replicated the national system to the extent that it too was multiparty, the PSD must also be mentioned, though it was unquestionably a minor party in the District and would always remain so. With the limited appeal of the PSD in the Federal District, it was quite common during the period 1945-62 for that party to form a coalition with the PTB. In such cases it was usual practice for the stronger party, the PTB, to name the gubernatorial candidate, leaving the vice governor or senatorial aspirant to the

PSD. In 1965, when Francisco Negrão de Lima, a pessedista, was the nominee of the coalition, it was still clearly with the approval of the PTB, which maintained a veto over the joint candidacy.[11]

In résumé, then, it can be seen that of the five states with the largest concentration of votes, the UDN was best equipped to fight with some chance of success in the electoral arenas of Minas Gerais and Guanabara. And the presence of the fiery and mercurial Carlos Lacerda in the latter state, coupled with its long tradition as the stage on which political history was enacted for the nation, lent it a color and importance greatly beyond the ordinary for the student of Brazilian politics. The aforementioned extreme politization which characterized Guanabara gave to politics in that state an intensity and vitality which no other area could consistently match, and it is to Guanabara that we turn our attention in this and the following chapters.

The Setting and the Characters

Rio de Janeiro was from 1763 until 1960 the capital of Brazil, both politically and culturally. When the new city of Brasília was formally inaugurated in 1960, Rio ceased to be the official capital but continued as the heart of the nation's cultural, artistic and political life. In that year the old Federal District became Brazil's newest and smallest state, the State of Guanabara, bounded on three sides by the State of Rio de Janeiro (commonly called "the State of Rio" by Brazilians) and on the other by the Bay of Guanabara.

Historically Rio had long been the focal point of political maneuvering by Brazilian leaders, and the shifting of the seat of

government some six hundred miles inland did not change this. Some critics referred to Brasília in its first five years of existence as the "three-day capital," a jocular reference to the tendency of many lawmakers to arrive there on Tuesday and do their utmost to leave on Thursday.[12] Plainly, their heart was still on the coast, and even today it is in Rio that the political pulse of the nation can best be taken on most normal occasions. Brazil at the present time has in reality two capitals and is in a stage of transition by which the old capital will gradually yield to the new. At this writing Brasília has about 500,000 people and is growing; each year another few government bureaus (repartições) make the long move inland from Rio to the Novacap (new capital). The government of Garrastazu Médici has announced that all foreign delegations not transferring their embassies to Brasília by 1972 will lose their diplomatic ties with Brazil. Until the move is complete, however, many agencies continue in Rio and their employees show little enthusiasm for leaving Guanabara. The American embassy at this writing is an imposing glass and steel multistory structure in downtown Rio, while the makeshift headquarters in Brasília resembles nothing so much as an army barracks or other government prefab. Indeed, such is the appeal of Rio--or lack of appeal of Brasília--that special incentives such as subsidized housing and wage differentials have been necessary in the past to coax workers to leave Rio for the new capital on the central plateau.

The position which Rio occupied for almost two centuries as nerve center of the nation helps explain the unquestioned high degree of political awareness among the populace (politization), but it also had

less desirable effects of the Federal District:

> Not only the presence of the federal government and its traditional system of paternalism and patronage [empreguismo] deformed the local political life, but also the very fact of the city being governed simultaneously by a Chamber of Aldermen [vereadores], elected by popular vote, and by a mayor [prefeito] named by the President of the Republic created insurmountable obstacles to the normal functioning of the administration.[13]

Another highly important factor lending uniqueness to the politics of Rio/Guanabara is that the state has the highest index of urbanization in the country. In 1960, when Guanabara came into existence, the population was 3.3 million, with a 97 per cent rate of urbanization. Considering that the index of urbanization for the entire Central-Eastern region at that time was 51 per cent, it becomes clear that Guanabara was something of an oasis of urbanization in the area, a fact which assumes practical political importance because the city-state proved no exception to the numerous studies which have shown worldwide a high positive correlation between urbanization and a high level of political activity, both by voters and on the part of political parties. In 1962, for instance, twelve different parties won seats in the Assembléia Legislativa, the same number that had gained representation in the chamber of aldermen in 1958, a sign that the state was barraged with a multiplicity of partisan appeals of various colorations.[14]

Coupled with Guanabara's high rate of urbanization is another factor which makes for electoral participation at a degree greater than average for Brazilian states. In Guanabara adult literacy was 85 per cent in 1965, compared with the 50 or 51 per cent for the nation as a whole.[15] That a higher percentage of the total population is eligible to vote helps explain the frenetic character of Rio elections; it has

been estimated that 60 per cent of all residents in Guanabara are of voting age.[16] Discounting those who for one reason or another are ineligible to vote, the "electoral potential" (derived by dividing the total population by the number of eligible voters) is 50 per cent in Guanabara, highest of any Brazilian state. Significantly for the UDN, the electoral potential in Guanabara was higher for the urban dwellers than for the 84,000 who lived in the rural zones.

Voter turnout in Rio has been high ever since the return to a multiparty system after the overthrow of Vargas in 1945. In the 1962 elections, for instance, Guanabara had an 85.29 per cent turnout, topped only by the three southern states of São Paulo, Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul (86.43 per cent, 86.97 per cent and 86.71 per cent, respectively).[17] Since 1945 Guanabara has invariably had a higher turnout than the country as a whole, as the figures below show.[18]

Year	Guanabara	Brazil
1945	90%	83%
1950	73%	72%
1955	70%	60%
1958	95%	92%
1960	91%	81%
1962	85%	80%

In part, no doubt, the high turnout can be attributed to the penalties imposed on those who fail to vote. The non-voter must show cause for not having appeared at the polls before he can draw his next check if he is a government employee, for example--an important factor in a city

with as many government agencies at both federal and state level as has Rio.[19] But the high voter turnout reflects more than just the desire to avoid the nuisance of having to fill out forms listing reasons for abstention. It is an indication of the advanced state of political interest and awareness; this can easily be seen by comparing the turnout percentage in 1962 in Guanabara (85+) with that of traditionally oriented Pará (65.41) or Maranhão (64.24).

Among the principal reasons behind the intensive politization in Guanabara are some involving its very geography:

> The ease of communications which comes from the very urban nature of this agglomerate, [and] the technical means which characterize these communications contribute to intensify political campaigns in the state. Political caravans go throughout its entire extent, even into the farthest corners of the rural zone. Radio and television carry to all parts the word, the slogans and the very figure of the candidates, creating a density of political impact seldom found in other areas.[20]

Despite its position as one of the nation's leaders in per capita income, ranking with the developed states of São Paulo and the South, Guanabara still has a large percentage of its population classified as poor. One authority quotes the figure of 70 per cent, while terming 28.5 per cent as "middle class" and 1.5 per cent "rich."[21] Using the figures of Carlos Lacerda's own administration, the conclusion is the same: in Rio the poor far outnumber the middle and upper classes, a fact with profound implications for the UDN in that state and strong ramifications vis-à-vis the type of campaign the party must use to maximize its chances of electoral success. In a 1965 publication of the Guanabara Secretariat of Government, statistics showed that fully 47 per cent of the "urbanized" (i.e., non-favela) population over the age of fourteen was non-remunerated, while 45 per cent of the same age

group among favelados had no income. Furthermore, approximately one-quarter of both favela dwellers and those living elsewhere earned one minimum salary per month, or less.[22]

The sociological and political implications of such disparate distribution of income as existed in Guanabara in the mid-1960's are many, but the most immediate is that the lower socio-economic groups represent an indispensable factor in any equation designed to effect a winning electoral campaign in a statewide (i.e., "majoritary") race such as that for governor.[23] This "obliges the candidates to seek to bring themselves ever closer to the poor classes in order to get elected."[24] Despite the higher illiteracy rate among the poor, especially in the favelas, the previously cited 87 per cent adult literacy in Guanabara demonstrates that the ranks of the less privileged classes did not suffer greatly from the electoral requisite of knowing how to read and write.[25]

Besides these demographic data, however, one needs a grounding in certain other political characteristics of the state before he can appreciate the microcosm that is Guanabara. First, the electorate in Guanabara, like that of the United States, tends to vote "against" rather than "for," which is to say that it is easier to arouse the voters to express a protest at the polls than it is to rally them behind a politician with whom they are satisfied. This was especially true in the years after Carlos Lacerda came to cominate the UDN-GB; more will be said below (pp. 191-205) on the role and influence of Lacerda in Guanabara and within his party. Second, those candidates identified with the situação (incumbent government) have done rather poorly in Rio since the transfer of the capital to Brasília, which may

reflect the resentment of cariocas toward the change which left the former capital in a less desirable position in terms not only of prestige but also of finances. In addition to this natural bairrismo (local chauvinism) of inhabitants of Guanabara there must also be considered the traditional neglect into which the national government had allowed the Federal District to fall, comparable to the apathy shown by the American congress towards the problems of Washington, D.C. It is in this light that one must view the 1960 victory of Jânio Quadros in the state (41.8 per cent plurality) and of Francisco Negrão de Lima in 1965 (52.6 per cent), both of them "opposition" candidates.

Also prerequisite to understanding electoral phenomena in Guanabara is an appreciation of the temperament of the voter himself. As one of Rio's political commentators has put it:

> For the electorate of Guanabara, the greater the radicalization of the political campaign, the greater will be the turnout at the polls and the smaller the index of abstention. . . .
> The electorate of Guanabara--even though it may not recognize it consciously--psychologically likes fierce and verbally aggressive campaigns. . . .[26]

If the above thesis is correct, it helps explain the vitriolic and scathing attacks made by both sides during the campaign which I witnessed in the state in 1965. (See below, Chapter VIII, for the "Negrão Letter," probably the most visceral and emotional of any public attack made by either side during that campaign.)

Although Guanabara is highly politicized the nature of politics in the state is not basically ideological. Class-based parties are not the common phenomenon one finds in many European countries, although the PTB came closer to being a class party than any but the illegal

Communist Party. In discussing the essence of politics in Brazil one writer has stated:

> [The] populist leader considers the party almost exclusively an instrument for the exercise of personal power. . . .
>
> Within this framework in which the State, through the populist leaders, comes into direct contact with the masses, ideologies do not occupy a place of importance.[27]

Nevertheless, evidence will be presented below which lends credence to the idea that, at least in part, much of the support of Carlos Lacerda in Guanabara fell within a conscious or unconscious ideological pattern. In the lower socio-economic classes, however, there is no indication that their political behavior was class-based in the Marxist sense--i.e., an expression of their perception of the role they play in the exploiters' social system. Even in the infrahuman living conditions of the favelas, Rios concluded that:

> . . . in the political behavior of the favelado it is rare to [find] any ideological or purely partisan motivation. The favelado voter is moved by very concrete and immediate interests, by extremely personal attachments.[28]

An IBOPE study of the Guanabara electorate done in 1963 tends to confirm this. Dealing with the question of ideology, the survey showed approximately 50 per cent of the respondents identifying themselves as "center," 25 per cent as "leftist" and 10 per cent as "rightist." The remaining 15 per cent was unable to classify itself.[29] Fully 90 per cent of those identifying themselves as leftists voted for the PTB, the IBOPE affirmed. This finding is of interest in view of the charge, frequently heard in the heat of the 1965 campaign in Guanabara, that the majority of PTB supporters were communists.

Another salient political fact of life in Guanabara is the large gap between the overall percentage of the state's population which is

female and the percentage of female voters. Although women make up slightly over half the Guanabara population, in 1965 they comprised a mere 37.5 per cent of the state's eligible voters.[30] From the standpoint of practical politics these figures become even more significant in light of the differential voting rate in middle class areas as opposed to lower class zones. A woman in the middle or upper class (the latter, of course, quite small in numerical terms) is more likely to vote--and be eligible to vote--than her counterpart in the working class districts or in the favelas. It is noteworthy that the only electoral zone in 1965 which had more women registered than men was the Fifth, which includes the middle- and upper-class districts of Leme and parts of Copacabana. There women registrants numbered almost 40,000 and men just under 37,000. By contrast, in the Twenty-fifth zone, a "suburban" grouping including Campo Grande and other far-flung communities of the Zona Norte, male voters outnumber females by over two to one (35,785 to 17,169).[31] This phenomenon manifests itself despite the TRE ruling that housewives and domestics were also subject to this provision of the Electoral Code.[32] As a result of the low participation level for women, the PTB and other left-of-center parties lost a sizable fraction of their theoretical maximum electoral potential. Had the PTB made a concerted and continuing effort to combat illiteracy and apathy in the working class districts and in the favelas, its total vote would have been appreciably higher and its resultant political influence in the state greater. Even a sympathetic critic of the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro could but lament the party's lack of efforts in this direction:

> But where was the PTB, over the years, whose [leaders] have shown themselves incapable of executing a valid short- or long-range

> political plan? . . . The leaders of the PTB did not possess the mentality and sensibility to understand the socio-economic phenomenon. . . . They did not combat illiteracy (much greater in the poor areas) which would bring to the party, implicitly, electoral dividends; they never undertook a campaign against the blank vote, extremely accentuated among those areas. . . . Their suburban committees never worried about registering the poor voter and the unskilled worker.[33]

The above, a valid criticism of the inaction of the PTB vis-à-vis the lower class areas, was doubly true for the UDN in Guanabara, which seemingly "wrote off" the working class areas during the period 1945-65 in order to concentrate on the middle class vote. Sporadic attempts were made from time to time to woo at least a portion of the lower class vote, but these were intermittent and of little value. (See below, Chapter VIII, for examples during the 1965 campaign.) That this was due in part to the polarization of politics in Guanabara is undeniable, but equally indisputable is the fact that neither the PTB nor the UDN made any consistent effort to reduce polarization by cultivating the electoral strongholds of the other.[34] Indeed, as can be seen in the following chapters, both sides actively fomented the process during the 1965 campaign--an occurrence which might have been inevitable in any case but which thrived on the highly partisan propaganda, charges and countercharges hurled by both sides.

The Pivotal Role of Carlos Lacerda

To attempt an understanding of the politics of Rio de Janeiro (first as Federal District, later as state) without analyzing the place of Carlos Lacerda would be akin to trying to explain Louisiana politics without taking into account the Long family. Carlos Lacerda is the outstanding political figure to arise in Rio in the postwar period--revered by some, damned by others, praised by his enemies for his intellect, criticized by his friends for his ofttimes precipitous acts.

No account of the UDN-GB or the politics of the city-state would be complete without a summary of the pivotal place of Lacerda, so-called "Destroyer of Presidents."

Carlos Frederico Werneck de Lacerda was born April 30, 1914, in the State of Rio de Janeiro. His father, a well-known journalist and political figure, named him after Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, and in his student days the young Lacerda was to become a member of a communist organization, as he never tired of relating later in his days as an anti-communist crusader. After breaking with the Reds in the 1930's he became a vociferous opponent of communism who claimed first-hand knowledge of the Party's subversive tactics and ideological snares.

Lacerda first came to public attention when he published the interview with José Américo which marked the end of years of censorship in 1945 and presaged the fall of the Vargas dictatorship. The following year he entered politics and was elected to the chamber of aldermen for the Federal District with 34,762 votes.[35] This was three times the amount garnered by the nearest opponent (Pedro de Carvalho Braga of the Communist Party) and over six times the total of the second-running UDN candidate, samba composer Ari Barroso.

In 1949 Lacerda founded a newspaper in Rio, the Tribuna da Imprensa, still extant today although Lacerda has severed his connection with the journal, which remains nonetheless one of his most loyal and vocal supporters. The Tribuna da Imprensa became Lacerda's organ of denunciation of Getulio Vargas' government when the ex-dictator returned to office democratically in 1950. In August of 1954 an attempt was made on Lacerda's life following a series of trenchant

attacks on Vargas published in Lacerda's newspaper. Though Lacerda himself escaped with a bullet wound in the foot, his companion, Air Force major Rubem Vaz, was killed. Despite Vargas' personal ignorance of the plot, it was traced to his bodyguard corps, and in the resulting furor leaders of the military presented the aged politician with an ultimatum to resign. On August 24, 1954, Vargas committed suicide; the Destroyer of Presidents had claimed his first victim.[36]

The same year, just weeks after the suicide of Vargas, Lacerda was elected to the federal chamber of deputies with the largest vote of any candidate for that body in the entire country--159,707 votes, a number sufficient to elect five other UDN candidates to the chamber as well.[37] In 1958 Lacerda was re-elected to the chamber with 143,012 votes, again the largest total for any candidate for that office in the Federal District.[38] His popularity was rapidly approaching its apex, and in 1960 he turned his sights to the governorship of the newly-created state of Guanabara.

The gubernatorial election of 1960 is a high-water mark in Lacerda's political career, for it marked the first time that he had exposed himself to a race in which his beliefs and record would be judged in unequivocal terms by the voters. Whereas previously he had run in "proportional" races, the governorship would be decided on a "majoritary" basis. The vote would clearly be pro-Lacerda or anti-Lacerda, and any future political hopes of the journalist turned lawmaker would ride on the outcome of that race.

The 1960 elections "marked the beginning of the process of ideological polarization and accentuated the radicalization of the electorate of Guanabara in terms of Lacerda and anti-Lacerda."[39] Lacerda

began the race under something of a cloud in the view of UDN leaders because of his sudden about-face on the question of who would be the UDN gubernatorial candidate. Since February of 1959 Lacerda had indicated his strong support for Geraldo de Menezes Côrtes, a general and federal deputy, as UDN candidate for the post. Lacerda's decision to seek the governorship himself, announced on May 20, 1960, caught even seasoned political observers by surprise.[40] Lacerda's launching of himself led to the resignation of Menezes Côrtes as secretary-general of the UDN-GB. In his letter of resignation the disgruntled deputy stated:

> During my stay in Brasília in the last few weeks, where I was exercising the leadership of the UDN, the [Regional] Directorate decided, without even informing the secretary-general and without awaiting the presence of the federal Deputies, to launch officially the candidacy of Carlos Lacerda for the governorship of the State of Guanabara, surprising all of us, as we were reaching agreement to decide on the candidacy towards the end of June. . . . I was a possible candidate of the UDN for the governorship of Guanabara, my duty as I saw it to those voters who placed their confidence in me. Desiring the victory of our party and convinced that it can only win with the full union of its forces, I have always thought it distasteful to carry the dispute to the Convention when there was a possibility of foreseeing the result. This is what is happening presently in the UDN, for the Convention is made up only of the Directorate members and the members of congress and of the local Chamber. The fight, therefore, would be a disservice to the party because of the subsequent weakening of the candidate finally selected.[41]

Thus came to public notice one of the long-standing elements of the UDN-GB after the ascension of Lacerda to domination in the state: the tension between the bancada federal and the state party leadership. Until the extinction of the UDN in 1965, relations between the UDN federal deputies representing Guanabara in congress and the leadership of the UDN-GB were always strained, sometimes to the point of open animosity. (See below, Chapter VII, for examples of this in 1965--

Lacerda-Amaral Neto hostilities and ill feeling between Lacerda and Aliomar Baleeiro.)

The year 1960 was also the date of election of a new president of Brazil, a complicating factor in Lacerda's plans to become first occupant of the Guanabara statehouse. (See above, pp. 48ff, for an account of the presidential race of Jânio Quadros and the role of the UDN in his victory.) Lacerda had been one of the early janistas in the UDN, but there are few indications that Jânio felt a personal debt to the Rio political leader; in fact, Jânio's winning margin in the state was such that it may be argued that Lacerda's narrow victory was a "coattail" offshoot of the Quadros sweep. The president of the Movimento Popular Jânio Quadros comments that Lacerda was right to "ardorously seek" the support of the MPJQ, considering the narrowness of his eventual victory.[42]

The PTB nominated Sérgio Magalhães, a federal deputy of relatively limited exposure in the state as a whole and considered part of the left wing of the PTB-GB.[43] Although Lacerda was the avowed favorite from the outset, he feared a PTB-PSD coalition against his candidacy, a fear which proved groundless when the PSD--at that time on the outs with the Labor Party--nominated its own candidate, a marshal-deputy named Mendes de Morais. Had Mendes been the candidate of the PTB or both PTB and PSD, he could have presented a formidable challenge to Lacerda, for he had been accused by Lacerda of having plotted the assassination attempt of 1954 and later of ordering him roughed up by thugs as he left a radio station.[44]

But without the support of the PTB legend backing him, Mendes was just a diversionary candidate who would serve to draw some few votes

away from Magalhães. Despite his known position as mortal enemy of the UDN leader, Mendes' candidacy never really got off the ground and he was to finish with a mere 5.1 per cent of the votes.[45]

The candidacy of Sérgio Magalhães, however, was beginning to show evidence of generating widespread support among the lower classes, despite the limited financial resources at its disposal. Telltale signs began to appear, indicating growing voter interest: Magalhães accused Lacerda of corruption, fistfights between Lacerdists and Sergists broke out in the Central do Brasil, and "the proletarian groups felt, as always, the drive to defeat Lacerda as the figure of Vargas . . . began to arise in the subconscious of the poor classes."[46] The only candidate who offered a chance of beating Lacerda was Magalhães, and the petebista's following grew as the weeks wore on. As the lower classes responded to the increasing polarization of the campaign, Magalhães' possibilities of victory grew apace.[47]

It was at this point that the candidacy of Tenório de Cavalcanti arose. Cavalcanti, a political boss in the neighboring State of Rio de Janeiro, enjoyed a colorful reputation as one of the most outspoken politicians in the country. It was rumored that he had extensive underground connections and carried a machine gun under his cape, but such allegations only served to increase admiration for him in the lower socio-economic classes. A personalistic candidate, Cavalcanti entered the race without the backing of a major party, and his presence was to become the deciding factor in the election.

> Tenório drew votes away from Sérgio, but only in the lowest classes, thus doing away with the class base of Sérgio. Tenório . . . was a typically class-based candidate.[48]

Was the entrance of Tenório Cavalcanti into the gubernatorial race a stroke of fortune which repercussed to the advantage of Lacerda and the UDN, or was it part of a strategy? Coutto holds that Cavalcanti made the try at the behest of the Lacerdists, a patent attempt to split the lower class vote. By attacking Lacerda violently and incessantly, Cavalcanti stole part of Magalhães' thunder, siphoning off some of the votes which otherwise would have gone to the PTB-PSB nominee.[49] A tactical error of Magalhães was to prove fatal:

> Instead of denouncing Tenório at once as a divisionist, as a tool of Lacerda, Sérgio preferred to wait in order to see if Tenório . . . would withdraw in his favor, for he thought Tenório really was Lacerda's enemy. It was quite ingenuous, and politics makes no allowance for such attitudes. When Sérgio saw the reality it was too late. Tenório had grown too much--at one point he even scared Lacerda, who vetoed the presence of Jânio at a luncheon offered by Tenório. . . .[50]

With Cavalcanti's entrance into the four-way race, it became a contest of Lacerda against three anti-Lacerdas. Utilizing all the most modern means of mass communication

> . . . relying on an extremely powerful system of propaganda, based on the most advanced publicity techniques, appearing daily on television and radio, . . .[51]

Lacerda made maximum use of the oratorical gifts which gave him a kind of charisma among the voters to whom he appealed, though it was never sufficient to make major inroads into the electoral strongholds of the vehemently anti-Lacerda opposition.

Meanwhile, the candidacy of Sérgio was experiencing setbacks, some of them, however, to turn into political assets. The PTB itself, which had nominated him only after he was already the PSB candidate, appeared less interested in furthering his cause than did the Movimento Nacionalista, a non-partisan political entity whose main thrust was, as the

name implies, nationalism.[52] Finally, the Church came out against the Magalhães candidacy:

> The veto came from Cardinal D. Jaime Câmara and the anathema was promulgated by word of D. Helder Câmara, then auxiliary archbishop of Rio de Janeiro. . . . In the interest of truth it is indispensable to emphasize that various ecclesiastic sectors reacted against the cardinals' veto . . . [as] Sérgio Magalhães [was] above all a practicing Catholic.[53]

In the long run it is probable that the incident created a backlash which helped rather than hurt Sérgio's chances.

On October 3, 1960, the election was held, after an extended and rigorous campaign marking the onset of an extreme polarization which, continuing in existence through 1965, would finally culminate in the vitriolic campaign which rent the state in that year. In 1960, however, the division of the electorate in face of three anti-Lacerdas was to prove decisive in the victory of the middle class candidate. The results, in terms of percentages, were: Lacerda - 36.5; Magalhães - 33.4; Cavalcanti - 22.3; Mendes - 5.1.[54]

As Rios notes:

> This distribution of votes demonstrates the extreme division of political forces and the small margin which assured the victory of the elected candidate. A coalition between the PTB and the PSD in Guanabara would have defeated the udenista candidate.[55]

Even with the divisionary figure of Tenório Cavalcanti in the race, had the PSD supported Sérgio Magalhães, its small 5.1 per cent would have sent Sérgio to the Palácio Guanabara instead of Carlos Lacerda.

An interesting study of the 1960 election has shown that, while Magalhães' appeal was roughly the same in all socio-economic classes, Lacerda and Cavalcanti must be considered class candidates.[56] For example, of those voters who favored Lacerda, 39 per cent were of the middle or upper class.[57] Tenório, on the other hand, received 35 per

cent of the votes of the operário class.[58] Within the working classes, those with "some index of professional specialization were for Sérgio. Manual labor preferred Tenório."[59]

It is noteworthy that the 1960 election saw a very low index (less than 4 per cent) of blank and null votes in the balloting for governor, an indication of the intense polarization which resulted from the campaign.[60] This high degree of extreme feeling was to reappear two years later, when the 1962 congressional and vice-governor races were marked by division of the electorate into proletarian and privileged classes after Lacerda had donned the mantle of anti-communism in his sustained attack on the João Goulart administration.[61] And of course the polarization in 1965, which handed Lacerda his most important setback to his political ambitions, was a direct offshoot of that which began five years earlier.[62]

If it seems that a disproportionate amount of space has been devoted to an account of the 1960 election, it should be kept in mind that that campaign is of importance for several reasons if one is to appreciate the Lacerda phenomenon in Guanabara and achieve an understanding of the role he played both in the UDN-GB, the national UDN and in state politics as a whole.

First, the 1960 election showed that Lacerda's charisma, although it did influence some voters of the lower classes into supporting him, was "less than would be expected if there were no correlation between Lacerdism and social class."[63] In other words:

> . . . in the elections of 1960 in Guanabara, the charismatic influence of Lacerda was reduced and limited to the higher classes.[64]

In the 1965 election Lacerda was to discover that even this limited

form of charisma was not transferable and that his candidate could not amass sufficient following among the middle class to gain election.

Second, the 1960 election proved that the UDN in Guanabara could win only in the event of a split among the opposition. Even so, the victory was of the "squeaker" variety, representing little more than a third of the vote. The Magalhães candidacy, furthermore, made notable incursions into the traditional middle class domain of the UDN, foreshadowing what was to occur five years later when Negrão de Lima represented the opposition.

Third, the 1960 election set the tone which was to dominate politics in Guanabara throughout the period of effective public enfranchisement which came to an end after the 1965 gubernatorial elections and the subsequent crackdown by the military regime. From 1960 onward, Guanabara's politics took on an increasingly polarized appearance, reaching a climax in 1965 when not only the continuation of UDN state power was at stake, but also Lacerda's aspirations to the presidency of the republic. After 1960 the main issue--it would be but a slight exaggeration to say the only issue--in statewide elections would be Lacerda. Whoever might appear on the ballot--as Flexa Ribeiro in 1965--the public would be voting for or against Carlos Lacerda.

Fourth, the 1960 election began a new era in the political life of Lacerda. For the first time he was situação (government) and not oposição. His political hopes thereafter would necessarily be tied to the record he would make as governor of the "ungovernable" city of Rio. In fact, there is some speculation that the Goulart administration actually wanted Lacerda to win in 1960 in order that he might prove a

failure as administrator and thereby reduce his chances for national office.[65]

Elected simultaneously with Lacerda--and by a far wider margin--was Jânio Quadros, who had the support of the controversial journalist-politician from the time predating the UDN nominating convention.[66] But within a few months of Quadros' taking office friction between the national executive and the head of government in Guanabara began to emerge.[67] By August of 1961 Lacerda had turned from ardent janista to archenemy of the policies of the Quadros government, although hesitating to attack the popular Quadros himself.[68] On August 24, 1961, Lacerda went on television to expose a plot, allegedly devised by Quadros' minister of justice, to close congress and rule by decree pending an "institutional reform." According to Lacerda, several governors had been approached, and he had been asked to sound out certain key military leaders about their reaction to the coup. But Lacerda denounced the conspiracy to the public:

> The Minister of Justice . . . outlined to me, with his unimpeachable intelligence, a panorama which can be summed up as follows: we consider it necessary to prepare the country for an "institutional reform" in which the congress, since it wants a "paid vacation," will really have a paid vacation. For this, told me this minister who has the confidence of the President, we need the support of some governors, starting with yours. The governor of São Paulo isn't ready yet for this talk, but later we'll converse with him, . . . said the Minister of Justice.
>
> I asked him what these reforms consisted of and got no precise answer about them. But he alluded to some articles of mine in 1956, when they were calling me a golpista because in a situation completely different from the present one, in a set of circumstances entirely dissimilar, I called for a short postponement of elections so that, with the consent of congress, the government could have full powers to execute certain reforms, beginning with the electoral laws. . . .
>
> The Minister of Justice then told me that he had sounded out two of the military ministers and asked me to sound out the remaining one. Of course I did not . . ..[69]

Lacerda went on to deplore the pink-tinged foreign policy of Jânio Quadros, adding that "perhaps the Southern Cross [decoration] given to Che Guevara will serve at least to hide the bloodstains on his chest from the Cubans he killed."[70] In conclusion he stated:

> I sincerely regret having to bring to the public this information. . . . Now, however, that from all sides have come so many voices calling to my consciousness a responsibility which I could not deny, I felt that I could only remain in office [rather than resign as he had contemplated] if I could have at my side the public conscience in order to wake up the President's, which lies sleeping in the wilderness of Brasília. I have faith in it, I have faith in him. I have faith in his lucidity, in his patriotism. . . .
>
> [I have decided to] remain, not in order to organize a force to oppose the President of the Republic, but to contribute to the organization of a force which can help the President not to oppose himself. . . .
>
> I remain in [office] so the President will not be alone; I remain in Guanabara so that my country may not stray from the path its founders laid down for it; . . . I remain in Guanabara so that all those who esteem me and those who hate me, those who understand me and those who defame me, may know that in the hour of plots and intrigue I did not shrink from my duty.[71]

The following day Jânio Quadros resigned from the presidency. The Destroyer of Presidents had claimed his second victim.[72]

In the time between the inauguration of João Goulart as Quadros' successor and the military takeover in 1964, Carlos Lacerda busied himself with the administration of the city-state of Guanabara and with the furtherance of his political ambitions--ambitions which went beyond the Palácio Guanabara and centered on the Palácio da Alvorada, the presidential mansion in distant Brasília.

Surprisingly, Carlos Lacerda proved to be an able administrator in Guanabara, something even his critics begrudgingly admitted. Coutto, for example, mentions the "administrative efficiency of his government,"[73] while Negrão de Lima paid Lacerda an indirect compliment by virtually ignoring his administrative record and concentrating on the alleged

shortcomings of the man, not the governor. In his five-year term Lacerda attempted to create what he termed a "new Rio," with construction of a divided freeway from downtown to the Zona Sul, new schools, viaducts and other public services. While it can be argued that many of the expenditures went to help the middle class, it is beyond dispute that such projects as low-cost housing in Vila Kennedy and Vila Esperança were intended to aid the working class and favelados--however less than universal their acceptance among those groups they were designed to benefit.[74]

From a personal standpoint, it was evident that Lacerda enjoyed governing after a lifetime in the opposition. In an interview published in November, 1964, he expressed his ideas on the subject:

> I didn't invent anything, I didn't discover gunpowder, nor did I bring about agrarian reform or square the circle. I merely began doing something which had not been done for a long time in Brazil: governing. It's unbelievable how things happen when you start to govern. In Brazil, governing is like shaking a kaleidoscope. Every movement of the hand produces new designs--they are schools, viaducts, hospitals.[75]

At the same time he governed, however, Lacerda was far from idle on the political front. After João Goulart gained full presidential powers in the plebiscite of January, 1963, which ended the abortive experiment in parliamentarianism, Lacerda perceived a drift leftward in the national administration and simultaneously a possible advance for his own presidential ambitions. As the inept Goulart administration showed itself unable--or unwilling--to contain a galloping inflation and did little to combat the increasingly leftist coloration of the government, Lacerda once again donned the anti-communist cloak and inveighed against the policies of the president of the republic. As he

said on one occasion just before the military takeover:

> It is necessary to do justice to Sr. João Goulart. He had already allowed his party, the PTB, to be colonized by the Communist Party. Deprived of the inspiration and the prestigious presence of President Getulio Vargas, the PTB was led by his self-styled heir into the hands of the Communist Party, which constitutes an influential group within it and knows what it wants and where it is going.76

In October of 1963 Goulart reacted to Lacerda's incessant attacks in a very direct manner, as recounted by Skidmore:

> The plot, apparently directed from the presidential palace, called for a small unit of paratroopers to seize Lacerda at a public dedication ceremony. Not only did the force arrive too late (because of a traffic delay!), but the Governor had been warned by some officers who had refused the order to carry out the plot. The ensuing publicity, predictably exploited by Lacerda, diverted attention from what had been a simultaneous plan to depose Miguel Arraes, the leftist Governor of Pernambuco. Goulart's objective was to remove at one stroke the two governors who symbolized the mobilization on the left and right, thereby giving his bid for emergency powers a politically "neutral" character. He would also be removing two of the leading candidates for the Presidential election of 1965. . . . Preparations in Pernambuco were even more rudimentary than in Guanabara, however, and the whole plot came to nothing.77

It was from this abortive coup that feelings began to grow in higher circles of the military that the president of the republic was trying to "overturn the table" and play by his own rules. Of the five politicians who were hoping to become Goulart's successor, three became conspirators--Governors Lacerda, Magalhães Pinto and Adhemar de Barros--and two others were consumed in the aftermath of Jango's fall (Kubitschek and Arraes).78

On March 31, 1964, the armed forces moved against João Goulart and forced him into exile in Uruguay , meeting with virtually no organized resistance. The Destroyer of Presidents had claimed his third--and last--victim.

Flushed with success and prestige for his role in bringing about the overthrow of the indecisive and increasingly unpopular Goulart, Lacerda entered the last phase of his political career in 1964 by winning the UDN presidential nomination after reaching a modus vivendi with Magalhães Pinto. In his acceptance speech, at the closing session of the UDN national convention in São Paulo on November 8, 1964, Lacerda stated his position as follows:

> Attracted early in life by the conflict of ideologies, I had to suffer a great deal in order to learn that democracy does not admit of [any one] ideology. The rigidity of ideology takes from democracy, which is not a finished system but a process of social and political evolution, its best instrument--flexibility in the study of and solution to national and world problems. . . . All the decisions of the statesman should be free of ideological preconceptions and open to understanding. Ideology creates preconceptions, which generate insuperable prejudice. . . .[79]

The question of Lacerda's ideology, now that he was an official candidate to the nation's highest office, was to assume greater importance between late 1964 and the gubernatorial elections of 1965 when his prestige and presidential aspirations were at stake. On another occasion Lacerda remarked apropos of his beliefs:

> I begin by arguing that a true democrat has no ideology. Democracy allows for a variety of solutions to problems, from socialistic means to those of [classical] liberalism, according to the circumstances, the historical period, the necessities and the limitations [of the situation]. There is, in this sense, in the democrat an inclination to look for solutions without bias or prejudice, which is just the opposite of what is entailed in a system, an ideology.
>
> I have a doctrine, yes. And a program. I have ideas. But not an ideology.
>
> I learned a lesson with Marx and have not forgotten it: it is necessary to stop explaining the world and try to transform it.[80]

Despite Lacerda's disclaimers and however unmistakable his personalist appeal for those who made up his corps of supporters, the Lacerda phenomenon was not devoid of ideological content, as Dillon Soares has shown. Briefly, Lacerda backers were in favor of laissez-faire

capitalism and of foreign capital, not at all surprising given the middle class makeup of urban UDN support.[81]

As a candidate of national scope, Lacerda was faced with the problem of broadening his appeal beyond the middle class which, even in Guanabara, was not large enough to elect him without the help of a divided opposition. Without alienating the middle class, he had to find some means of attracting voters from the lower groups as well. Since 1958 Lacerda had attempted to soft-pedal his opposition to Getulio Vargas and the Vargas myth by arguing that with the latter's death the "personal questions" between the two had ended.[82] The glowing reference to the "prestigious presence of President Getulio Vargas" in the PTB quoted on page 157 is indicative of the toned-down approach the udenista leader was taking in the 1960's. It was not until the gubernatorial campaign of 1965 that Lacerda was to find the key to an appeal to both middle class and lower socio-economic groups: indefatigable opposition to the ever more unpopular Castelo Branco government. If Lacerda could manage to present himself as the candidate of the revolution while at the same time attacking Castelo as having betrayed the revolution, his victory would be much nearer realization, especially since the purge of such potential rivals as Juscelino Kubitschek and Miguel Arraes. The first half of Lacerda's strategy had begun to emerge even as he accepted the nomination of his party to the presidency:

> The Revolution has a government which needs us and to which we can not deny aid. The Revolution will have a candidate. <u>That candidate will be the one you have chosen</u>.[83]

Only later, when it became unmistakably evident that Carlos Flexa

Ribeiro, Lacerda's candidate to his succession, was destined to lose, did Lacerda begin to "inveigh violently against . . . Castelo, hoping to topple him from the government."[84] Perhaps ingenuously, Lacerda never lost entirely the desire to be the candidate of the revolution even after his assault on the acknowledged representative of that revolution.[85] Ironically, although Lacerda was unsuccessful in bringing about the fall of a fourth president, he did instigate a crisis of authority in the higher reaches of power which hastened the end of the direct vote in Brazil by ushering in the Second Institutional Act.[86]

Carlos Lacerda is acknowledged--even by his enemies--to possess one of the keenest minds to enter Brazilian politics since Ruy Barbosa. He speaks excellent English and French, both self-taught, and has written essays, criticism and plays, as well as the Portuguese translation of How to Succeed in Business Without Really Trying, a smash hit in Rio. Lacerda never obtained a university degree, being hounded by Vargas' police during his student days in the 1930's into taking refuge, but his oratorical talents and sharp wit were among his most useful and feared political weapons. On one occasion an opponent exlaimed to Lacerda, "You are a thief of other people's honor!" Lacerda replied instantly, "Then you have nothing to fear."

Despite his indisputable gifts, however, Lacerda faced in 1965 the greatest challenge he had ever confronted. On the one hand he must assure a continued power base by securing the election of a UDN candidate as governor in Guanabara. On the other he must walk a tightrope between the groundswell of discontent with the revolutionary government of Castelo Branco and the ever present possibility of a military veto of Lacerda's own presidential aspirations should he overstep the

bounds in his sometimes strident denunciations of the administration. In Chapters VII and VIII a case study will be presented which attempts to demonstrate how Lacerda tried to meet this challenge.

The case study will also try to demonstrate the operational aspects of UDN politics in the state of Guanabara. Centering on the nomination process within the UDN-GB and the hard-fought gubernatorial campaign which followed it, the study will provide information and insights about the relation between Lacerda and his state party and about the unique position of Lacerda in the city-state of Rio. As Coutto has said, "Lacerda, really, is the great elector of the State, as much for as against his person."87 This observation is borne out in the study which follows.

It should be kept in mind that a case study does not lend itself to facile generalization. Guanabara can in no way be considered a representative microcosm of Brazilian overall political behavior except insofar as it is in the same economic take-off stage as certain other regions of the country. Of course it is subject to the same electoral regulations and structural limitations as the rest of Brazil, but in general the differences between Guanabara and the other states--in terms of literacy, percentage of voters, relative wealth and state of politization--outweigh the similarities.

NOTES

[1]Rowe, "Stirrings in Acre," pp. 4-5.

[2]One example is the case of Minas Gerais between 1958 and 1962. The UDN in 1958 was only the fourth largest party in terms of seats in the Assembléia Legislativa, with eleven deputies compared to the twenty-four of the PSD, the seventeen of the PR and the twelve of the PTB. The UDN held but 14.8 percent of the total membership. But in 1962 the UDN won twenty-six seats to the eighteen taken by the PSD, which lost ground to become the second largest party in the state. The UDN in 1962 had 30 percent of the seats in the Assembléia, a difference which can be explained by the vigorous campaign of the UDN governor, José Magalhães Pinto, to elect a workable percentage of legislative supporters. See Julio Barbosa, "Minas Gerais," in Cavalcanti and Reisky Dubnic (eds,), Comportamento Eleitoral no Brasil, pp. 187ff.

[3]Some authorities include Bahia in the Northeast, but for this analysis I have included only the states of Ceará, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraíba, Pernambuco, Alagoas and Sergipe.

[4]Peterson feels that in assessing the relative electoral strength of parties within a state "perhaps the most accurate picture is presented in the results of state deputy elections," for several reasons. (Peterson, "Brazilian Political Parites," pp. 120-123.) Among these is the fact that coalitions were far less common in proportional elections such as those for state deputy because even small parties felt they stood a chance of electing at least a few members. Also, state deputy elections were usually--not always--held in a non-presidential election year, thus minimizing any "coattail effect." Finally, where a candidate for governor or senator might win through a fluke--as Carlos Lacerda did in Guanabara in 1960--the overall balance of the multiparty Assembléia, chosen on proportional and not plurality basis, was less subject to such electoral accidents.

[5]Other reasons included a large proportion of the state's residents under the legal voting age (eighteen years), a high rate of abstention because of poor internal communications and transportation, and a tradition of low politization.

[6]Peterson, "Brazilian Political Parties," p. 120.

[7]Dados Estatísticos: 1960, p. 11.

[8]São Paulo was the personal political fiefdom of the late Adhemar de Barros, sometimes governor and founder of his own personalist party, the PSP. He went into retirement after the revolutionary government stripped him of his political rights following the 1964 takeover. Adhemar's PSP enjoyed a solid position of strength in his home state, though in later years it was challenged by the PSD. Caught in the PSP-PSD axis in São Paulo, the UDN found slim pickings. In Rio Grande do Sul the lion's share of power belonged to the PTB, creation of Getulio Vargas.

The state, Vargas' birthplace, never voted the UDN as many as 10 percent of the seats in its Assembléia, nor did the party achieve election of more than two federal deputies at any one time in the gaúcho delegation.

[9]Barbosa, "Minas Gerais," pp. 187-188.

[10]The fragmentation at the local level (i.e., in the Assembéia) was so pronounced in the Federal District that year that an even dozen parties won seats in the lawmaking body. The PSD and PTB held five each, and other parties took from one to four seats. That such a phenomenon may be related to a high degree of urbanization--certainly a hallmark of the state of Guanabara--is suggested in Gláucio Ary Dillon Soares and Amélia Carvalho de Noronha, "Urbanização e Dispersão Eleitoral," Revista de Direito Público e Ciência Política (July-December, 1960), pp. 258-270.

[11]See below, Chapter VIII.

[12]This practice was severely curtailed after the revolutionary government took power and clamped down on the availability of free flights to and from the new capital on weekdays.

[13]José Arthur Rios, "Guanabara," in Cavalcanti and Reisky Dubnic (eds.), Comportamento Eleitoral no Brasil, p. 123.

[14]However, in 1962 the UDN won fourteen seats of fifty-five and the PTB took thirteen, an indication that the multiparty index of Guanabara was higher in 1958, when no party won more than eight seats. See Dillon Soares and Carvalho de Noronha, "Urbanização e Dispersão Eleitoral," p. 259.

[15]Although the literacy requirement is winked at in many parts of the interior where the coronéis still hold political power, it is generally enforced in the cities, albeit with imperfect uniformity.

[16]Rios, "Guanabara," p. 124.

[17]Dados Estatísticos: 1962, p. 15.

[18]Based on data in Dados Estatísticos, Vols. I-VI [1945-1962].

[19]This is another example, however, of a law oftimes more honored in the breach than in the observance.

[20]Rios, "Guanabara," pp. 124-125.

[21]Francisco Pedro do Coutto, O Voto e o Povo (Civilização Brasileira, 1966), pp. 15-16. He cites the IBOPE as source for the figures.

[22]Estudos Cariocas: Mobilidade Populacional e Condições Sócio-Econômicas (Estado da Guanabara, 1965), unnumbered pages.

[23]"Majoritary" elections were distinguished from "proportional" elections in that the latter allotted seats in the federal chamber of deputies or in the Assembléia Legislativa on the basis of total vote for each party, regardless of the number of candidates on that party's list. "Majoritary" election--those for president, vice president, governor, vice governor and senator--were decided on an individual basis, a fact which discouraged small parties from running and lent impetus to coalitions and alliances.

[24]Coutto, O Voto e o Povo, p. 13.

[25]Even in the favelas, where large numbers of illiterates and semi-literate persons from the Northeast and other depressed areas are concentrated, the literacy rate is still high compared to Brazil as a whole, which claims approximately a 50 percent adult literacy rate. For an interesting description of the Rio favelas and their political behavior, see José Arthur Rios, "Aspectos Humanos da Favela Carioca," which appeared in the newspaper O Estado de São Paulo in 1960.

[26]Francisco Pedro do Coutto, Correio de Manhã, July 11, 1965, p. 3.

[27]Weffort, "State and Mass in Brazil," p. 191.

[28]Rios, "Aspectos Humanos da Favela Carioca," p. 27. The author goes on to state that "parties function little," quoting one favelado as saying, "People put the party to one side and vote for the person." Rios further points out the fundamentally non-ideological nature of the favelas' political behavior by relating the story of one favelado who installed a loudspeaker to electioneer for a candidate supported by ex-Integralista Plínio Salgado. "His loudspeaker was stoned, but not for any ideological reason. Because it made a lot of noise at night." (Ibid.)

[29]Quoted by Coutto, O Voto e o Povo, pp. 105-106.

[30]Ibid., p. 107. The population figures are confirmed by conclusions in Estudos Cariocas: Dados Demográficos (Estado da Guanabara, 1965).

[31]Ibid., pp. 31-32.

[32]The TRE is the Tribunal Regional Eleitoral or State Electoral Court, highest court in Guanabara in dealing with questions of voting, registration of parties and candidates, settlement of charges of electoral fraud, etc.

[33]Coutto, O Voto e o Povo, pp. 109-110.

[34]It could be argued, of course, that the PTB by nominating Negrão de Lima in 1965 chose a candidate of some acceptability to the middle class, normally the mainstay of the UDN in the state. Nevertheless, once Negrão was officially named candidate of the PTB-PSD coalition he himself openly fostered polarization as a tactic designed to overcome the advantage his UDN opponent had built up in the early months.

[35]Dados Estatísticos: 1945, p. 115.

[36]Even as long as eleven years later, during the 1965 elections, it was common to see scrawled on walls around Rio the anti-Lacerda slogan, "Negrão never betrayed Getulio."

[37]Dados Estatísticos: 1954 e 1955, p. 162.

[38]Dados Estatísticos: 1958, p. 262.

[39]Coutto, O Voto e o Povo, p. 57.

[40]Castilho Cabral, Tempo de Jânio, p. 197.

[41]Ibid., pp. 197-198.

[42]Ibid., p. 205.

[43]Coutto, O Voto e o Povo, p. 58.

[44]Ibid., pp. 63-64.

[45]Rios, "Guanabara," p. 126.

[46]Coutto, O Voto e o Povo, pp. 61-62.

[47]Coutto, political analyst for the Correio da Manhã, states that in elections in Guanabara the UDN always got off to a fast lead because the middle class decides quickly which candidate it will support. The UDN, therefore, always "peaked out" early and never passed the 40 percent mark in votes. The PTB, on the other hand, its strength based on the lower class votes, took longer to reach its full potential because the "proletarian" electorate wavered for a longer period before coming down firmly on the side of the leftist-populist PTB. In part, he contends, this was due to the subconscious effect of Getulio Vargas--his political legacy to the PTB. (Coutto, O Voto e o Povo, pp. 76-77.)

[48]Gláucio Ary Dillon Soares, "As Bases Ideológicas do Lacerdismo," Revista Civilização Brasileira (September, 1965), p. 59.

[49]Although the support of the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) was of small importance in terms of votes commanded by the party itself, it had psychological value in consolidating the leftist-socialist orientation of the forces behind Magalhaes. In the race for Assembléia seats, held concurrently with the gubernatorial election, the PSD polled only 5.8 percent of the total votes. (Rios, "Guanabara," p. 126.)

[50]Coutto, O Voto e o Povo, pp. 64-65.

[51]Ibid., p. 58.

[52]Ibid., p. 66.

[53]Ibid., pp. 66-67.

[54]Rios, "Guanabara," p. 126.

[55]Ibid.

[56]Dillon Soares, "As Bases Ideológicas do Lacerdismo," p. 60.

[57]Ibid., p. 61.

[58]Ibid., p. 62.

[59]Coutto, O Voto e o Povo, p. 68.

[60]Ibid., p. 68.

[61]Rios, "Guanabara," p. 166.

[62]See below, Chapter VIII, for a discussion of the effects of polarization in the 1965 election.

[63]Dillon Soares, "As Bases Ideológicas do Lacerdismo," p. 62.

[64]Ibid., p. 60.

[65]Coutto, O Voto e o Povo, pp. 65-66.

[66]See above, pp. 53-56.

[67]See above, pp. 67-69.

[68]This tactic of Lacerda's was repeated during a later period when he headed the opposition to the Castelo Branco government. Lacerda carefully refrained from attacking the revolution in order to avoid creating enmity among the higher echelons of the military; rather he assailed Castelo as having betrayed the revolution and used Roberto Campos, the planning minister, as a scapegoat for the country's economic ills.

[69]Carlos Lacerda, O Poder das Idéias, 2nd edition (Distribuidora Record, 1963), pp. 331-332.

[70]Ibid., p. 339.

[71]Ibid., pp. 339-341.

[72]For a somewhat more detailed account, see above, pp. 67-69.

[73]Coutto, O Voto e o Povo, p. 81.

[74]The major complaint of the favelados removed--many of them against their will--from the hillside shantytowns was that the new housing projects were so far from their places of employment that they spent two hours or more going to work and a like amount returning.

[75]Carlos Lacerda, Palavras e Ação (Distribuidora Record, 1965), p. 67.

[76] Ibid., p. 186.

[77] Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, p. 263. For a detailed account of the events leading up to the overthrow of Goulart, see Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, pp. 261-300.

[78] Ibid., pp. 273-276.

[79] Lacerda, O Poder das Idéias, p. 15.

[80] Carlos Lacerda, Reforma e Revolução. ABC Democrático 4 (Distribuidora Record, 1964), unnumbered pages.

[81] Dillon Soares, "As Bases Ideológicas do Lacerdismo," p. 69.

[82] Coutto, O Voto e o Povo, p. 55.

[83] Lacerda, Palavras e Ação, p. 16. (Emphasis added.)

[84] Coutto, O Voto e o Povo, p. 90.

[85] It should be noted that presidential elections scheduled for 1965 had been postponed until 1966 by means of prorrogação (extension) of Castelo's term, approved by congress. At the same time the terms of the incumbent governors, destined to expire in 1964, were also extended, including those of Lacerda and Magalhães Pinto.

[86] Coutto, O Voto e o Povo, pp. 90-91.

[87] Ibid., p. 63.

CHAPTER VI

AN ATTITUDINAL STUDY IN GUANABARA

When the present work was first conceptualized in 1964 there was a notable dearth of in-depth studies of Latin American parties. With such exceptions as Harry Kantor's pioneering study of the Peruvian APRA,[1] Latin American parties had generally been studied on a national or even hemispheric basis, with little attention given to the operations of particular parties within a nation or subdivision thereof. As Fitzgibbon pointed out in his well-known essay on the subject, "So many questions need to be asked, so many definitions suggested, so many measurements devised and applied!" He went on to argue that the field of Latin American political parties

> . . . is one which needs a vast amount of spade work of a primary sort. . . . I commend the field of Latin American political parties to a whole generation of prospective graduate students in political science.[2]

Although as yet there has been no noticeable plethora of case studies of Latin American parties, in recent years scholars have begun to undertake some of the "spade work" to which Fitzgibbon referred.[3] The present study, then, attempts to make a small contribution through explaining the structure and function of one political party in one country of South America--the UDN in Brazil. As a case study it is of course limited to its own parameters, but it is to be hoped that a series of case studies may later be synthesized into a theoretical construct which is "greater than the sum of its parts."[4] It is the

author's desire that this study may take its place as one of numerous inquiries into party phenomena in Latin America, awaiting the coming of a latter-day Durkheim to weave a tapestry of theory from the threads of seemingly unrelated data.

Just as the overall form of the present work is a case study, the data incorporated in this chapter represent a "case study within a case study." This chapter deals with the feelings, attitudes or perceptions of some 312 persons who to a greater or lesser degree identified with the União Democrática Nacional in 1965 and who lived in the state of Guanabara.

Methodology

The findings related in this chapter derive from a survey made by the author in late April and early May, 1965, in the state of Guanabara.[5] The questionnaire used to obtain much of the information was evolved during several months of preliminary study and cultural adaptation in the city of Rio de Janeiro (approximately January through March of 1965) and was pretested with a group of forty-seven persons. The pretest resulted in several modifications in content and wording but did not change the overall orientation of the project.

Respondents to the questionnaire came from two sources. The larger portion of the sample (202 persons) consists of those interviewed prior to and during the UDN National Convention held April 29-30 in Niterói, capital of the State of Rio de Janeiro, across the Bay of Guanabara from the city of Rio. This convention was held to elect a successor to outgoing UDN president Olavo Bilac Pinto, ineligible under party statutes to succeed himself. Chosen for sampling purposes

primarily for reasons of availability and convenience, the convention was to prove far more interesting than anyone had anticipated.[6] The National Convention had several features which made it a highly attractive site for gathering opinions. First, it guaranteed the presence of several hundred party activists in an atmosphere of intense politicization. Second, it marked a climax in partisan feeling and intraparty division, a polarization within the UDN which might later be less apparent as attempts were made to close ranks for the 1965 gubernatorial election. Third, it provided an unparalleled opportunity to watch a Brazilian political party at a moment of high emotional commitment. Finally, it allowed a chance to make use of assistants to conduct opinion sampling in a semi-controlled situation. It yielded ninety-eight respondents.

The assistants were recruited in the main from the Social Sciences faculty of the Pontifícia Universidade Católica (PUC), a Roman Catholic university generally acknowledged to have an excellent program in the social sciences. The assistants numbered fourteen in all and were from nineteen to twenty-eight years of age. Because of cultural factors which preclude Brazilian females from approaching a stranger and starting a conversation, only male interviewers were employed.

Social Sciences students from PUC were used because it was felt they represented the closest thing Rio had at that time to graduate students, combining as they did interest in the subject matter and an appreciation of the utmost importance of honesty in data collection. All interviewers underwent an intensive training program in which were outlined the purpose and goals of the project, while interviewing

techniques, some fundamentals of survey sampling and other necessary background were also provided. The assistants were drilled in interview procedures by conducting several mock interviews in the presence of the researcher and their fellow interviewers. Before collecting the data found in this chapter the assistants were given a test run, two weeks before actual information gathering began. As a reliability check, each assistant was told to list the respondent's name, address and home or office telephone number. Each of these interviews was then followed up by phone or in person by the researcher and only one case of "armchair interviewing" (cheating) was discovered. The culprit was eliminated from the project. It is thus with a certain degree of security in the reliability of the data that the conclusions in this chapter are presented.

After the preliminary veracity check, the students were assigned to conduct interviews during the period April 16 through April 30, culminating in the National Convention of the UDN in Niterói. Roughly two-thirds of the respondents (201 persons) were interviewed either before or during the convention, with only about one-third of the total (111 persons) questioned in the two weeks following the national meeting. No attempt has been made in this study to distinguish between those respondents at the convention and those queried elsewhere.

While the time period involved in this survey is longer than that usually found in similar studies in the United States, certain elements in the Brazilian way of life made an extended span unavoidable. It was frequently necessary, for example, to set three or four appointment times with an individual respondent before succeeding in the task. (Politicians, obviously busier than the average, were among the worst

offenders in this respect.) Government workers, who would tell the interviewers to come to their offices, seldom arrive before ten a.m.--especially those in the higher echelons of management--and many senior functionaries show up two days a week at most because they hold down one or more other jobs. The observance of hora latina, whereby the interviewee might come anywhere from half an hour to two hours late--if at all--was another factor which obliged expansion of the time period. In addition, demands of school work on the assistants had to be taken into consideration, for the project took place during the PUC academic year.

Subjects for interview were selected in various ways. A certain freedom in selection was enjoyed because of the lack of necessity of extracting a random sample from the Guanabaran universe of all political partisans. Only those identifying to some extent with the UDN and/or Carlos Lacerda were chosen, although the degree of identification varied from highly intense to a mild preference. Some of the sources from which respondents, other than those at the UDN National Convention, were drawn include the following: lists of contributors and duespayers in the UDN national headquarters and in the office of the UDN-GB, student officeholders in UDN youth organizations, visitors to the UDN-GB office, members of the Assembléia Legislativa listed as udenistas, cabos eleitorais, persons formerly active in the state party but since inactive, students identified as strong UDN sympathizers or Lacerdists although not officeholders, friends and acquaintances of the student assistants, former officeholders on the state and the national levels, political writers for newspapers and magazines. In

many cases those contacted were able to offer suggestions regarding other sources that might prove useful.[7]

Compiling a resource list from which to draw UDN sympathizers was not an easy task, for Brazilian voters did not indicate their party preference at the time they registered to vote. Also, many Brazilians--like many Americans--take pride in their lack of party affiliation, yet another factor which contributed to the lack of "responsible" political parties in the 1945-65 period. It was therefore necessary to compile preliminary lists which perforce contained many whose political sympathies lay elsewhere and then make discreet inquiries until a suitable subject was found. For example, it was felt that more productive results would arise from seeking udenistas among lawyers and faculty members at colleges and universities than, say, among manual laborers in a foundry. It was difficulties such as this which rendered inevitable the use of the UDN National Convention as a source of respondents, especially those in the Officeholder and Activist classes. (See below for definitions of these terms as used in this study.)

One final point vis-à-vis the use of student assistants is in order. It was felt that a foreign researcher, however proficient his Portuguese, would have an inhibitory effect on respondents. Therefore, with the exception of unstructured interviews with politicians and other politically sophisticated persons accustomed to the idea and ends of survey research (e.g., professors and newspapermen), interviews were conducted exclusively with the use of native Brazilians.

For purposes of analysis, respondents were divided into three party rank categories according to their degree of involvement in UDN political

undertakings. The three groups are Officeholders, Activists and Sympathizers.[8]

Officeholders include those who had held or were then holding elective or appointive office at local, state or national level either within the UDN--as for example, members of the UDN National Directorate--or under the banner of the party--such as state and federal deputies. Though relatively small (N = 47), this group represented those who had attained the highest emoluments the party could confer and therefore, at least in theory, those with the greatest stake in the continuation and advancement of the UDN. Abbreviation in tables: OH.

Activists is the term applied to those who, although not holding office, were involved in party activities to a greater extent than merely voting for it or "wishing it well." This group included student leaders in the UDN university associations, delegates to state or national conventions who had not held any other office,[9] poll watchers, organizers of electoral committees in behalf of the party, and cabos eleitorais.[10] This group was larger than the Officeholders but smaller than the Sympathizers (N = 98). Abbreviation in tables: A.

Sympathizers were those expressing a degree of identification with the UDN (or with Carlos Lacerda) who did not fall into either of the first two categories. As might be expected, this was the largest division (N = 167). Abbreviation in tables: S.

Respondents were asked to supply information as to age, profession, place of birth, family income, area of residence in Guanabara and other data which would be used to classify them. They were not, however, asked to give their name or address. In the preliminary survey

done prior to that reported here, it was found that a marked reticence was apparent among some respondents--a reaction, it is likely, to the repressive measures following the 1964 revolution and to the uncertainty then prevailing in national politics. By guaranteeing anonymity to the respondents this problem was satisfactorily overcome.

A copy of the questionnaire is included in Appendix II, in English translation. Statistical tests for validity were restricted to Chi-Square, a non-parametric measure necessitated by the nature of the sample, the randomness of which is highly debatable. Unless otherwise noted, findings are significant at the .05 level or better. In the analysis which follows, it should be understood that this survey makes no claim of being definitive or of having widespread applicability beyond the small segment to which it applies. There is no proof that those interviewed represent a random sample of the udenistas of Guanabara in 1965, but it is hoped that the findings--indicative rather than exhaustive--will serve to provide at least an approximate idea of what some members of the UDN were thinking and feeling in the year their party was extinguished.

Major and Minor Hypotheses

A major hypothesis of the survey was that, all factors maintained equal, Activists and Officeholders would tend to be better informed about the history and current activities of the UDN than those with a lesser degree of involvement. As the table below demonstrates, this hypothesis was affirmed.[11]

TABLE IV

INFORMATION LEVEL OF UDN ADHERENTS, BY PARTY RANK CATEGORY

	% Answering All Questions Correctly
Officeholders	93
Activists	74
Sympathizers	35

Of the four items intended to determine the subject's degree of acquaintance with current events and history of the party (questions 9, 13, 27 and 42), three dealt with public figures then in the news (the minister of education, the federal deputies from Guanabara, the minister of planning) and the fourth asked for the name of any one of numerous founders of the UDN. Questions 13 and 27 admitted of various correct answers, but even so only slightly more than one-third of the Sympathizers were able to answer correctly all four items. When educational level is held constant, the same phenomenon occurs, as seen in Table V below.

TABLE V

EDUCATION AS A FACTOR IN INFORMATION LEVEL OF UDN ADHERENTS

No college training		Some college training (incl. degree)
% Answering all questions correctly		% Answering all questions correctly
Officeholders	86	95
Activists	65	78
Sympathizers	27	48

In all cases, it may be seen, Officeholders scored highest, with Activists in second place, and Sympathizers the least informed. Not surprisingly, in all three groups those who had had some higher education or had completed a college degree were better informed than their non-university counterparts, but in no instance did a college-educated group in one category surpass even the non-university group in the higher category. This would tend to corroborate the original hypothesis.

A second major hypothesis--designed to test easy generalizations about the prevalence of party-switching and the nature of personalism in Brazilian parties--was that there existed a direct correlation between one's rank within the UDN and his sense of loyalty and obligation to its candidates. That is, the higher one rose in the party, the more likely he was to have supported UDN nominees for local, state and national offices through the years. Therefore questions were included in the survey asking each respondent to state how he had voted in each of the presidential elections since 1945 and in the last balloting for federal deputy and for the Assembléia Legislativa. (In the pretest it was found that many respondents were unable to recall for whom they had voted in congressional elections, and an even larger number could not remember their party choice for the Assembléia; for this reason questions relating to the lower offices were restricted to the most recent election.) The findings tend to indicate that, although party dissension and defection of well known politicians within the various party groups receive a great deal of attention and create headlines, the run-of-the-mill partisan (at least of the UDN) was rather loyal.

TABLE VI

PARTY LOYALTY AS REFLECTED BY VOTE FOR UDN CANDIDATES, BY PARTY RANK CATEGORY

	% Voting for UDN in last presidential election	% Voting for UDN in last federal deputy election	% Voting for UDN in last Assembléia election
Officeholders	95	92	87
Activists	88	79	75
Sympathizers	64	57	41
	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$

Two comments are in order regarding Table VI. First, it is clear that Officeholders tend to vote for the party whatever the level. There is not a statistically significant difference between the percentage of Officeholders supporting the UDN candidate at presidential, congressional or Assembléia level. Furthermore, Officeholders are more likely to have voted for the party candidates than either Activists or Sympathizers, whatever the electoral level; the relation is linear. Second, there is a sizable disparity between the percentage of Sympathizers supporting the presidential candidate (Jânio Quadros in 1960) and the percentage backing UDN candidates for the Assembléia.[12] This would tend to confirm Coutto's concept of the existence of a large "domestic vote" in Guanabara.[13] Even among party Officeholders and Activists support for Assembléia candidates is less than for the higher offices, though not of statistical significance.

A third hypothesis, suggested by a study done by Dillon Soares in Guanabara,[14] was that there existed a correlation between one's

socio-economic status and several dependent variables. Among these were one's degree of interest in politics, one's likelihood of voting, and one's probability of adopting an issue-orientation rather than a personality-orientation. The basis of this hypothesis is the clearly demonstrated correlation in Guanabara between socio-economic status and occupation, income and education.[15] In an effort to test this, questions were included in the survey requesting the respondent to state his area of residence (limited in this study to Zona Norte or Zona Sul, the latter including Tijuca), the highest level of formal education he had completed, and a self-classification listing the social class with which he identified himself. In addition, respondents were asked to furnish data on their family income, measured in terms of salários mínimos (the monthly minimum wage in Guanabara).

A sub-hypothesis was that persons subjected to cross pressures would be less likely to be Activists or Officeholders than those free of such contradictory stimuli. For example, a person whose family income was one of salário mínimo but who identified with the upper middle or upper class would obviously suffer from opposing forces pulling him in two directions simultaneously. He would therefore be likely to take refuge in apathy, an improbable set of circumstances for creating Activists or Officeholders. By the same token, if a person lived in the Zona Norte, electoral redoubt of the PTB, but nevertheless identified with the UDN, he would find himself under cross pressures from the environment in which he dwelled; he too would be likely to withdraw into apathy, assigning little importance to the realm of politics.[16]

The findings of the survey tend tentatively to bear out these hypotheses. Table VII shows the percentage of individuals in each of the three categories who were classed as subject to cross pressures for reasons of class identification, residence or income.

TABLE VII

UDN ADHERENTS SUBJECT TO CROSS PRESSURES, BY PARTY RANK CATEGORY

	% Subject to cross pressures
Officeholders	0.0
Activists	15.4
Sympathizers	28.4
	$p < .001$

Without exception Officeholders were free from contradictory pulls. Whether this explains why they became Officeholders or is a reflection of the absence of forces which would tend to divert them from the road leading to the highest echelons of the UDN must remain conjecture. Officeholders uniformly lived in areas of UDN electoral strength, enjoyed high incomes and had completed secondary or university training--all factors which would tend to lead to strong identification with the UDN in Guanabara. Sympathizers, on the other hand, were more likely than others to be subject to environmental, income or occupational cross pressures, and in some cases more than one such disorienting element was present. This helps explain both the lower support percentages given by Sympathizers and the fact that abstention from voting--a common sign of contradictory demands--is higher among Sympathizers than either of the other classes.[17] Activists also show a

fairly high degree of cross pressures, especially in comparison to the Officeholders. This may reflect the influence of cabos eleitorais, who live in the area in which they are trying to mobilize voters (including the predominantly PTB-oriented Zona Norte), or it may reflect the fact that Activists as a group include a large number of persons whose upward mobility has as yet manifested itself more in terms of class identification or shift in party allegiance than in increased income or change of residence. Again, only further study can clarify this point. In any case it seems apparent that by the time a UDN adherent had arrived to the stage of holding party office, his class identification, educational level, income and occupation were all in accord with his environment; in other words, he lived among and interacted with persons largely of the same political persuasion. In part, of course, this reflected the increased horizontal mobility of the middle classes--their ability to exercise greater freedom of choice in selection of a neighborhood.

A positive correlation emerged between position in the party and socio-economic position, although no preliminary hypothesis had been formulated in this respect. Table VIII shows this relationship. It becomes unmistakably apparent that Officeholders are far above average in terms of education, occupation and income; this is in keeping with previous statements pointing out that those who run for office are generally expected to contribute to the party and finance their own campaigns rather than being beneficiaries of party largesse. Activists are predominantly in the middle income range, but so are Sympathizers. It would be interesting to compare UDN Sympathizers with PTB Sympathizers of the same period in terms of income, if such data

were available. Although an educated guess would be that UDN Sympathizers generally enjoyed higher incomes than their counterparts in the PTB (as reflected by the UDN's strength year after year in the Zona Sul, where the middle and upper classes were concentrated), there is no "hard" evidence to back up this presumption. Nevertheless, it can be safely stated that UDN supporters, whatever their level of enthusiasm on the tripartite scale, enjoyed income levels well above the median in the state of Guanabara.

TABLE VIII

INCOME LEVEL OF UDN ADHERENTS, BY PARTY RANK CATEGORY

	Nº of salários mínimos		
	0-1	2-4	5 or more
Officeholders	0.0	2.7	97.3
Activists	5.1	68.4	26.5
Sympathizers	24.2	54.5	21.3

Another facet of the composite picture of UDN adherents in 1965 is their occupational classification. A major hypothesis was that, if one classifies occupations in terms of the training and/or education usually prerequisite to their practice, UDN adherents in Guanabara would be found in the higher professional categories in percentages higher than the state mean. In order to do this, occupational categories used originally by Hutchinson in his study Mobilidade e Trabalho were employed, slightly modified.[18] The categories are:

I--Liberal professions and high administrative positions
II--Management and directing positions

III--High supervisory positions and non-manual inspection
IV--Non-manual routine jobs
V--Supervisory and inspection positions (manual)
VI--Skilled manual jobs
VII--Unskilled manual jobs

Dillon Soares found a high positive correlation to exist between job category and education, with those in Categories I and II far more likely to possess a university degree than persons in the lowest three categories.[19] For purposes of analysis in the present study, Categories I and II, Categories II and IV, and Categories V, VI and VII will be considered as separate subsets with no further division between, say, skilled and unskilled manual laborers. This follows Dillon Soares' practice and allows for larger statistical cells.

In the Dillon Soares study, based on research conducted by a polling organization in Guanabara in 1960, the following distribution of occupations was shown.[20] All figures are in percentages.

Category I	7.6
Category II	6.0
Category III	14.4
Category IV	30.0
Category V	7.1
Category VI	23.2
Category VII	11.6
Total:	99.9

(The total does not add up to 100.0 per cent because of rounding.)

Using the groupings previously mentioned, the following pattern results.

Categories I and II	13.6
Categories III and IV	44.4
Categories V, VI and VII	41.9

Respondents in the present study, conducted in 1965, were asked to list their occupations. (It is assumed that the patterns of five years before had not shifted significantly in the interim, leaving Guanabara

with approximately the same occupational proportions which had prevailed when the Dillon Soares data were compiled.) The results confirm the hypothesis that UDN adherents were indeed drawn from the total population in groupings significantly different from the norm. Table IX demonstrates this.

TABLE IX

DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY

Category	% of Respondents
I, II	32.8
III, IV	44.2
V, VI, VII	22.9

In other words, udenistas in Guanabara differed significantly from the population as a whole in terms of occupational distribution, thus tending to uphold the many observers who had pointed to the UDN's appeal as centered in the middle class in Brazil and especially in Guanabara. In this sample, UDN adherents were more than twice as likely to fall into occupational categories I and II than the Rio population as a whole, while udenistas among the manual categories (V, VI and VII) were roughly half as prevalent as their counterparts in the total population. The middle categories (III and IV) did not vary significantly from the Guanabara work force as a whole.

Maintaining occupational category constant produces the figures seen in Table X when each of the three divisions (Officeholders, Activists, Sympathizers) is taken into consideration. Not surprisingly, the correlation between socio-economic status--as measured by

education and occupation--and rank in the party continues to hold. That is, Officeholders are seen to be concentrated among those in the top two occupational categories. Figures are in percentages.

TABLE X

OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS, BY PARTY RANK CATEGORY

Categories	Officeholders	Activists	Sympathizers
I, II	95.0	34.9	16.8
III, IV	5.0	55.9	47.1
V, VI, VII	0.0	9.3	36.1
	100.0	100.1	100.0

$p < .001$

It becomes evident that Officeholders are recruited principally from the upper-middle class and higher, from among the college educated and those working in the professions or in positions of high management, all of which show a significant positive correlation among themselves. Activists also tended to concentrate in non-manual job classifications, while over a third of the Sympathizers fell into Categories V, VI or VII. This disparity will be discussed below in terms of class identification and the phenomenon of personalism in Guanabara.

Table X demonstrates that, whereas virtually all Officeholders fall into professional or managerial job classifications, both Activists and Sympathizers of the UDN were represented in Categories I and II in proportions above the state average, though among Sympathizers the margin was not statistically significant (16.8 per cent as opposed

to the state total of 13.6 per cent). Activists, on the other hand, are significantly above the average, with more than a third of their number in Categories I and II (34.9 per cent). This leads to the tentative conclusion that Activists in the UDN were recruited in large part from groups experiencing vertical mobility and that Activism was the path to future positions of power within the party.[21]

Another factor which the questionnaire attempted to investigate was the relation between one's self-declared class identification and other variables. Class identification, which was mentioned above in connection with cross pressures, was determined by the respondent's answer to the question, "Nowadays there is much talk about social classes. With which of the following classes, if any, do you personally identify: upper (or rich) class, upper-middle class, lower middle class, operário class, working class or poor class?"[22] For purposes of analysis the small number identifying with the upper class were lumped with the upper-middle and middle classes, while "working" (trabalhador) and operário classes were combined with the "poor" classification. Crude as this breakdown may sound, it was sufficient for the measure of such variables as cross pressures and sensitivity to personalist appeals, as will be discussed below.

As Dillon Soares demonstrated, "among persons with the same socio-economic status, those who identify with one class behave politically in a different manner from those identifying with another class."[23] In the present study it was found that those identifying with the upper and middle classes did indeed show significantly divergent attitudes from those who identified with the working or lower classes. Table XI shows the breakdown between those identifying with the upper

class, upper-middle and lower-middle (grouped together as "M" class) and those identifying with the working, operário and poor classes (collectively termed "L" classes).

TABLE XI

RESPONDENTS' SELF-IDENTIFICATION WITH CLASS, BY PARTY RANK CATEGORY

	Percentage Identifying With		
	"M" classes	"L" classes	
Officeholders	100.0	0.0	
Activists	68.5	31.5	$p < .001$
Sympathizers	62.5	37.5	

It is somewhat surprising to find that over a third of the Sympathizers and almost a third of the Activists stated that their identification (and presumably their sympathies) lay with the lower class, given the middle class orientation and image which the UDN enjoyed in the state of Guanabara. An explanation of this phenomenon must await further studies, but one possible interpretation may lie in the respondents' inner feeling that they "should" identify with the working classes, however objective indices might belie the reality of such identification. A related phenomenon is seen in the United States in the often-noted reluctance of even obviously wealthy families to label themselves as "upper class" in what is predominantly a middle class nation. In Table XI the complete absence of lower class identification among Officeholders should be mentioned, in keeping with the results of Table VII which showed this group to be unanimously free from cross pressures. Since

Officeholders were indeed highly educated, well paid members of the middle and upper classes and since the ability to assess realistically one's status constitutes a valuable asset for a politician, it is no surprise to find this group calling itself part of the "M" classes. It is a rational evaluation. Given the conservative-moderate orientation of the UDN in Guanabara and the fact that its policies stood to benefit the urban middle class more than other groups, Officeholders can be seen to have made a truer alignment between their party affiliation and their objective socio-economic status than either Activists or Sympathizers.

But Table XI does not provide a complete picture, for class identification only begins to assume its full significance when correlated with other factors such as residence, education and income. It is in so doing that cross pressures emerge and hypotheses may be tested. Thus for example, it may be hypothesized that udenistas in the Zona Norte, subject to greater cross pressures because of their area of residence, will be less emphatic in their advocacy of party principles (or at least less outspoken in support of them) than udenistas living in the Zona Sul. Questions were included in the survey in order to test this hypothesis and will be analyzed below. First, however, it is desirable to show the relation between class identification and other factors. This is done in Table XII. Respondents were divided into those living in the Zona Norte and those in the Zona Sul in an effort to determine whether residence was correlated with class identification. As seen in Table XII, it is, although not as strongly as the correlation which exists between occupational category and class identification, as will be shown subsequently.

TABLE XII

RELATION BETWEEN RESIDENCE AREA
AND CLASS IDENTIFICATION,
BY PARTY RANK CATEGORY

% In Each Residence Zone Identifying With "M" Classes		
	Zona Sul	Zona Norte
Officeholders	100.0	*
Activists	87.0	60.0
Sympathizers	68.5	47.7
* No cases		$p < .001$

Table XII makes it apparent that there is a positive correlation between one's area of residence in Guanabara and the tendency to identify with the middle class. Given the known relationship between one's class feeling and his voting behavior,[24] it may be concluded that udenistas living in the Zona Sul were more likely to take an active interest in politics--be they Activists or merely Sympathizers--than their counterparts in the Zona Norte who were constantly exposed to residential and/or occupational cross pressures. This is borne out in Table XIII, which lists the self-classification of respondents in reply to the question, "Do you consider yourself very interested in politics, rather interested, not very interested or uninterested?" For purposes of analysis the first two categories and the last two were lumped together to produce "Interested" and "Uninterested" groups. Both terms are relative, it should be stressed. Table XIII, however, presents a somewhat biased figure in that it groups together <u>all</u> respondents, including Officeholders and Activists, both of whom may reasonably be

assumed to fall into the Interested subset ipso facto. Holding party rank constant and including only the Sympathizers, the following pattern comes to light.

TABLE XIII

RESIDENCE AREA AS A SOURCE OF CROSS PRESSURE; ALL RESPONDENTS

	Zona Sul	Zona Norte	
Interested	77.4	62.6	$p < .01$
Uninterested	22.6	37.4	

TABLE XIV

RESIDENCE AREA AS A SOURCE OF CROSS PRESSURE; SYMPATHIZERS ONLY

	Zona Sul	Zona Norte	
Interested	62.4	54.8	N.S.
Uninterested	37.6	45.2	

Thus Table XIV substantiates the contention that--at least among Sympathizers, who may be termed rank-and-file UDN members--cross pressures owing to area of residence produced a diminution of political interest as the basically middle class orientation of the party came in conflict with the working class tendencies so marked in the Zona Norte. Udenistas living in the Zona Norte apparently had a greater tendency than their Zona Sul counterparts to take refuge from cross pressures by reducing the importance they attributed to politics. In other words,

their "perceptual screen" filtered out many of the stimuli which otherwise would have led them to experience anxiety and inner conflict.[25]

In summary, the udenistas surveyed in 1965 showed significant differences in background in terms of occupation, education and degree of interest in politics, and these differences were more sharply delineated when respondents were separated into categories of Officeholder, Activist and Sympathizer. The first group was notable for its elevated degree in all the socio-economic attributes which set it apart and in a privileged position in both the state population as a whole and among UDN adherents. The other two groups displayed less homogeneity than the Officeholders, though they were still predominantly middle class in their outlook (as measured by identification with the "M" classes.) Having sketched the general characteristics of the sample, we are ready to turn to an examination of certain intraparty matters such as the effect of Carlos Lacerda and Lacerdism on the perceptions, attitudes and voting behavior of the respondents. In so doing, the purpose is to provide an objective and quantifiable measure of the impact of the controversial Rio politician within the party which he ruled virtually undisputedly during the period under consideration--the UDN-GB.

The Central Role of Lacerda in the State Party

Items were included in the survey with the intention of discerning the respondent's attitude toward Governor Carlos Lacerda, at that time by far the best known figure in the UDN-GB and the most powerful personality in the state party. Given the divisive force which the colorful and controversial Lacerda represented, it was hypothesized that those

strongly identifying with him would demonstrate major attitudinal differences from those harboring deeply anti-Lacerda sentiments. In order to test the supposition two approaches were incorporated into the survey.

The first was an open-end question dealing with the respondent's reaction to Lacerda as governor and as a personality, the subject being asked to describe Lacerda using adjectives of his own choosing. Later the responses were coded into pro- and anti-Lacerda categories, while comments of a neutral or impartial nature (which were notably few, a reflection of the polarizing effect of Lacerda even within his own party) were omitted from the analysis. In some cases individuals cited both favorable and unfavorable aspects of Lacerda as they perceived him, and in such cases the preponderant sentiment was used to classify the respondent (tentatively) as pro-Lacerda or anti-Lacerda. Even so, some replies had to be omitted as unclassifiable, either because the subject used only "neutral" descriptions (e.g., "controversial," "active," "party leader") or because on balance his comments had the effect of canceling each other.[26]

The second control designed to separate Lacerdists from anti-Lacerdists was a method used with success by a researcher concerned with political attitudes among Brazilians in 1960-61.[27] The investigative tool employed was a scale from one to ten, with the respondent asked to rate various individuals, policies and nations on the scale according to his personal attitude toward them. This approach has the advantage of being "self-leveling" in that comparisons between the persons or items are perforce those of the respondent rather than predetermined intervals such as "favorable," "very favorable,"

"unfavorable," etc. Using this scale, respondents ranked such figures as Lacerda, Castelo Branco and Jânio Quadros on a basis of one (lowest) to ten (highest). The results were used to determine which respondents were Lacerdists; only those ranking Lacerda at seven or higher and using predominantly favorable terms to describe him were denoted as Lacerdists. Those rating Lacerda at three or lower and employing generally denigratory adjectives in describing him were classed as anti-Lacerdists (or non-Lacerdists, the two terms being used interchangeably in this study).

Table XV shows the distribution of respondents into pro- and anti-Lacerda groups. (N = 258 after unclassifiables are omitted.)

TABLE XV

PRO-LACERDA AND ANTI-LACERDA FACTIONS WITHIN THE UDN, BY PARTY RANK CATEGORY

	pro-Lacerda	anti-Lacerda	
All respondents	75.2	24.8	
Officeholders	73.7	26.3	
Activists	87.8	12.2	
Sympathizers	68.1	31.9	$p < .01$

It is readily apparent that Carlos Lacerda did speak for the large majority of udenistas in Guanabara in 1965--at least those sampled in this survey--but there are some noteworthy features of the distribution of sentiment among the three groups. Sympathizers, it can be seen, were the least sanguine of the three groups in their support of Lacerda, while Activists were the most favorable. Although further investigation

would be necessary to pinpoint the reason for this, a plausible explanation might include the following line of reasoning. Because Lacerda was undisputed leader of the UDN-GB in 1965, Activists felt obliged for reasons of practicality to link their fortunes to those of the governor if they wished to rise in the party apparatus and eventually become Officeholders. Activists were strivers, individuals who had risen from the rank-and-file but were still in the middle ground where pragmatic considerations dictated their going for the main chance; in Rio in 1965 that main chance was Carlos Lacerda, governor and head of party. Officeholders, on the other hand, supported Lacerda less than the average of the three groups. It may be conjectured that these individuals had already "arrived" and could therefore enjoy the luxury of giving less than wholehearted support to their party leader.[28] Even so, Officeholders were more favorably disposed toward Lacerda than Sympathizers, but it is impossible to say whether this reflects a rise within the party based on their close relations to the governor or whether those inclined toward Lacerda were more likely to become candidates and thereby Officeholders. Certainly there is no lack of evidence in the newspapers of 1965 to substantiate the conclusion that holding office in the UDN from Rio did not ipso facto create a benign attitude vis-à-vis Lacerda.

In an attempt to differentiate further among Lacerdists and anti-Lacerdists, and between varieties of Lacerdists, replies to the same open-end question ("How would you describe Carlos Lacerda, either as a man or as a political figure?") were divided into favorable and unfavorable as before and then further separated in terms of whether the comment dealt with Lacerda the man or Lacerda the political figure.

The results are interesting, for it was assumed by the present researcher that Officeholders would tend to praise or criticize Lacerda more on the basis of his role as party leader or administrator, while Sympathizers would tend to mention personality traits with greater frequency. This presumption was disproved by the results, as seen in Table XVI, which shows the percentage in each category mentioning personal or "public" factors in their assessment of Lacerda.

TABLE XVI

PERCENTAGE CITING PERSONAL VS. PUBLIC FACTORS IN RESPONSE TO LACERDA, BY PARTY RANK CATEGORY

	Pro-Lacerda		Anti-Lacerda	
	Personal	Public	Personal	Public
Officeholders	58	68	*	*
Activists	47	77	*	*
Sympathizers	65	71	78	38

* Insufficient cases to analyze

As Table XVI shows, Sympathizers were actually more likely than Officeholders to couch their pro-Lacerda comments in terms of the public man rather than the private individual, although the difference is not statistically significant. Perhaps the reason for this was the continuing stress Lacerda placed on his administrative record, a theme which was to be heard again and again in the gubernatorial campaign in 1965. Although the propaganda effort was not to reach its peak for several months after the survey was carried out, the impact of Lacerda's administration had already begun to make itself felt, both

among rank-and-file udenistas and among the public as a whole. This was to influence the governor's decision to choose a candidate for his succession who was part of his administrative team.[29] On the negative side, however, Sympathizers were far more personal in their attacks on Lacerda. Of the anti-Lacerdists, some 78 per cent mentioned undesirable personal qualities (e.g., "temperamental," "irresponsible," "tactless") while only 38 per cent made reference to negative features of Lacerda as public figure (e.g., "divisive force," "dictatorial party leader"). It should be noted, however, that a majority of the respondents in all categories mentioned both public and personal traits in their analysis of Lacerda, and the Sympathizers who were favorable to the governor cited personal reasons in greater proportions than did either Officeholders or Activists. In summary, pro-Lacerda Officeholders were more likely to adduce items from the public sphere to back up their feelings about the governor than they were to point out his qualities of personality, but the same can be said about both the other categories. Interestingly, Activists show the largest divergence between personal and public justification of their pro-Lacerda sentiments. It is reasonable to conjecture that this reflects their preoccupation with vertical mobility within the party and the heightened awareness of Activists of the importance of Lacerda's stress on "running on his record" while downplaying personality.

One hypothesis which was verified through the survey was that Lacerdists would be more likely than non-Lacerdists to opine that the Castelo Branco administration had been unsuccessful, given the known divergence between the governor and the national leadership. In order to test this, a question was included asking "Do you feel that the

revolutionary government has done a satisfactory job overall?" Respondents were allowed to explain their answers, but for our purposes they have been classified into simple "yes" and "no" categories, as shown in Table XVII.

TABLE XVII

PERCENTAGE EXPRESSING SATISFACTION WITH REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT, BY FACTION

	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	
All respondents	60	40	
Lacerdists	56	44	$p < .05$
Non-Lacerdists	73	27	

Evidently, Lacerdists found themselves in 1965 subjected to cross pressures from their need to identify with the head of the successful revolution which ruled the country (an indispensable adjustment with political reality) while at the same time responding to the increasingly vociferous attacks Lacerda was making upon the administration. They reflected this in their lessened degree of satisfaction with the government, without rejecting it in numbers sufficient to constitute a majority.

Through the use of the "ladder scale" respondents could give a comparative evaluation of several political figures simultaneously, contrasting, for example, Lacerda with Magalhães Pinto or Castelo Branco with Juscelino Kubitschek. The results, computed on the basis of a rating of ten as highest admiration for the politician named, are

shown in Table XVIII on the following page. Certain comments on the findings are in order.

First, Lacerda enjoyed a relatively high rating among all the sectors listed, with even non-Lacerdists according him a 6.4 evaluation. (A ranking of 5.0 may be considered "average" or "neutral.") But the President of the Republic, Castelo Branco, also rated well, despite his lower esteem among Lacerdists (6.3). Non-Lacerdists again differed significantly from Lacerdists in that they rated Castelo at 7.5, the highest score he received. The conclusion is that Lacerda's attacks on the president had limited penetration in the UDN ranks, and then principally among the governor's own adepts.

Second, the political prestige of Jânio Quadros was virtually nil in 1965 among Guanabara udenistas. His rating was below average in every sector. On the other hand, Juscelino Kubitschek continued to enjoy a certain popularity with udenistas, emerging with a 6.2 average.

Magalhães Pinto, an intraparty rival of Lacerda, apparently commanded respect from all branches, including Lacerdists. Among Officeholders he won a 7.2 rating, close to that given Lacerda by the same group. Perhaps Magalhães' prestige within the party was a factor in Lacerda's decision to reach an agreement with Magalhães regarding the UDN presidential nominee for 1966 (i.e., Lacerda himself).

Returning to the question of specific approval or disapproval of governmental policies, we find that pro-Lacerda udenistas were far less reticent in their criticism when the focus was removed from the innermost center of power. Table XIX shows the respondents' replies to a question inquiring into satisfaction with the policy of Planning

TABLE XVIII

"LADDER SCALE" OF POLITICAL FIGURES

	Occupational		Party Ranking			Factional		
	I, II	V, VI, VII	OH	A	S	Lac.	Non-Lac.	All resp.
Lacerda	7.3	7.5	7.6	7.8	7.1	8.4	6.4	7.5
Castelo Branco	7.2	6.5	7.3	7.0	6.8	6.3	7.5	7.1
Jânio Quadros	4.2	4.3	4.0	4.1	4.3	4.2	4.3	4.2
Magalhães Pinto	6.7	6.2	7.2	6.9	6.8	6.6	7.4	6.7
Kubitschek	6.2	6.4	5.8	6.0	6.6	5.9	6.2	6.2

Minister Roberto Campos, a constant target of Lacerda's attacks as "architect of the nation's economic ruin."

TABLE XIX

PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS EXPRESSING SATISFACTION WITH ROBERTO CAMPOS, BY FACTION

	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	
All respondents	47	53	
Lacerdists	40	60	$p < .001$
Non-Lacerdists	70	30	

It should be noted that the proponderance of Lacerdists over non-Lacerdists tends to affect the overall results of various items of the survey, and in this case the rejection of Campos' policies by less than two-thirds of Lacerdists is numerically powerful enough to bring the total udenista sentiment to the side of Campos' opponents despite the overwhelming pro-Campos feeling (70 per cent) found among non-Lacerdists. The fact that over 86 per cent of those finding Campos unsatisfactory were pro-Lacerdists is strong evidence pointing to the impact of the governor on the views of those identifying with him. Unlike the situation prevailing in relation to Castelo Branco, the standpoint taken on Campos reveals clearly the impact of Lacerda on those identifying with him.

Another aspect of the pro-Lacerdist bloc within the UDN-GB was its degree of political interest. It was hypothesized that Lacerdists experiencing cross pressures would express a lower interest in politics than those showing no cross pressures. In the specific case of

Lacerdists, this hypothesis would be most testable by examining those in the manual occupational categories (V through VII) and those residing in the Zona Norte. Their identification with the leader of the UDN-GB would set them apart, it was hypothesized, and the resultant cross pressures would manifest themselves in a lessened degree of political involvement. This is an important point because Lacerdists were found to appear in occupational categories V, VI and VII in greater proportion than non-Lacerdists. This is in keeping with the theory that Lacerda's charisma won him adherents in the lower socio-economic groups exclusive of--or despite--the UDN's ideological appeal. Table XX shows the relation between occupation in a manual category and degree of interest in politics, contrasting Lacerdists with the party as a whole.

TABLE XX

RELATION BETWEEN OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY AND INTEREST IN POLITICS, BY FACTION

	% in Manual Categories	% of Manual Workers Self-Classed Interested
All udenistas	22.9	56.4
Lacerdists	30.0	35.6
Non-Lacerdists	12.5	*

* Insufficient cases to analyze

$p < .001$

Table XX, therefore, lends credence to the idea that Lacerda supporters in the manual occupations did indeed suffer from cross pressures and attempted to escape through apathy, as measured by their self-termed

lack of interest in politics.[30] Evidently, UDN supporters in manual occupations, especially those who lived in the Zona Norte (a large majority), paid a high price for their political independence.

Lacerdists might also be expected to differ significantly in their identification with the state UDN in contrast with non-Lacerdists, who might be presumed to identify in larger proportions with the national UDN. A question was therefore included to test whether the notorious divergencies between the state UDN (as embodied in the person of Carlos Lacerda) and the national UDN were reflected in the attitudes of the udenistas in Guanabara. As Table XXI shows, they were, slightly.

TABLE XXI

IDENTIFICATION WITH NATIONAL PARTY LEADERSHIP, BY FACTION

	% Identifying with National UDN	
Lacerdists	37	
Non-Lacerdists	44	N.S.

The low percentages expressing a greater identification with the national UDN rather than the UDN-GB may or may not be a function of strong pro-Lacerda sentiment, for the difference between the two groups is of a small order, statistically speaking. The reluctance to identify with the national party rather than its local affiliate may have been a manifestation of the political power realities existing in Guanabara in 1965, or it may be that state parties in general exerted a stronger appeal than national parties. Without further tests it is impossible to conclude safely that either argument is correct.[31]

One question of great interest to Lacerda himself in early 1965 was that of the gubernatorial succession. As previously stated,

opinion sampling was carried out among the Guanabara electorate in an attempt to discover what candidate enjoyed the greatest appeal with the public; results were inconclusive. In the survey conducted among udenistas, similar results were obtained, indicating that neither the undifferentiated public nor the UDN faithful had a clear idea before mid-1965 of who the candidate should be. In response to the question "Among the several persons mentioned as possible candidates to the succession in Guanabara, who would be your choice to represent the UDN in the gubernatorial race?", the following results were obtained.

TABLE XXII

RESPONDENTS' PREFERENCES FOR PARTY GUBERNATORIAL NOMINATION

Amaral Neto	12%
Cravo Peixoto	10%
Sandra Cavalcânti	8%
Américo Fontenele	4%
Others	14%
Don't know, undecided	52%

The inescapable conclusion of Table XXII is that as of the date of sampling there existed no coherent group sentiment regarding who should be the UDN gubernatorial candidate in Guanabara. In the absence of such a mandate, Lacerda could exercise his own preference without running athwart public opinion within the party, and the ultimate choice of Flexa Ribeiro--one acceptable to all sectors of the state UDN--reflected this. Since party preferences were still inchoate, Lacerda's maneuverability continued fairly unrestricted up to the final choice of the UDN standard-bearer, although of course he did not wish to choose a

nominee who would offend any important sector of the party.[32] Although at the time the sample was taken Lacerda was advancing the candidacy of Cravo Peixoto, it can be seen that within the UDN-GB, rank-and-file support of the minister of works was not great, and Lacerda himself was later to withdraw his backing of Cravo's candidacy.

Another element which distinguished Lacerdists from non-Lacerdists in terms of attitudes was their respective outlooks toward the future. That is, it was hypothesized that Lacerdists would evince markedly less satisfaction with the status quo in Brazil than would non-Lacerdists, a manifestation of their leader's lifelong role in the opposition. As the UDN candidate for president of Brazil in the vote set for 1966, Lacerda could be expected to influence the outlook of those who strongly identified with him, it was hypothesized. Those who shared his views would be less likely to express contentment with the existing state of affairs in Brazil than would those who did not back Lacerda and his ideals. To test this hypothesis, respondents were asked first whether they felt the country was better off than it had been five years before, then whether they felt the nation would be better off five years in the future than it was in 1965. They were then asked if they felt their own personal situation was better in 1965 than it had been five years earlier and whether they expected their condition to improve or worsen in the five years to come. Table XXIII shows the results. (Figures relating expectations for the future correlated very highly with the above--indicating that those who looked with optimism on the past tended to be optimistic about the future, both in national and in personal terms--and have therefore been omitted from the table for reasons of simplicity.)

TABLE XXIII

EVALUATION OF NATIONAL AND PERSONAL SITUATIONS, BY FACTION

	% Feeling Brazil's Situation Had Improved	% Feeling Personal Situation Had Improved	
Lacerdists	62	61	$p < .05$
Non-Lacerdists	76	78	

Table XXIII supports the hypothesis that Lacerdists took a less optimistic view of the past and future than did those opposing the governor, and this may help explain his charismatic appeal, especially among the lower socio-economic groups where support of Lacerda ran contrary to objective standards of economic self-interest. Among such groups a charismatic leader can awaken the hope that through his own person he can work a far-reaching change in the social order, overcoming such obstacles as political and economic impediments. Of those Lacerdists in the manual occupation categories, it should be pointed out, the "dissatisfaction index" was higher than among udenistas as a whole (who were largely happy with the status quo) or among Lacerdists taken as a group.

Respondents' Perceptions of the UDN Role and Purpose

In 1961 Hélio Jaguaribe argued that Brazilian parties were

> . . . intransitive and non-representative. And if it is true that, through the force of social pressure, the parties tend to acquire, on the federal level, a gradual differentiation, the . . . disparity, in each party, of its state sections, each with the others, operates . . . to aggravate the ambiguity of the parties.
>
> In such conditions, the present political parties are incapable of exercising the function of political orientation which civil society demands of them . . . because they are lacking in the indispensable [qualities of] representativeness and internal

consistency.[33]

If indeed Brazilian political parties in the early 1960's were rather amorphous groups with little or no central direction, and if the UDN was beset by dissension and squabbling, perhaps it was because the very adherents of the party had no clear idea of what it stood for nor any unified concept of the direction it should take. The results of the survey show that the rank and file of the UDN (Sympathizers) had virtually no appreciation or understanding of the party's position on certain issues, although Activists and Officeholders--despite their frequent disagreement with prevalent intraparty currents--were better informed. Furthermore, in some cases--such as the question of extending the franchise to illiterates--the overall udenista opinion in Guanabara went directly against the position with which the national UDN was identified and which it upheld on the numerous occasions the question was raised in the national congress.[34]

In order to plumb respondents' perceptions of what their party was--and what it should be--interviewees were asked to state in open-end format what they felt the UDN stood for. They were also queried on several specific points relating to the national party's stand on various substantive issues. Beyond formalisms and platitudes (e.g., "democracy," "free expression of the people," "the eternal liberties"), few Sympathizers were able or willing to specify what they felt the UDN represented substantively. (As will be seen below, Activists and Officeholders, while not completely eschewing such clichés, were more capable of formulating more candid and realistic statements about the party.) Among Sympathizers, few mentioned the middle class orientation of the UDN or its commitment to classical liberalism (i.e., laissez-

TABLE XXIV

RESPONSES TO INQUIRY INTO PURPOSE OF UDN
(Percentage for each response)

	Officeholders	Activists	Sympathizers
Ideological generalities ("liberty," "democracy," etc.)	21	12	54
Personal generalities and moralisms ("honesty,""uprightness," etc.)	32	24	52
Anti-communism	48	45	57
Christian ideals	14	11	22
Middle-class values; "party of the middle class"	27	31	9
Free enterprise or private initiative	36	32	29
Party of the opposition	18	10	12
Other	18	14	15

$p < .001$

faire capitalism), though anti-communism was alluded to either directly or indirectly by a significant number. The reluctance of udenistas to "get down to cases" was noted in a study of the Guanabara electorate carried out in 1964 by the polling organization INESE. Despite the tendency of udenistas to cluster in the category of "class-identifying voters" (i.e., those with an "attitude of solidarity with the social class to which they belong") they nonetheless clung to the image of a UDN made up of

> . . . "meritorious men" from "good backgrounds," patent euphemisms for the expression of deeply favorable party sentiments. Rarely do they recognize in the parties a function of class representation, preferring to distinguish them as "good" or "bad," "clean" or "corrupt," "dishonest" or "honest."[35]

The tendency to couch judgments in moralistic terms will be mentioned below in connection with the theme of anti-communism as a driving force among udenistas of all colorations and especially among Lacerdists.

Officeholders and Activists, however, took a more pragmatic approach to the question, citing in their answers such sophisticated concepts as currents or wings within the party, differences from one state to another, and the disparity between professed beliefs and actual practice. Even so, as will be seen in Table XXIV, there was a notable lack of unanimity among even party "professionals" (Officeholders and Activists) as to just what, if anything, the UDN represented.

Table XXIV, one of the most revealing and useful in this study, demonstrates that for the 312 respondents taking part in the survey, there was no single unifying theme which linked Officeholders, Activists and Sympathizers, and that the element which came closest was a general anti-communist sentiment. This is worthy of further analysis, for it confirms the nebulosity which pervaded the UDN-GB (and the national

party as well) and sheds light on the reasons the party often found itself at cross purposes.[36]

(This phenomenon can be interpreted in a more favorable light, however. As was pointed out in Chapter I, using the LaPalombara-Weiner definition, both the UDN and the Brazilian party system were basically pragmatic during the period 1945-65. It is possible that lack of consensus among udenistas as to what the party stood for was actually a healthy sign, an indication that the UDN was broad enough to encompass a wide range of ideological orientations--however distasteful this may be to advocates of "responsible" political parties. As LaPalombara and Weiner have shown, there is a tendency for ideological parties to become contemptuous of opposition and, where they gain power, to consider all outside the party as misguided at best and enemies of the state at worst. That this did not happen with the UDN--or with any other Brazilian party of the period--can be viewed, therefore, as a plus factor if one is so inclined. Certainly it can be argued that in the United States the two-party system has "worked" for a long time with no discernible ideological homogeneity.)

The first pattern which emerges in Table XXIV is that once again Officeholders and Activists show a different profile from Sympathizers, but even among these professionals the sole issue which attracts more than one-third of either category is anti-communism. Whether or not this reflects the long and viciferous campaigns waged by Lacerda against real and alleged communists in Brazil is conjectural.[37] Sympathizers cited opposition to communism in more than half their responses, while the other two groups were not far behind. The opinion

of the writer is that this is in part the effect of the time period at which the sampling was taken. Less than a year before the survey, a successful revolution had taken place in Brazil, using as its rallying cry the threat of a communist coup in the nation. The military government laid claim to having saved the country from communism, and the popular response which greeted the ousting of the Goulart government seemed to indicate that this viewpoint was accepted by the public at large. It was understandable, then, that anti-communism would continue to loom large in the consciousness of members of the party which had played such a prominent role in the conspiracy which had led to the fall of Goulart. From this standpoint, Lacerda was correct politically when in the last stages of the 1965 gubernatorial campaign he turned the spotlight away from his administrative record and raised the bugbear of communism. Scare headlines such as THIS MUST NOT HAPPEN AGAIN (over a picture of João Goulart and Negrão de Lima) would indeed seem to have been the politically advisable tactic to maximize udenista loyalty to the party candidate. (See below, pp. 304-305.) Despite this, however, sufficient UDN defections were to occur to allow Negrão to win an absolute majority in the October election. Some data relevant to this problem will be presented below in the discussion of the udenistas' view of their own party in comparison with others.

Another unmistakable conclusion drawn from Table XXIV is that Sympathizers were wont to employ generalities in depicting their party, either of an ideological nature ("democracy," "equalitarian," etc.) or of a more personal type ("honest," "moral," etc.). While such vague terms may be useful in judging subjectively the depth of one's

attachment to the party, they are of little value in formulating a substantive model of what the UDN stood for in the eyes of its adherents.[38] The party professionals, on the other hand, were able to bring a less subjective approach to the question. It is interesting to note that Officeholders were more likely than Activists to talk in generalities, either ideological or personal. Although the reasons for this remain unresolved, perhaps it reflects the fact that Officeholders had been in the party for a longer period (many were among the founders of the UDN in 1945, or so they said), and the use of terms such as "defenders of democracy" and "anti-dictatorial" may reflect their having participated in the formative period when the União Democrática Nacional was indeed a union of all forces opposing the Vargas dictatorship. Another explanation for the less romantic position taken by the Activists is that they represented a generation (in the main) which had come to adulthood after World War II and as organizers and workers (e.g., the cabo electoral) were far more concerned with the day-to-day necessities of mobilization of consent than with platitudes or clichés.

Also noteworthy in Table XXIV is the extremely small percentage of Sympathizers who mentioned middle-class values as part of that which the UDN--a party identified with the middle class by virtually all political writers--stood for. This is in keeping, however, with the previously cited INESE study which alluded to the lack of class-oriented terminology among udenistas. No such ideological blindness is apparent among Officeholders and Activists, for 27 per cent and 31 per cent, respectively, made some reference to the middle class in sketching their perception of what made the UDN what it was. The

conclusion is that party influentials, at least, did appreciate to a larger extent the facets of the UDN which set it apart from other parties. More will be said about this below.

In their mention of free enterprise and/or private initiative, all levels of the party showed a surprising likeness of mind. This gives support to Dillon Soares' statement that laissez-faire capitalism was one of the "ideological bases" of Lacerdism in Guanabara,[39] and as has been seen, to be an udenista in Guanabara in 1965 was in a large majority of the cases, to be a Lacerdist. Roughly one-third of Officeholders and Activists and over one-fourth of the Sympathizers alluded to some element of the free enterprise economic mode in their answer. The marked contrast among Sympathizers is their readiness to attribute certain economic qualities to their party while simultaneously avoding labeling the UDN a "middle class" political entity. An explanation of this phenomenon must await further study.

Almost one-fifth (18 per cent) of the Officeholders made references to the UDN as an opposition party, while only 10 per cent of the Activists did so. Perhaps this is yet another manifestation of the fact that Officeholders tended to have deeper roots in the party and remember the sometimes painful days before 1960 when the UDN was always the opposition and never the government (both in the national presidency and in Rio). Activists, it may be supposed, tended to look more toward the future than the past and therefore put less emphasis on the role of opposition; presumably their sights were on governing, not on serving as loyal opposition.

Ironically, anti-udenistas were much more precise and exact in

their concept of the UDN, as for example the 32-year-old salesman in Rio who described the party as follows: "I see the UDN as a party of elites. . . . The flies may change but the manure is still the same. . . ."[40] Or the 31-year-old Rio carpenter who remarked that the UDN

> . . . is conservative, tied in with latifundários [large landowners] and the reactionary bourgeoisie. Those who have a lot and want more, at the cost of the people, . . . making laws against the interest of the people and in favor of international interests, in exchange for re-election and positions in groups such as Light [the foreign-owned electric light monopoly].[41]

Whatever the truth or falsity of such outspoken opinions, it is indisputable that the critics of the UDN were more successful in articulating their perception of the party than its followers.

The final item to be dealt with in this chapter is the survey question which asked respondents to describe in graphic form their idea of where the UDN stood ideologically in relation to other parties on the Brazilian political spectrum. The question was as follows: "Here is a drawing. In it you see the UDN marked and spaces for placing the initials of other political parties. Excluding the PCB, please write in the names of as many parties as you desire, putting those you feel are more conservative than the UDN to its right, and those you feel are more liberal to its left, showing by the placement of each party the nearness or distance which you feel exists between the UDN and the other parties."[42]

UDN

. . . . . .

Liberal Conservative

The several places on the scale were assigned values from -1 to -4 on the Liberal side and +1 to +4 on the Conservative side.[43] Where more than one party was placed on the same dot they were accorded

equal value. This rather crude interval scale nevertheless had the merit of allowing each respondent to determine his own measure of the psychological distance which he felt separated the UDN from other parties. The results are shown in Table XXV. In tabulating the responses only those parties mentioned by at least 10 per cent of the subjects were included, which limited the number to five (PSD, PTB, PSP, PDC, PRP). Table XXV (next page) supports the conclusion that udenistas in 1965 did perceive certain similarities between their own and other political parties, while distinguishing in sharp fashion between the UDN and the PTB.

An examination of Table XXV shows that in overall terms the udenistas interviewed perceived the Christian Democrats (PDC) as the party closest to the UDN, slightly to its left (-0.4). On the right the nearest neighbor was felt to be the PSD, judging by the aggregate opinion of all respondents (+1.4). But UDN influentials (Officeholders and Activists) had a somewhat different outlook, for they perceived the PDC as more "distant" than the PSD, albeit in opposite directions and by small margins. Thus Officeholders ranked the PDC at -1.3 and the PSD at +0.5, with Activists rating the PDC at -1.1 and the PSD at +1.0, evidence that these two categories of udenistas found the Social Democrats closer ideologically than the Christian Democrats. The Sympathizers departed from the virtually unanimous placement of the PDC left of center by the influentials, and in fact many Sympathizers viewed the PDC as right of the UDN by small increments. Both in the case of the PDC and the PSD, party influentials and party rank-and-file demonstrated a significantly different perception

TABLE XXV

"IDEOLOGICAL DISTANCE" AS PERCEIVED BY RESPONDENTS

	OH	A	S	Lac.	Non-Lac.	I,II	V, VI, VII	All resp.
PSD	+0.5	+1.0	+1.7	+1.3	+1.2	+0.8	+1.6	+1.4
PSP	+1.8	+1.6	+2.3	+2.1	+1.8	+1.5	+2.4	+2.0
PRP	+2.5	+2.7	+3.2	+2.9	+3.1	+2.8	+3.0	+2.8
PDC	-1.3	-1.1	-0.2	-0.4	-0.3	-0.9	-0.2	-0.4
PTB	-2.3	-2.4	-2.8	-3.1	-2.1	-3.2	-2.0	-2.6

of the UDN position in relation to these parties. Officeholders and Activists put the PSD closer to the UDN (+0.5 and +1.0, respectively), than did Sympathizers or the party as a whole, an indication that those best informed about the ideological orientation of the party felt it to occupy a position reasonably close to that of the PSD.

The lack of consensus between party influentials and rank-and-file udenistas may help explain the intraparty disputes which marked the UDN throughout its existence, although among themselves the influentials showed greater unanimity of outlook toward other parties than did the Sympathizers as a group.[44] As decisionmakers of the UDN, the Officeholders and Activists determined when the UDN would enter into electoral alliances with other parties and in this respect rank-and-file opinion played little if any role. But the confusion among lower ranking udenistas helps one understand the phenomenon which occurred in 1965 in Guanabara when Negrão de Lima won a large number of middle class votes which normally would have gone to the UDN candidate. The fact that the respondents as a whole perceived the PSD as the closest party on the right of the UDN, coupled with the acceptability among the Guanabara middle class of Negrão as a familiar political figure whom they could "live with," pointed up the difficulties the UDN-GB would face in the gubernatorial election. They were to prove fatal.

Table XXV also shows that among occupational Categories I and II--the best paid and most prestigious--the PSD was perceived as much closer to the UDN (which may be interpreted as closer to the UDN position as perceived by the respondent, and therefore nearer the position he would desire his party to take) than was the case among the

manual categories. Since Categories I and II are far more likely to include persons of middle- and upper-class income levels, the conclusion is that the PSD in 1965 was perceived among these individuals as less "distant"--and presumably less threatening--than was the case among manual workers in the UDN.

Table XXV is also of interest in assessing the gulf which separated the PTB in Guanabara from the UDN. It may be conjectured that the PSD was perceived as reasonably acceptable--like the PDC--because it was, in the Guanabara political reality, a minor party. Without further evidence this must remain a supposition. But the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), the UDN's major rival in Guanabara, was another creature entirely. As can be seen in the table, perceptions of the PTB differed significantly in various sectors of the UDN.

Although all elements of the UDN agreed that the PTB was left of their own party, the difference in degree is more than can be accounted for by the laws of chance. Thus, for example, Lacerdists found the Labor Party quite distant from the UDN (-3.1), while non-Lacerdists were less removed from it (-2.1). Although Officeholders and Activists did not differ greatly from rank-and-file in this instance, occupational categories offered a dramatic case of cross pressures: Categories I and II rated the PTB at -3.2--the farthest left of any group--but Categories V, VI and VII ranked it at -2.0. The conclusion is that manual workers within the UDN "softened" their opinion of the PTB as the result of cross pressures stemming from their occupation, residence area or both.

In explaining why Lacerdists differed substantially from non-Lacerdists in their perception of the Labor Party, a likely hypothesis

is that this reflected the long-standing animosity between Carlos Lacerda and the Labor elements in Guanabara, a bitterness heightened by Lacerda's role in the events leading up to the suicide of Getulio Vargas. (See above, p. 146.) The greater the individual udenista's identification with Lacerda, the more likely his holding a negative opinion of the PTB. In this case such a view would manifest itself in the placement of the PTB to the far left (radical) position on the political spectrum. It is worth noting that UDN influentials saw the PTB as slightly less leftist than Sympathizers. This leads to the conjecture that perhaps decision-makers of the UDN were forced into positions which they themselves held less firmly than their followers (e.g., non-coalition with the PTB) lest they lose the adherence of their supporters.

In conclusion, the above study may be of value in leading to certain tentative ideas about the UDN electorate as it existed in 1965. It can be seen that although the rank-and-file udenista was relatively loyal to the party there were points at which his views diverged significantly from those of the party leadership (as represented by the Officeholders and Activists). Whether this was instrumental in leading to the UDN's defeat at the polls in October of that year is uncertain, but it seems undeniable that the presence of an acceptable PSD candidate--even one running with the backing of the PTB--led to the defection of sufficient middle-class udenistas to bring about the defeat of Flexa Ribeiro.

The emphasis on works in the first stages of the 1965 gubernatorial campaign seems to have been the correct strategy in terms of the overall electorate, but once Negrão entered the race a shift in tactics

was called for. The findings of the above study would seem to support pragmatically Lacerda's decision to stress the communist/revanchist threat in the last stages of the race, given the anti-communist leanings of so many udenistas at all levels of the party hierarchy. That it was not enough, however, to prevent inroads into the normal UDN vote was proved by the results of that election.

If anti-communism was a feature of the ideological framework of many udenistas in 1965, it was the only issue that approached general acceptance among party members. This lack of consensus can be pointed to as one of the shortcomings of the UDN which led to internal doubts as to the direction the party should take.[45] When the major ideological bond is a negative one (anti-communism), it makes the task of unification more difficult, and the UDN-GB could win majoritary elections only when the opposition split. Founded on the support of the middle class, the UDN peaked out consistently at the level of roughly 40 per cent of the voters in Guanabara. It is doubtful that greater internal cohesion would have made the UDN the majority party in that state, but internal dissension can only be considered a negative factor in the UDN's electoral struggles.

The study also shows that, despite the publicity which accompanied open ruptures between Lacerda and the bancada federal, the governor was both actual and titular leader of the UDN-GB, and three-fourths of the respondents who took a position vis-à-vis Lacerda were on his side. This gave him a great degree of political latitude in deciding important political questions in the state party such as who should carry the UDN standard in the gubernatorial race, and in effect it largely reduced the UDN state directorate to a rubber stamp.[46] It is of

interest to speculate about the effect Lacerda's loss of political rights (cassação) would have had on the UDN-GB had the party still existed when its leader was purged, for beyond dispute Lacerda was the driving force behind the state party and the figure that the public called to mind in connection with it. This is not to imply, however, that the UDN-GB would have simply closed its doors and disbanded had Lacerda lost his rights while the party continued to exist. By the definitions introduced in Chapter I, both the national UDN and the UDN-GB were capable of surviving the loss of any one leader, however influential. Neither the national UDN nor its affiliate in Guanabara was a personalist party; both fully met the first criterion LaPalombara and Weiner postulate. (See Chapter I, pp. 3-4.) Nevertheless, had the UDN still been in existence when Lacerda was stripped of his political rights, the UDN-GB would have suffered the loss of the one man most identified with the party in the minds of the public at large and--as has been seen in this chapter--the rank-and-file udenista. The party would have continued to function, doubtlessly, in Guanabara even without Lacerda, but its electoral appeal would surely have been diminished by taking away of a charismatic figure such as the ex-governor.

NOTES

[1]Harry Kantor, The Ideology and Program of the Peruvian Aprista Movement (University of California Press, 1953).

[2]Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "The Party Potpourri in Latin America," in Tomasek (ed.), Latin American Politics, pp. 199, 222.

[3]One such study of interest is Burt H. English, "Liberación Nacional of Costa Rica: The Development of a Political Party in a Transitional Society" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Florida, 1967).

[4]One of the best known examples of this is Emile Durkheim's classic study Suicide (The Free Press, 1951), in which the author draws general conclusions from suicide data from several European countries.

[5]Although approximately one-third of the respondents were interviewed in Niterói and not in Guanabara, only persons listing their voting residence as Guanabara were asked to respond.

[6]See below, pp. 235-241.

[7]This points up something which every researcher in the social sciences soon discovers in Brazil: the overriding importance of personal contacts. One contact may open a variety of doors, but finding the right one may take months or may be impossible in the time available for completion of the research. This was another argument in favor of using PUC students, who for various reasons would tend to have a large number of channels among the socio-economic strata in which UDN adherents in Guanabara were concentrated. PUC is a private, tuition-charging university and its students usually come from the upper-middle and upper classes.

[8]A person who fell into more than one category was classed with the higher of the two. Ex-Officeholders, for example, were grouped with those presently occupying such positions, even though they were no longer as active in the party as previously.

[9]Although placing such delegates in the Activist rather than the Officeholder category may seem somewhat arbitrary, this was done in order to avoid artificially inflating the number in the latter group and because at times persons were designated delegates, especially to the substantively unimportant conventions, on the basis of personal friendship rather than any real service to the party.

[10]An interesting study could be done on the functions of the cabo eleitoral and his effect on the voting behavior of those with whom he comes into contact. The cabo eleitoral (literally, "electoral corporal") is as an integral a part of the urban political scene as is the voto de cabresto ("bridle vote"--i.e., votes of rural hired hands which are for practical purposes cast by the coronel) in the countryside. The cabos eleitorais "act as intermediaries between the

large impersonal framework of the city and the people of a neighborhood, a favela, or a recreational club. Most of the lower and middle classes are of recent rural origin and are without the knowledge, the skills, and the relatives and friends to satisfy their needs in the large cities. The cabos eleitorais are middle men. From the administration they obtain services for their clients, such as obtaining a job, a place in a school or hospital, bringing water or electricity to a street, getting a public telephone installed, or having a bus route changed. In return the cabos eleitorais deliver the votes of their group." (Juarez R. B. Lopes, "Some Basic Developments in Brazilian Politics and Society," in Baklanoff [ed.], New Perspectives of Brazil, pp. 64-65.) To use a term more familiar to American readers, the cabo eleitoral may be compared to the ward heeler of an earlier period in U.S. politics, when in urban areas such as Boston they served as brokers between the as yet unassimilated immigrant groups and the local power structure. (See The Last Hurrah, a fictional treatment of the passing of this era in face of the "new rules" wrought by the advent of television and other mass communication techiques which replaced the older face-to-face style of mobilization of consent.) In Brazil, a country still in the process of development, such personal contacts assume the greatest importance, especially in local elections (Câmara dos Vereadores everywhere but Guanabara, where it is the Assembléia Legislativa). Coutto has called this phenomenon the "domestic vote." He contends that in Guanabara in 1962 "a great part of the electorate voted for those they know personally, in exchange for favors, through gratitude or future personal expectations. . . . Such a vote, therefore, is devoid of the slightest ideological content, nor does it define in any way any political position, either conscious or unconscious." Noting that the domestic vote is much more frequent among the lower classes than in the middle or upper levels, Coutto adds that "Thus it becomes difficult for the [incumbent] government of the state to lose elections for the Assembléia" because the administration is in a position to grant the multitudinous small favors which win votes. (Coutto, O Voto e o Povo, pp. 78-80.) José Arthur Rios in his study of the Rio slums notes that "The cabo eleitoral is the necessary link between the voter and the politician. The importance of this political intermediary grows with the low level of the electorate. In the popular classes [i.e., lower socio-economic groups] his importance as political organizer and recruiter is far greater than in middle class groups. . . . [He is] an indispensable figure in the favelas, for the politician can not be everywhere at once." (Rios, "Aspectos Humanos da Favela Carioca," p. 29.) Although the UDN had few cabos eleitorais in the slums--especially in comparison to the parties such as the PTB which made a direct appeal for the favelado vote--the above observations about the function of the cabo hold, to a lesser degree, when discussing the UDN identifiers' voting for local office.

[11] In all statistics cited in this chapter, percentages refer to those replying to the questionnaire item, omitting those who left it blank or refused to answer. Where applicable, "don't knows" are recorded separately.

[12] Of course it may be argued that 1960 was an atypical presidential year. Quandros' tremendous personal appeal and the fact that the

UDN saw him as its best chance to end fifteen years out of power may have influenced an abnormally large number of udenistas at all levels to support Jânio despite any misgivings they might have had about the candidate. Even so, the gap between Sympathizer support for Quadros and for Assembléia candidates remains noteworthy, for it is not found in either Officeholders or Activists.

[13]Although it is impossible to estimate the percentage of Sympathizers in other parties who supported their Assembléia candidates, it is likely that the low percentage among UDN Sympathizers does not represent any mass defection absent in PTB or PSD circles. It can be contended, however, that UDN adherents, most common in the middle class, are less likely to be swayed by the personal and/or patronage bonds which play such a large part in generating the "domestic vote" to which Coutto refers. The resolution of this question must await further research.

[14]Gláucio Ary Dillon Soares, "Interêsse Político, Conflito de Pressões e Indecisão Eleitoral nas Eleições de 1960 no Estado da Guanabara," Síntese Política Econômica Social (April, 1961), pp. 5-34. Hereafter cited as Dillon Soares, "Interêsse Político."

[15]Ibid., pp. 11-20.

[16]Ibid., pp. 27-28.

[17]Among those who stated that they did not vote in one or more previous elections although eligible to do so were 3.7 percent of the Officeholders, 14.3 percent of the Activists, and 41.6 percent of the Sympathizers. Of course there are other reasons for abstention than cross pressures, but it seems undeniable that such conflicting demands play a large role in the decision not to vote, especially in a country where the vote is obligatory. Incidentally, it is the author's contention that the large percentage of Activist abstainers is due to some degree to their having been "merely" Sympathizers at one time, with a concommitantly high rate of non-voting.

[18]The modifications are those introduced by Dillon Soares, "Interêsse Político," p. 11. These changes were necessary in order to adjust Hutchinson's model to the Brazilian occupational modality.

[19]Dillon Soares, "Interêsse Político," p. 12.

[20]Ibid. The actual polling was carried out among nearly two thousand voters drawn from the rolls of the Tribunal Regional Eleitoral and was weighed by electoral zone (of which there were fifteen in Guanabara at that time, ten less than in 1965).

[21]This is also the common-sense conclusion. Although no item was included in the questionnaire asking Officeholders whether they had formerly been Activists, it seems highly probable that many of them had at some time filled one or more of the roles defined under the heading of Activist (in the special sense in which the term is used in this study) before becoming a candidate. At the present time, however, there is

nothing beyond anecdotal evidence to support this belief.

[22]Dillon Soares, "Interêsse Político," p. 21.

[23]Ibid., p. 13.

[24]Ibid., pp. 21-22.

[25]The phrase "perceptual screen" is that of Angus Campbell, et al., in The American Voter (Wiley, 1960).

[26]A differently worded item in the survey, however, drew a more uniformly favorable response to Lacerda. In answer to the query "Do you feel Carlos Lacerda has done a satisfactory job as governor?", affirmative replies were given by 85 percent of Officeholders, 91 percent of Activists and 79 percent of Sympathizers, demonstrating that when the question was restricted to Lacerda as administrator--omitting personal factors--his rating is higher with all three groups.

[27]Lloyd A. Free, Some International Implications of the Political Philosophy of Brazilians (The Institute for International Social Research, 1961). Free's study consisted of 2,168 interviews throughout Brazil (1,026 urban, 1,142 rural) carried out by INESE under Dr. Octavio da Costa Eduardo in 1960-61. Most of the interviews were conducted after Jânio's election but before he took office.

[28]For example, Aliomar Baleeiro, one of Lacerda's intraparty adversaries, told me in an interview that he did not fear retribution at the polls from the governor because he, Baleeiro, had a steady group of voters who supported him, and proportional representation made twenty thousand votes in a population of three million a solid power base. (Interview of April 10, 1966, in Rio de Janeiro.)

[29]See below, pp. 244-247, for a brief discussion of the "technician-candidate," in part a result of public opinion polls which showed this to be the strategy most likely to maximize UDN electoral appeal.

[30]It should be kept in mind that in all items dealing with degree of interest in politics, only Sympathizers are included, it being assumed that Officeholders and Activists were highly interested.

[31]It would be interesting to investigate the same question among adherents of the defunct PTB and PSD, or for that matter among Democrats and Republicans in the United States, to determine whether the Guanabara case is representative. Unfortunately the study cannot be replicated, for the UDN no longer exists and Lacerda's political rights have been canceled.

[32]One such sector was the bancada federal, which was at odds with Lacerda over the question of the party nominee, desiring one of its own (such as Adaucto Cardoso) as the candidate.

[33]Hélio Jaguaribe, "A Renúncia do Presidente Quadros e a Crise Política Brasileira," Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais (November, 1961), pp. 298-299.

[34]On the question of giving the franchise to illiterates, over two-thirds (68 percent) favored the move, with Officeholders slightly more affirmative than Activists or Sympathizers. Perhaps this reflected the extremely high literacy rate in Guanabara or the desire to move the UDN image away from its exclusivist bacharel stereotype.

[35]INESE, Motivação do Comportamento Político do Brasileiro (Mimeographed, n.d. [1964]), p. 13. This study, along with typed carbon copies of transcriptions of interviews with voters in Rio and other Brazilian cities, was made available to the researcher by an American Embassy official in 1965 with the proviso that he not be named. Hereafter, when the typewritten pages rather than the mimeographed report are quoted, they will be cited as INESE, notes.

[36]Although an examination of the beliefs and attitudes of members of other parties such as the PTB was beyond the scope of this study, it would have been of interest to discover whether a similar omnidirectionality existed among petebistas, usually asknowledged as the most ideological of legal parties in Brazil. (The Communist Party was outlawed in 1947.) Whether the lack of consensus was peculiar to the UDN or common to most or all parties must remain a moot point.

[37]A further breakdown of the respondents shows no significant difference between Lacerdists and non-Lacerdists in frequency of the anti-communism response. It may therefore be assumed that concern with the Red menace was pervasive in both currents within the party.

[38]Of course it is doubtful that rank-and file Democrats in the United States would be able to state concisely just what their party stands for, and it is likely that an Alabama farmer and a college professor in New York City would have radically opposing ideas of what the party "should" represent. The point made in the above paragraph is that UDN Sympathizers evinced a far greater tendency to take refuge in such value-laden terms than did higher ranking udenistas.

[39]Dillon Soares, "As Bases Ideológicas do Lacerdismo," p. 69.

[40]INESE, notes.

[41]Ibid.

[42]The placement of the UDN in the center of the drawing does not indicate a belief on the part of the researcher that the party necessarily occupied a position of dead center in the 1965 spectrum of Brazilian parties. Rather its location in the middle allowed for maximum range in interviewees' responses. In addition, respondents could--and did--add extra places on the graph and in many instances placed parties between dots. In such cases values of +2.5, -1.5, etc., were assigned.

[43]There is some danger in using the terms "liberal" and "conservative" in the Brazilian political context, for the former has acquired the connotation of Nineteenth Century classical liberalism of the laissez-faire variety. Nevertheless, the imperative need for some control which would allow the calculation of distance and directionality made the use of these terms inevitable. Alternate terms were felt to be insufficiently universal in acceptance or have powerful emotive overtones--e.g., "leftist," "populist," "radical."

[44]Many Sympathizers seemed confused by the question and left it blank. Others listed one or two parties, compared with the influentials who averaged over four parties in their answers. The conclusion is that rank-and-file udenistas had little clear-cut idea of the party's ideological stance.

[45]This is not to argue that there existed strong consensus in the PSD-GB or even in the PTB-GB, marred by its own internal squabbles. It is merely to contend that the lack of agreement over party principles was a stumbling block to greater integration within the UDN and therefore to more efficient utilization of its political resources.

[46]It is for this reason that little attention has been given in this study to the formal structure of the UDN-GB--which in any case differed in no major particular from that of the other UDN state affiliates. Lacerda's hold over the decisionmaking apparatus of the UDN-GB continued undiminished despite changes in titular leadership or shifts on the diretório regional.

CHAPTER VII

BACKGROUND TO THE 1965 GUBERNATORIAL CAMPAIGN IN GUANABARA

The problems inherent for a political party in any election-year setting were complicated for the UDN-GB and its leader Carlos Lacerda by the fact that the national convention of the party was scheduled for April 26, 1965--at which time Lacerda could expect a challenge to his position within the party and perhaps even an attempt to remove him from the head of the ticket.

Such a move did arise, and in order to repulse the threat it represented, Lacerda was obliged to place in abeyance for the moment the all-important question of selecting his successor in the Palácio Guanabara.

The Problem of the UDN Presidency

The political attention of the nation was drawn to the question of the selection of the new national president of the UDN for the reason that it was an obvious test of Lacerda's strength within the party's higher echelons. The process of choosing a UDN president, as one political commentator noted, was seldom a dull affair.

> The election of the president of the UDN is traditionally an exciting political episode. . . . [But] the struggles for the presidency have never provoked a schism and almost always it is the victorious faction which executes the policy espoused by the defeated faction.[1]

The choice of a successor to UDN president Bilac Pinto was seen as not

only a barometer of Lacerda's intraparty influence nationally, but also as an indication of the role the UDN might be expected to take in the election the following October for eleven state governorships. Whether the bulk of UDN party faithfuls would see fit to follow Lacerda's lead in increasing the political distance between himself and Castelo's administration was a question to which many saw at least a suggestion of the answer in the vote for or against Lacerda's hand-picked candidate. The difficulty was summed up succinctly by one observer as follows:

> The friction between the Governor of Guanabara and the Government of the Republic, the growing Lacerdist pressure against a type of policy which Marshal Castelo Branco does not plan to let go of, and the very dynamics of Sr. Carlos Lacerda's campaign tend to transform [the situation] into a state of crisis. It will be difficult for Sr. Carlos Lacerda to maintain himself as a candidate of the revolutionary system or related to the revolutionary system. . . .
>
> While Sr. Lacerda follows this political and electoral route, the leaders [cúpula] of the UDN tend to keep the party at the side of the Federal Government. The udenista delegation is the basis of the government's Parliamentary Bloc in the Chamber. . . . The political representation of the UDN, solidly behind the President, may even go so far as breaking with Sr. Carlos Lacerda. . . .[2]

Rightly or wrongly, then, the choice of his own man as new party president was seen as a hurdle Lacerda must overcome to maintain his position of ascendancy in the UDN. It was of course well known that the Castelo Branco government would have welcomed a reduction in Lacerdista influence in the party which formed the bulwark of the revolution's legislative backing.[3]

The enmity existing between Lacerda and the Castelo Branco administration had been growing since the last months of 1964, as public opinion increasingly swung away from the Marshal-president and his policies of economic austerity. That Lacerda, a shrewd politician, was aware of this became apparent in his ever more frequent and vitriolic

attacks on Castelo Branco--if not yet on the revolution itself. The theme adopted by Lacerda in his attempt to establish himself as defender of the people against the abuses of the Castelo administration--without risking the charge of "counter-revolutionary" and the attendant sanctions such a label might visit upon him--was twofold. Both of the points of attack may be seen in an editorial published on the first anniversary of the 1964 coup in the newspaper founded by Lacerda:

> One can not refrain from pointing out and analyzing the principal fact which, on the political plane, brought about the crumbling of the ideals of the movement of the 31st of March. It was the extension of the mandate of Marshal Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco.
> . . . But it happens that Castelo Branco had spent 64 years without thinking about power. And once in [power], he revealed his complete lack of preparation. . . . And then the inevitable began to happen: the government broke off from the revolution, gradually stopped representing it, and soon began to betray it.
> On the economic-financial plane, the betrayal was the handing over of the instruments of command and decision to Consultec, having as its head Sr. Roberto Campos. On the political plane, it was the extension of the presidential term of office.
> . . . Since he assumed the Presidency, Castelo Branco [has been] a prisoner of the Consultec and of the *entreguistas* in the Planning Ministry. . . . All his acts have always had as their goal a selfish expansion of his time in Power.[4]

In this excerpt the two-pronged attack which Lacerda adopted is plainly stated: Castelo Branco had "betrayed" the revolution, and Roberto Campos, the minister of planning, was the major villain. Lacerda was to hammer at these two ideas incessantly during the period culminating in the Ato Institucional No. 2. He could surely not be accused of counter-revolutionary tendencies when he was supporting the revolution by attacking its "betrayers," and by his assaults on Castelo and Roberto Campos he hoped to build an image as champion of the people against the *entreguistas* then in power.[5]

It was understandable, given the nature of the attacks that Lacerda directed against the president, that Castelo would look with favor upon a diminution of Lacerda's power within both the UDN and the nation as a whole. The first test of Lacerda's clout in the party, following his break with the revolution, was the selection of the national president of the UDN.[6] For that reason the contest generated an interest out of proportion to the real political importance of the office. To be sure, any party candidate to the presidency would consider it a plus factor to be assured of the strong backing of the UDN national president, but it could hardly be considered a sine qua non for Lacerda's projected race for the nation's highest office. All told, the choosing of a party president was a matter of prestige--virtually a vote of confidence--for Lacerda, not a question of direct significance to his campaign plans. Tactically, Lacerda could have survived a defeat in the selection of a party president, but it would doubtlessly have strengthened the hands of anti-Lacerda forces within the UDN who were already talking about the unwiseness of having chosen a presidential candidate (Lacerda) so far in advance of the scheduled elections. Although no "recall" movement had yet gone beyond an incipient stage, Lacerda obviously considered it of major concern to reassert and demonstrate his sway within the UDN by furthering his own candidate for the party presidency.

Lacerda's choice for the head of the UDN was well known: Deputy Ernâni Sátiro, from the Northeastern state of Paraíba, but Lacerda's support alone, he knew, would not be enough to guarantee Sátiro's election in a party from which its inception had been marked by dissension. Although one prominent politician, Paulo Campos, president

of the state UDN in Minas Gerais, declared that Sátiro's election was "as certain as two and two are four,"[7] others were not so sure. In opposition to the Sátiro candidacy, several candidates had presented themselves. From São Paulo a federal deputy, Padre Godinho, a Roman Catholic priest, came forward as candidate for the post, claiming the support of eight state directorates.[8] However, his candidacy was not considered a serious threat, and after the convention the priest became known as one of Carlos Lacerda's most vocal adherents. The outgoing UDN president, Bilac Pinto from Minas Gerais, fearing a split in the party, attempted to offer a compromise candidate in the person of Guilherme Machado, already mentioned as the reputed choice of Castelo Branco. Machado, however, despite his following in his native state of Minas Gerais, had little support elsewhere and his candidacy was soon withdrawn.[9]

The remaining--and most formidable--opponent to the candidacy of Ernâni Sátiro was Aliomar Baleeiro, a native of Bahia who had been elected to the chamber of deputies from his home state and later repeated his electoral success in the Federal District, now the State of Guanabara, which he represented in the lower house in Brasília. Baleeiro, a respected jurist and authority on law, enjoyed less than cordial relations with Lacerda during the period under discussion. As part of the UDN bancada federal (delegation to the two houses of congress), Aliomar Baleeiro had come into conflict on several occasions with Lacerda over administrative problems in Guanabara, especially the question of the University of Guanabara.[10] During his entire term in office, as has been noted, Lacerda's relations with the bancada federal

varied from barely civil to acrimonious, though for obvious reasons a public break was never announced.

Basing his candidacy for the party presidency on the conventional grounds of serving as an impartial functionary within the UDN itself, above intraparty factionalism, Baleeiro denied that he had come forward in order to undercut Lacerda's position in the party. "The president of the UDN, like that of any party, should be a technical and juridical instrument of the majority will of his copartisans," Baleeiro contended.[11] He consistently denied any "deals" with other UDN figures, including maverick federal deputy Amaral Neto, who was to bolt the party and run for governor against the UDN standard-bearer.[12]

Baleeiro, a popular and respected figure within the upper echelons of the UDN, represented a threat to the candidacy of Lacerda's choice, despite the low-key campaign carried out by the transplanted Bahian. No attempt was made by Baleeiro to arouse anti-Lacerdist feelings within the state-delegations--some critics might contend that there was no need to do so--and Baleeiro's stance was fundamentally that of a loyal party servant seeking the well earned right to direct the organizational aspect of the UDN for the common partisan good. He scrupulously avoided raising such polemic points as the advisability of "reconsideration" of the UDN nomination for president of the Republic.

The front-runner Ernâni Sátiro, however, more certain of the backing of a majority of the state directorates, took a more direct stand on certain issues. He reiterated his intention, once elected, to see that the party respected the decision taken in São Paulo to offer Carlos Lacerda as UDN candidate to the presidency, plus "unrestricted support" to the Castelo government and to the revolution.[13]

Although the candidacy of Baleeiro was always considered that of a "dark horse" at best, events of the weeks prior to the convention--slated for April 29-30 in Neierói, across the Bay of Guanabara from Rio de Janeiro--put the quietus on any real chances he might have had for achieving an upset victory. The most important was the announcement of an entente between Carlos Lacerda, governor of Guanabara, and José Magalhães Pinto, governor of Minas Gerais--the two best known figures in the UDN.

Magalhães Pinto had long had the desire to run for the presidency of Brazil, but the dominant position of Lacerda within the UDN had undermined his possibilities, and relations between the two udenista governors were strained. Thus the creation of a "secret" (but readily "leaked") Minas-Guanabara axis served notice that the two had reached an understanding, however temporary. Main provisions of the pact included Lacerda's promise not to interfere in internal politics in Minas (Lacerdistas had been offering some support to Bilac Pinto, a mineiro rival of Magalhães), and the Minas governor's declaration of support for Ernâni Sátiro. In addition, Magalhães and Lacerda agreed to act jointly against any attempt of the Castelo government to endanger their political positions.[14]

Armed with the support of the large and prestigious Minas delegation, solidly controlled by Magalhães Pinto, the candidacy of Ernâni was now assured of victory. Lacerda now felt secure enough of his position to make a trip to Portugal, and the jurist Aliomar Baleeiro--seeing perhaps that the game was over--left to represent his country in proceedings in Buenos Aires, returning five days before the convention.[15]

In order that the division within the party be smoothed over as much as possible, it was decided that such lesser offices as vice-presidencies, secretaryships and other positions of authority would be filled with representatives of all wings of the party.[16] Even so, there was no lack of rumors claiming schism within the party, and on the eve of the convention one anti-Lacerda newspaper even made the rather improbable statement that "it is not out of the question that . . . [Lacerda himself] will come forth as a candidate to defeat Sr. Ernâni Sátiro."[17]

The national convention of the União Democrática Nacional began on April 29, 1965, in the Caio Martins Stadium in Niterói, capital of the State of Rio de Janeiro. The first session opened at three p.m.; the credentials committee had begun accrediting delegations at noon. The afternoon session was devoted to opening ceremonies and reports from the several committees. The evening session of the first day of the two-day convention was held at eight p.m., at which time miscellaneous motions were presented dealing with procedural matters related to the party; the presidential ballot would be taken the next day.

The first day went very smoothly for the gathered udenistas, the only sour point being the lack of interest which the gathering created among the populace of Niterói. Despite efforts to acquaint the people of the city with the fact that a national party was holding its convention there, the turnout of unaffiliated (i.e., non-delegates) was disappointing. Even the Jornal do Brasil, which generally took a favorable position toward Lacerda and his team throughout the gubernatorial campaign, reported that

> . . . the National Convention of the UDN was a failure from the point of view of popular mobilization, for it did not succeed in

> bringing together more than 800 persons, including 100 journalists, 60 policemen and over half the 397 delegates signed up.[18]

In essence, judging from the above figures, the convention drew at most four hundred "interested bystanders." Some saw this as an omen that the party's appeal in the October election was not on the rise. The UDN of the State of Rio de Janeiro admitted through a spokesman that teams sent out in sound trucks to stir up voter interest in the proceedings had met with indifference. To be sure, they added, "it was raining hard when Governor Lacerda arrived at [the convention hall]."[19]

The events of the second day of the convention, however, were to make many reading of the happenings wish they had been in attendance, for Brazilians love a good fight as much as anyone.

As delegates and spectators began filling the convention hall shortly before two o'clock of the second and final day of the gathering, it was evident that feelings and disagreements within the state UDN of Guanabara were rapidly reaching a point at which they could no longer be kept below the surface. A small group of fifteen to twenty persons--including his son--arrived accompanying federal deputy Amaral Neto, who had been the largest vote-getter in the state of Guanabara during the previous election.

Amaral Neto, as was commonly known, had greatly desired the party nomination to contest the governor's seat soon to be vacated by Carlos Lacerda, but his candidacy "was vetoed by Sr. Carlos Lacerda for reasons never clearly expressed."[20] The disappointed deputy, as was to be made abundantly evident at the convention, interpreted Lacerda's veto as an affront to his honor and vowed to expunge the disgrace. For

that reason a confrontation between Amaral Neto and the man who had "shamed" him was for most observers a more interesting--and certainly more colorful--event than the official business of the convention, including the election of a new president.

The main business of the afternoon session of the final day was the state-by-state balloting for the successor to Bilac Pinto, but the underlying tension among the delegates was due to the announced arrival of Carlos Lacerda, scheduled for four p.m. Amaral Neto, seated several rows back from the long table at which were located the presiding officers, had just two days earlier received the gubernatorial nomination of the Partido Libertador (PL), a small party with scant following at the polls. In his acceptance speech he had renewed his violent verbal assaults on Lacerda, calling the governor among other things a "coward" and "two-faced."[21] In several interviews Amaral Neto had reiterated his intention to prevent Lacerda from addressing the UDN convention, and it was a matter of public knowledge that the hot-tempered legislator carried a gun.[22]

Fearing that Amaral Neto planned to disrupt the convention proceedings, several speakers took the stand prior to the onset of voting to call for unity and harmony among all udenista factions present, some of whom directed themselves openly to the dissident delegate himself. Among the would-be peacemakers were the president of the UDN of the host state and deputies from three states, but to each of these Amaral Neto repeated his unshakable intention to impede Lacerda's attempt to address the convention because for him "it was a matter of honor."[23] Similarly without effect was a warning from the outgoing president, Bilac Pinto,

that Amaral Neto could be jailed if he were to carry out his threat; Amaral Neto asked permission to address the chair, received it and read the following statement:

> 1. I declare on my honor that my stand is limited exclusively to the risk of my own life, without involving the lives of third parties.
> 2. I desire only a complete and written explanation of what has been said, callously, about my honor.
> 3. I demand a complete and written explanation that at no time has there been an attempt to impinge upon my honor.
> 4. In [the event of] the impossibility of any of these statements, in the name of my honor and my family, only dead or unconscious will I allow my detractor to occupy this democratic podium to speak.[24]

Half an hour before the time set for Lacerda's arrival, a female delegate identified as Sra. Maria Helena Ferreira made her way to the platform and read a letter in behalf of Amaral Neto. Sra. Ferreira, president of the Women's Committee for the Candidacy of Amaral Neto, also read a letter bearing the signature of Carlos Lacerda which advised her not to support the candidacy of the controversial politician because "he is no good and is not right to govern Guanabara."[25] The "bombshell," which had been the subject of rumors since early in the day, failed to produce a perceptible effect on the delegates, however, and there were boos as Sra. Ferreira stepped down from the platform in tears.

Reacting to the ill reception accorded his supporter, Amaral shouted out that "a party which will boo a woman is truly at the end of the road."[26]

It was evident to this observer that the loudest opposition to Amaral Neto and his views--as judged subjectively by the volume of boos and catcalls from the distinguished delegates--came from the delegations from Guanabara, Rio de Janeiro State and Minas Gerais. Cries of

"agitator" and "communist" were frequently directed toward the embattled Amaral.

As the hour of Lacerda's arrival drew nearer, numerous spectators--including the present writer--were hard pressed to divide their attention between the proceedings on the floor, Amaral Neto, and the door by which the governor of Guanabara was expected to enter the hall.

At four p.m. the governor came into the meeting area, greeted by loud applause from the majority of delegates and scattered boos from the area in which were concentrated the supporters of Amaral Neto. Immediately surrounded by newspaper reporters and representatives of television and radio, Lacerda limited himself to saying that he had come to "fulfill his partisan duty, that of voting for Ernâni Sátiro."[27] Waving off further inquiries, Lacerda stopped to greet various delegates with hearty abraços, then made his way toward the rostrum to address the convention, presumably in behalf of his candidate in the balloting which was in progress at that very moment. At this point Amaral Neto leapt to his feet, pushing aside a delegate who was later identified as Carlos Quintela, from the state of Rio de Janeiro,[28] and rushed to occupy the speaker's stand, apparently to prevent Lacerda from using it. Amaral Neto then proceeded to hurl imprecations at his adversary, some of which were recorded by the several television cameramen present. The usually reliable Jornal do Brasil quoted the fiery congressman as screaming:

> That coward will not speak from the platform! That debauchee [crápula] doesn't have the courage to come to where I am to speak. Coward, slanderer, corrupt leader, Hitler Brazilian-style![29]

Lacerda, relatively unperturbed amid the shouts, boos and accusations coming from both delegates and spectators, made no attempt to force his opponent from the speaker's stand and went instead to the central microphone in the middle of the officials' table, where Bilac Pinto was seated. There he addressed the convention very briefly without mentioning Amaral Neto except somewhat obliquely when he said:

> It is because of this spectacle which you convention delegates are witnessing that [I] was obliged to choose someone better to succeed [me] as governor.[30]

He then made a brief appeal to the delegates to vote for Ernâni Sátiro and left the microphone.

By this time, however, the tumult had spread among the gallery of spectators lining the sides of the convention area, and fistfights between Lacerdistas and Amaralistas broke out in several spots. The fifteen-man squad of the DOPS (Public Security Division) found itself unequal to the task of breaking up the various squabbles.

Meanwhile, on the convention floor, Amaral Neto found himself at the center of a whirlwind of activity. One delegate attempted to drag him from the podium but was felled by a blow from the foot of Amaral Neto's son, Sérgio.[31] A student leader from Minas Gerais, yelling "that traitor needs to be shown a thing or two," managed to haul the lawmaker from the spot he had occupied, whereupon Amaral Neto put his hand into his inside coat pocket as if to draw a weapon. As one eyewitness put it, "convention delegates, newspapermen and just plain spectators got out of there in a hurry."[32] In the scurry that followed, according to the account printed the following morning:

> One woman who identified herself as "a fan and fanatic supporter of Lacerda," when she saw Sr. Amaral Neto put his hand in his

> pocket ran away from the spot, saying that "I'm very fond of the governor, of politics and of the UDN, but I don't want to die for them."[33]

Needless to say, during this period of parliamentary confusion the business at hand--i.e., balloting for the new UDN national president--was suspended by the chair. When calm was finally restored, after approximately half an hour, chairs were overturned, several delegates were examining bruises and bloody noses, and the police had removed six to ten persons from the scene. One radio commentator accused Amaral Neto's followers of having smashed his microphone, and gave the politician a sharp rap on the shoulder with his fist, adding:

> This is to pay for my equipment, because I don't have anything to do with all this. I'm not even a member of the UDN and have no interest in the fate of this party of agitators.[34]

The newspapers enjoyed a field day with the rather unusual events recorded at the convention of the party of "lawyers and intellectuals," and this was especially true for those journals noted for their opposition to Carlos Lacerda. The following day the Correio da Manhã ran a cartoon entitled "Udenista Order" which left no doubt of its view of the affair (see following page).

After an interruption of approximately forty-five minutes during which the above events took place, order was restored without gunfire or loss of life, although the personal dignity of several delegates had suffered somewhat during the altercation. Presiding officer Bilac Pinto announced that expulsion proceedings would be undertaken to remove Amaral Neto from the UDN, to which the latter responded, "As far as I'm concerned, I already consider it settled and I don't want to hear anything further about this party."[35]

The interrupted voting for president of the UDN was resumed shortly before five p.m. As a near anti-climax following the tumultuous events just completed, the assembled delegates followed predicted form and chose Ernâni Sátiro of Paraíba as their new leader; the vote was an easy victory for Lacerda's candidate--281 for Sátiro, sixty for Aliomar Baleeiro, and eighty-six abstentions. Bilac Pinto immediately called for adjournment until the final evening session at nine p.m.

Although the crowd for the evening meeting was noticeably larger than that of the previous sessions, there were no further extra-

A ordem udenista

FIGURE III

parliamentary happenings of note, and newly elected president Ernâni Sátiro made his acceptance speech, called for party unity, and adjourned the convention sine die.

Carlos Lacerda released after the convention the text of the speech he had prepared but been unable to deliver because of the obstacles erected in his path by Amaral Neto. Surprisingly, Lacerda in his speech did not attack Castelo Branco personally but called rather for the UDN to "complete through the vote what was begun by prayer and by arms." He repeated his demand for direct elections and implored the party to present a united front at the polls.[36]

Reaction to the colorful events of the UDN convention was varied in Rio's most widely read newspapers, and in some cases the several contributors to the same journal could not reach agreement. Thus the anti-Lacerda Correio da Manhã, which published the biting cartoon previously cited, also ran a flattering commentary on Ernâni Sátiro and Aliomar Baleeiro.[37] The same newspaper, however, published three days later a scathing editorial which read in part:

> It is a pity that the Juvenile Court did not take measures to insure the integrity of the upbringing of our young people by preventing the TV transmission of the UDN national convention during afternoon hours. The rash of dirty words used on the occasion was enough to make the most foul-mouthed lowlife in Lapa blush. [Lapa is a district in downtown Rio noted for its underworld and "marginal" population.]

The editorial went on to decry the devolution of the UDN from a "party arisen out of the fight against dictatorship" to one which had as its candidate for president of Brazil "a leader of clearly fascist tendencies." In conclusion it alleged that the party "by following the leadership of men like Carlos Lacerda and Amoral Nato [sic] replaced juridical get-togethers with pure hooliganism."[38]

The more middle-of-the-road Jornal do Brasil, on the other hand, gave a generally favorable editorial interpretation to the events of the convention, while simultaneously devoting a full coverage to the disturbances described above.

> In a moment of political perplexity and paralysis of the national Parties, the UDN gave a demonstration of its vitality by holding in Niterói its convention to choose a new President. . . . [But] there is no way to justify the intrusion of a purely statewide matter into a convention called for the purpose of choosing a new President for the Party.[39]

The editorial on balance was pro-UDN in that it concluded with a brief résumé of the role the party had played in the fall of the Vargas regime and expressed the hope that the UDN would assume a role of leadership in the introduction of much-needed legislation to reform the statutes regulating political parties.

The schism evident at the UDN national convention, as noted in the editorial of the Jornal do Brasil, was provoked by a matter which in theory centered solely around the issue of the selection of a UDN candidate to succeed Carlos Lacerda as governor of Guanabara. But the larger issue--Lacerda's maintenance of a power base for his campaign for president of the Republic--affected all party members. Having successfully withstood the threat represented by an opposition candidate for the party presidency, Lacerda was now able to return to the more important problem facing him in his home state: selecting a gubernatorial candidate who would unite and not sunder the UDN-GB.

Selection of the Party Candidate

What is graced in Mexico with a name of its own--futurismo-- is also a part of the Brazilian political scene, though no term has been coined to describe the phenomenon. The second half of an incumbent's

term is normally the time for rumors and speculations concerning his possible successor to become rife, a process especially visible during the twelve months or so prior to the election itself. The abnormal situation resulting from the 1964 revolution served to make political discussions during 1965 even more animated than was the norm in highly politicized Guanabara.[40]

Thus it was that Carlos Lacerda, who for practical purposes would name the party candidate to succeed him as governor of the state, had begun searching for an acceptable choice as early as the latter part of 1964. Although Lacerda knew he could force his choice upon the state directorate if necessary, it was obviously to his and the party's advantage to locate a man (or woman, for the name of Sandra Cavalcânti was also mentioned) who, if not able to unite the party in enthusiastic support, at least would not hopelessly divide it.

The actions of Amaral Neto at the UDN convention clearly indicated that the Lacerdist candidate would be guaranteed at least one vitriolic anti-Lacerda opponent, but the threat posed by the ex-UDN legislator was slight compared with that represented by the probable coalition of the PTB and PSD in Guanabara. Inevitably, Lacerda himself would be an issue, but it was evident that a dichotomy existed in the public mind between Lacerda the man--who was a source of immense controversy--and Lacerda the administrator--who was generally admired by the electorate.

This had been the conclusion drawn from a public opinion survey authorized by Lacerda and carried out by the IBOPE (Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics). It was found that, as Lacerda's term drew to a close, a large majority of those interviewed

agreed with Lacerda's policies as governor, while significantly fewer--less than half--supported his actions as politician.[41] Reacting to the findings of the poll, Lacerda opted for a political figure who would be associated with the administration and public works aspect of his government without being irrevocably linked in the public mind with his political position. As one commentator expressed it:

> Lacerda feared . . . the radicalization of the political-electoral process which would bring with it the resurgence of old hatreds dormant in the subconscious of the proletarian classes. Therefore, and because research showed the popularity of his works and the lack of popularity of his political image, caused in most cases by emotional factors, the governor adopted the thesis of the "technician-candidate."[42]

In practicality this meant that the choice could well be a figure from outside the ranks of the inner circle of the UDN, or even from outside the party itself, so long as the individual was indelibly stamped with the mark of Lacerda's administration.

Ideally such a candidate would be a member of Lacerda's cabinet or a high ranking civil servant below cabinet level appointed since Lacerda's term of office began in 1960. While his party affiliation--in the sense of his being a veteran udenista from the time of the anti-Vargas movement--was of less importance to the governor than certain other intangibles, it would be a plus factor if the candidate were readily identifiable as old-line UDN. In fact, this latter point was to prove one of the major stumbling blocks in the selection of the party candidate.

As reported in one of Rio's leading newspapers, Lacerda commissioned another poll to discover the relative popular acceptance of several of the members of his government as well as other leading figures within the UDN-GB. The survey was carried out by the polling

service Marplan and the results delivered in early April, showing the following percentages of persons responding favorably to each would-be candidate:

Enaldo Cravo Peixoto	21
Amaral Neto	5
Adaucto Cardoso	3
Raimundo de Brito	1

This poll helped Lacerda eliminate definitely several potential candidates as "unviable," among them Sandra Cavalcânti, Vice Governor Rafael de Magalhães and State Deputy Danilo Nunes (who was later, however, chosen the party candidate for vice governor). Also eliminated at this stage was Amaral Neto, who responded to the action as an attack upon his personal integrity and four weeks later blocked Lacerda from the speaker's stand at the UDN national convention (see above, pp. 238-240).

Amaral Neto's pique was due in part to the fact that he had been the largest UDN vote-getter in the last congressional race, drawing some 123,000 votes to Adaucto Cardoso's 18,000.[44] Furthermore, he claimed the allegiance of a number of the party leaders and delegates to the state convention soon to be convoked. State Deputy Édson Guimarães, however, denied any large scale support for Amaral Neto, stating that of some nine hundred persons on the twenty-five electoral zone directorates, only thirty-six had signed a manifesto in favor of the deputy as candidate to succeed Lacerda.[45] Later, after the events of the UDN national convention, Lacerda was to state publicly that his elimination of Amaral Neto had not been on personal or moral grounds as had been contended. By then, however, the dissident legislator was already the gubernatorial candidate of the small Partido Libertador.

Throughout the campaign he was to assume the role of anti-Lacerda, virtually ignoring the actual UDN gubernatorial standard-bearer in favor of violent and personal attacks upon the incumbent governor. The political impact of Amaral's candidacy, in terms of probable influence on the voting itself, will be discussed in Chapter VIII.

It was perhaps the findings of the above-mentioned poll, which demonstrated a marked preference for Cravo Peixoto, Lacerda's secretary of public works, which led the governor to become the leading advocate of the engineer-politician as the one most indicated to represent the UDN in the October election. Indeed, in April, political talk centered around Cravo Peixoto, who had suddenly assumed the favorite's role in the nomination sweepstakes.

Opposition to Lacerda's apparent choice was quick to arise. The focus of dissatisfaction was in the bancada federal, which called a strategy meeting to review the governor's decision to back Cravo Peixoto and pass over Adaucto Cardoso. One disgruntled member of the bancada was quoted as expressing perplexity at "the theatricality of the governor's gesture, trying to impose a candidate from his hip pocket."[46] The meeting, held at the home of Adaucto Cardoso, resulted in a decision of the federal deputies to present the name of Adaucto Cardoso at the convention, despite Lacerda's opposition. A party split was in the making. The national convention, to be held three days after the deputies' meeting, might well be the scene of yet another internecine battle between the pro- and anti-Lacerda branches of the party. Adaucto Cardoso defended his plan to bring up the matter at the national convention, despite the statewide nature of the dispute, by arguing that the succession problem in Guanabara

"is a national question, whether or not Sr. Carlos Lacerda desires it."[47] This statement was an apparent reference to the interest which the Castelo Branco government had in the outcome of the gubernatorial races in Rio and Minas Gerais. Although one newspaper headlined the story of Adaucto Cardoso's decision "Split in UDN Consummated,"[48] in actuality the statement by the Guanabara bancada was overshadowed and virtually crowded from public attention by the colorful and unusual events arising from the attempts of Amaral Neto to deny his enemy a political forum. Nonetheless, it was a sign that unity would not be the keynote in the upcoming gubernatorial race unless some modus vivendi were found to placate divergent elements within the party.

With the support of Lacerda, Enaldo Cravo Peixoto seemed virtually assured of ratification by the party leadership and in late April undertook a campaign to make his name and face better known among the people of Rio, especially the lower socio-economic groups, in preparation for the race itself. Thus the Lacerdist newspaper Tribuna da Imprensa headlined, "Enaldo Visits Samba Schools to Begin His Campaign for Governor."[49] Meanwhile there was talk in udenista circles that he should emulate the success of Lacerda, who has used a rose as campaign symbol, and choose a carnation as his rubric, based on the fact that cravo in Portuguese means carnation.

Who was Enaldo Cravo Peixoto and what were the qualities which brought one of the shrewdest politicians on the Brazilian scene to back him with such force? An engineer, Cravo had gained widespread public recognition as Lacerda's secretary of public works, which had led his detractors to dub him "Master of Works," a term in which he took pride. With some twenty-five years of public service in various

civil service capacities, Cravo felt that his position under Lacerda had been the most fruitful, "for it gave me a more complete vision of the problems of the State." During that period he had "contact with administrative, social, human and economic problems which constitute a preparation for the candidate."[50] His program as governor, he asserted, would focus on problems of continuing the "new Rio" which had been begun under Lacerda, centering around matters dealing with more adequate distribution of water and more efficient sanitation measures--both long-felt needs of Rio de Janeiro.

In terms of physical image--which can assume such magnitude in political races in the United States--Cravo Peixoto perhaps did not project the magnetism of Lacerda. A stocky, balding individual with a prominent nose and large lips, Cravo wore thick glasses and was often photographed in an open-neck sport shirt. It is unlikely, however, that physical attributes had any bearing at all on the ultimate selection of a gubernatorial candidate for either the União Democrática Nacional or its major adversary, the Partido Brasileiro Trabalhista, for both candidates were middle-aged, somewhat rumpled in appearance and far from the type usually termed "charismatic."[51]

Thus as the first month of serious consideration of the UDN candidate drew to a close, Enaldo Cravo Peixoto seemed to enjoy a commanding position, but there were other contenders and no lack of criticism of Lacerda's choice. Besides the aforementioned Adaucto Cardoso, Castelo's minister of health, Raimundo de Brito, was also a declared "candidate to be a candidate," and neither he nor Adaucto demonstrated willingness to withdraw in favor of the governor's preference. Unless some means could be found to reconcile the

congressional wing, with its strong preference for Adaucto Cardoso, and the Lacerdist wing, which favored Enaldo Cravo Peixoto, the UDN would face the always potent PTB in October as a divided party with little if any hope of victory.

The month of May saw the peaking of the Cravo boomlet. During the weeks following the hectic events of the party's national convention, tempers began to cool somewhat and full attention--which had been diverted from the backstage proceedings by the public display of disaffection between Amaral and Lacerda--was once again focused on the question of the best man to represent the UDN in Guanabara. During May it became increasingly clear that opposition to Cravo was more than merely superficial, and the bancada federal, united in its pursuit of the nomination for Adaucto Cardoso, spearheaded the "Stop Cravo" drive. (It should be remembered that the actual nomination, technically, would be made by the state party assembled in convention, but Lacerda's endorsement was a powerful asset for Cravo Peixoto in his drive to secure the UDN nod.)

The ill feelings that existed between Carlos Lacerda and most of the members of the bancada federal were well known to anyone who followed politics in Guanabara. A further proof of it was offered during the crucial month of May, when the Lacerda-supported candidacy of Cravo Peixoto would be put to the test. Eurípedes Cardoso de Menezes, a UDN federal deputy representing Guanabara, stated in an interview that he was opposed to the presidential candidacy of Lacerda because he felt the governor would "make fanatics" of the UDN. He went on to say that he would prefer to see passed a constitutional amendment

allowing the re-election of Castelo Branco rather than have Lacerda occupy the presidential palace.[52] Clearly, the bancada was an obstacle that must be overcome if Lacerda was to carry out his three-stage plan: (1) to nominate the man of his choice as UDN candidate for governor; (2) to bring about the election of that candidate and thereby assure a power base; and (3) use the UDN presidential nomination to win the highest office in the republic. In daisy-chain style, each step in the process was prerequisite to the following.

The opposition of the congressional delegation had expressed itself in polite but unmistakable form in a letter to Lacerda, titular head of the UDN-GB through his position as governor, which the press published in full at the beginning of May. The letter was signed by Deputies Cardoso de Menezes, Hamilton Nogueira, Aliomar Baleeiro, Arnaldo Nogueira, Maurício Joper and Aguinaldo Costa. Noting that Lacerda has first supported the name of his vice governor, Rafael de Magalhães, the letter went on to state:

> We were surprised by the substitution of the honored name of Engineer Enaldo Cravo Peixoto for that of the noble Vice-Governor [for he is] a person completely foreign to the UDN, to which he applied for admission only after becoming a candidate. . . .
>
> We are of the belief that the Governor should be a politician, a "technician of general ideas," a man of State, with a global view of problems, sensitive to the aspirations of the people. . . .
>
> Without any personal restriction on [Cravo Peixoto], we lament our inability to lend him our support, because he is a latecomer in the Party, one still subject to the formalities of admission. . . .
>
> . . . The new choice [Cravo Peixoto] had the effect of dividing still further the UDN, Guanabara section.
>
> For these reasons . . . we reiterate the indication of the name of our great fellow member and founder of the Party, Deputy Adaucto Lúcio Cardoso as candidate for Governor of Guanabara. . . .
>
> We ask God to illuminate the privileged intellect of the illustrious Governor, in whose conscience we leave the object of this message from old companions. . . .[53]

With the emergence of a united front among the members of the bancada federal in behalf of Adaucto Cardoso, the position of front-runner Cravo Peixoto weakened, and rumors began cropping up once again about possible "compromise candidates," among them an oldtime UDN politician named Moniz Aragão, who had served in the Castelo Branco regime as interim minister of education.[54] Moniz Aragão's name soon dropped from consideration, however.

A meeting of UDN leaders in Guanabara was held on May 12 to set a date for the state convention which would officially nominate the party candidate for governor. Lacerda had reportedly favored holding the convention at an early date, preferably within a week; this would have facilitated his task of achieving ratification of his hand-picked candidate before the opposition could fully unite against him.[55] But the party chieftains were unable to agree on a date for the convention and the meeting adjourned with little accomplished.

As May wore on it became increasingly apparent that there would be no overwhelming groundswell of support for Cravo Peixoto's aspirations. In fact, as time went on the secretary of works was "underwhelmed" as his support from Lacerda became less and less vocal and the chorus of opposition grew ever louder. By mid-month Cravo Peixoto was reduced to stating that the problem of the dissidence arisen because of his candidacy "was a problem for the competency of Sr. Carlos Lacerda."[56] If it was clear that Cravo was not to be the candidate, it was still far from evident who was to carry the banner of the União in the October fray.

During the period leading up to the nomination of a UDN candidate, the "forgotten man" was Raimundo de Brito, which is difficult to explain in terms of the qualifications offered as credentials for

some of the other would-be candidates. Although not a professional politician, Brito, a native of Rio Grande do Norte, had acquitted himself well enough as Carlos Lacerda's secretary of health that he was "promoted" to national minister of health by President Castelo Branco. A medical doctor, Brito was personal friend and physician to ex-President Eurico Dutra and it was perhaps for this reason that his candidacy was said to be well received in military circles.[57] Despite his underdog role in the competition to choose a UDN standard-bearer, Brito was sufficiently well thought of by political leaders to be mentioned prominently as a possible gubernatorial candidate in his native state of Rio Grande do Norte should his efforts in Guanabara prove unfruitful.[58] Although rumors were common alleging that Brito had been Lacerda's choice after two earlier preferences had failed to gain wide support in the party,[59] by early May it was clear that Brito was on his own insofar as organizing partisan support was concerned and that Lacerda's efforts were bent toward achieving the acceptance of Cravo Peixoto, if feasible.

Despite his role on the periphery of the political struggle taking place in the UDN-GB, Raimundo do Brito was far from inactive during this period, and he and the other dark horse, Deputy Adaucto Cardoso, seeing the strength of Cravo Peixoto fading rapidly, agreed during the last part of May to force scheduling of the state convention as soon as possible (i.e., the first days of June).[60] Brito had enjoyed less solid support than that given Adaucto Cardoso by his comrades in the bancada federal, but his presence in the race was nevertheless a factor in case a compromise candidate was necessary to break an impasse between pro- and anti-Lacerda wings of the party. A

political reporter quoted Brito in late May as stating that:

> His candidacy continues firm and he will accept only the decision of the voting at the convention. . . . If the convention decides in favor of another candidate, whoever he may be, he will not only accept the result but also give his support to the one chosen.[61]

On May 25 two events were announced of great significance to the political ambitions of the UDN, Guanabara section. The first was that the state directorate of the party had agreed to meet June 1 to set a date for the state convention to choose the party nominee. The second was that Carlos Lacerda himself had decided to reassume the presidency of the UDN-GB

> . . . for two motives: the realization of the convention of the PTB also in June and the paralyzation (for several days) of conversations designed to strengthen the candidacy of Engineer Enaldo Cravo Peixoto. . . .[62]

The UDN presidency in Guanabara had been held in rotation by Deputies Édson Guimarães, Célio Borja and Geraldo Ferrais--all members of Lacerda's circle of intimates. Lacerda's action was apparently aimed at strengthening his hand in the crucial negotiations leading up to the nomination itself. The fact that the opposition PTB could be expected to have nominated its candidate before the UDN convention was held would make the stakes that much higher. Lacerda and his colleagues could have no way of knowing at that point that the PTB convention would turn into a comedy of accusations and counter-accusations which would end up nullifying the actions taken there. Nor could it be known in advance that the UDN would finally name its candidate long before the opposition could field a politician acceptable to both the PTB and the Regional Electoral Tribune.[63]

As May drew to a close and the scheduled meeting to set the convention date approached, the Cravo boom went bust. On May 26 there appeared a short item in Rio newspapers quoting Federal Deputy Arnaldo Nogueira as stating that Governor Lacerda "admitted the hypothesis of reviewing the candidacy of . . . Cravo Peixoto."[64] This was the first time Lacerda was quoted as conceding the possibility that his secretary of public works would not be the party candidate, although--as noted previously--the informed consensus was that this had been a foregone conclusion for most of the month.

Raimundo de Brito and Adaucto Cardoso, however, were not the only names raised in opposition to Cravo Peixoto. At least three others were mentioned seriously in the press as possible candidates, though some were considered little but "second-choice" personalities who might be called upon to fill a gap left by deadlock within the party.

Col. Francisco Américo Fontenele, director of transit in Lacerda's government, was undoubtedly the most colorful as well as the most controversial of those suggested. An accomplished pilot, Fontenele had lived and studied some years in the United States, where he saw the problems arising from a high proportion of motor vehicles to persons. Because Rio de Janeiro enjoys the highest car/space ratio of any unit of the Brazilian federation, Fontenele undertook to straighten out the chaotic traffic conditions--especially the ubiquitous problem of automobiles double- and even triple-parked--by drastic and dramatic measures. Fontenele won international fame--or notoriety--from a report in Time describing his tactics in the war against illegal parking. The major weapon in his arsenal was esvaziamento, letting the air out

of tires of cars parked in prohibited areas. In a country where the percentage of scofflaws makes the issuing of parking summons impractical, Fontenele's solution made him the most talked about and railed against figure in Lacerda's government--but most viewers agreed that it worked.[65] In addition Fontenele established a large number of state-run parking lots in downtown Rio, employing college students as attendants. This gained him popularity among this important segment of the middle class, and on one occasion students held a rally to support Fontenele when a state deputy attacked his plan to build more parking areas.[66] The Fontenele plan gave rise to an entirely new profession in Rio, a product of the fertile imagination and ingenuity of the carioca: tire inflater. These individuals, who numbered in the hundreds during the height of the Fontenele era, carried bicycle pumps and for a fee would re-inflate tires emptied by the traffic police of Col. Fontenele. It was things such as this which made the retired aviator a public figure of more than casual interest and raised the possibility of his serving as candidate to the succession in Guanabara.

Sandra Cavalcânti, head of the National Housing Bank, was closely identified with the Lacerda administration because of its emphasis on construction of low-cost housing to replace the favelas where almost a million cariocas lived in 1965. Sandra Cavalcânti possessed impressive credentials, even for a male, and was generally conceded to be the outstanding woman civil servant and politician in the country. A former teacher, deputy and ex-secretary of social service, she had also been an alderman and delegate from Brazil to the Congress on Primary Education held in Geneva. In addition she had helped draw up

plans for a national reform of the educational system of the armed forces. Intelligent if rather plain, Sandra Cavalcânti was one of Lacerda's trusted associates and reputedly would have welcomed the chance to become Brazil's first woman governor. The fact that she was a woman in a society where politics is still very much a man's world made her candidacy rather unlikely, but she continued throughout the campaign to play a large role behind the scenes.[67]

Carlos Flexa Ribeiro, secretary of education from the beginning of Lacerda's administration, was also the oldest cabinet member in terms of service.[68] Like Sandra Cavalcânti a native of Belém, Pará, Flexa had degrees both in history and in law and was professor of art and holder of the chair of esthetics in the School of Architecture of the University of Brazil. Flexa also was owner of a fashionable private school in the Botafogo district of Rio and author of several works dealing with art. Rather unprepossessing physically--he looked more like the stereotype of a professor than a politician--Flexa was nevertheless respected by those who knew him as an energetic official who had contributed to the large number of schools constructed during Lacerda's administration. His major drawback politically was the fact that he was little known.[69]

It is noteworthy that not one of the six persons named as possible UDN candidates for governor--Fontenele, Sandra Cavalcânti, Adaucto Cardoso, Brito, Cravo Peixoto and Flexa Ribeiro--was a native of Rio, a singular testimony to the political magnetism of the former capital.

On May 27 a political bombshell exploded within the UDN-GB which lent an entirely different complexion to the succession dispute.

An accord was announced by which all three of the major contenders--Cravo Peixoto, Adaucto Cardoso and Raimundo de Brito--agreed to withdraw their candidacies at the behest of Lacerda, who feared a divided UDN would result from the conflicting aspirations.[70] This maneuver on Lacerda's part was most likely a response to the unceasing pressure exerted on him by the opposition headed by the congressional delegation. Although there were some who saw Lacerda's move as a mere political tactic designed to placate the opposition while still maintaining Cravo's chances unaffected,[71] most commentators interpreted it as a capitulation of sorts to the anti-Cravo forces.

The entente between Lacerda and his political foes had been reached as the result of a conference in the Palácio Guanabara between Lacerda and Adaucto Cardoso, lasting over an hour and marked by the presentation of a letter to the governor, signed by the bancada federal in support of the deputy's candidacy. The letter, however, continued in conciliatory tones and proposed some fifteen names--including those of all the federal deputies--as possible candidates. The governor refused to accept the letter, alleging that if he were to choose one, he would lose favor with fourteen.[72] After the conference, Lacerda announced the agreement which withdrew all three names from consideration.

A political vacuum arose as the result of the withdrawal of the three major candidates, and there seemed to be no immediately likely individual to fill it. Into the void, however, soon came the name of Lacerda's secretary of education, Sr. Carlos Flexa Ribeiro.

As one account expressed it, Flexa Ribeiro fit the bill of an individual who could "reunite all groups capable of having an influence

in the choice of the UDN candidate to the state succession" and who "possesses easy transit in all the political areas [of the party]."[73] In addition, the education secretary had the advantage of long-time association with the União Democrática Nacional--thus avoiding one of the pitfalls which had hampered the campaign to win the nomination for Enaldo Cravo Peixoto--and was closely identified with the administration of Governor Lacerda.

Interestingly enough, a journalistic coup of a kind had been achieved a full month earlier by Hélio Fernandes, intimate of Carlos Lacerda and editor of the Tribuna da Imprensa. Naturally pro-Lacerda and deeply involved in UDN intraparty politics, the Tribuna published an article on April 29 in Fernandes' column "Em Primeira Mão" which dealt with the possibility of Flexa Ribeiro as candidate. According to Fernandes, the theme of Flexa as a "unity candidate" had arisen with none other than Adaucto Cardoso, but without the knowledge of the governor of Guanabara, who was in São Paulo when the idea first occurred. When apprised of the concept, Lacerda is said to have replied that he esteemed his education secretary but feared that Flexa's running might raise charges of "vest-pocket candidate" even more than had that of Cravo Peixoto.[74] (Flexa Ribeiro's daughter was married to Carlos Lacerda's son, thus giving rise to the nepotism allegation to which Lacerda had indirect reference.)

With the rise of Flexa's political star, that of Cravo Peixoto went into permanent eclipse. On May 28 Cravo

> . . . placed his candidacy . . . at the disposal of Sr. Carlos Lacerda, claiming that he did not plan to run in order to split the UDN nor transform himself into a liability for the governor's candidacy to the Presidency of the Republic.

Cravo went on to state that "My candidacy is, as it always was, in the hands of the UDN and Governor Carlos Lacerda. I always said that, and no one believed it; now they'll see it's true."[75]

As May became June, events began to move rapidly. Sandra Cavalcânti, according to Carlos Lacerda's secretary of state, proposed the name of Carlos Flexa Ribeiro to the governor, arguing that Flexa would unite the dangerously divided party. Support for Flexa also came from other sectors of the UDN-GB, notably Pedro Paulo Pimentel.[76] On June 3 Lacerda convoked an extraordinary meeting of the UDN Regional Directorate[77] and urged it to support "a name identified with the work of the Administration, having party ties, and with no obligations to the economic-financial policy of the federal government."[78] Lacerda's criteria effectively eliminated Raimundo de Brito, who as a member of Castelo Branco's cabinet could hardly be counted on to mount an attack on Castelo's money policies--or allow Lacerda to do so in his name. It also removed from contention both Adaucto Lúcio Cardoso and Enaldo Cravo Peixoto, for the former had been a supporter of the Castelo regime (along with the large majority of UDN legislators) in the chamber of deputies, and the latter did not meet the prerequisite of "having party ties." More and more it began to look like Flexa Ribeiro by default.

By June 3 one political columnist was able to declare that Adaucto Cardoso had "furled his flag" and that the nomination of Carlos Flexa Ribeiro was a sure thing.[79] Within the bancada federal Flexa was found acceptable to all but Aliomar Baleeiro, who continued to oppose the nomination, and Arnaldo Nogueira, who was "indifferent."[80] Perhaps the most succinct statement about the selection

process leading to the choice of the UDN candidate was that "Flexa Ribeiro [was] finally weakly accepted by the udenista leadership."81

Once an agreement had been reached between Lacerda and his intra-party opposition, ratification of Flexa's candidacy by a state convention was a mere formality. The meeting was quickly set for June 14 in the main chamber of the Assembléia Legislativa.

In brief it might be said that the selection of Flexa was more a process of elimination than anything else. Among the potential candidates found unsuitable for one or more reasons were two federal deputies (Adaucto Cardoso and Amaral Neto), a state deputy (Danilo Nunes), the vice governor, (Rafael de Magalhães), a federal minister (Raimundo de Brito) and four members of Lacerda's cabinet (Sandra Cavalcânti, Col. Fontenele, Cravo Peixoto and Hélio Beltrão). Flexa Ribeiro, then, emerged from the competition as a compromise candidate, the one man acceptable--if barely, in some cases--to all factions of the UDN, Guanabara section. In his own words:

> I was not a candidate, I did not seek the nomination. My tradition was more that of an intellectual, an educator and professor. Carlos Lacerda's candidate was first Hélio Beltrão, second Rafael, who withdrew. Then Enaldo Peixoto, Adaucto Cardoso and Raimundo de Brito. Lacerda didn't want Adaucto or Raimundo, and the UDN rejected Cravo Peixoto. Forty-five days went by in an impasse. Then the party came to my house. My candidacy united the party. . . .82

On June 14, 1965, the convention of the UDN-GB opened with speeches and business of secondary importance. The following day the assembled delegates officially chose Flexa Ribeiro as candidate of the União Democrática Nacional for the governor's seat to be vacated by Carlos Lacerda. The convention was rapid, efficient and without incident of the type which had marked the national conclave six weeks earlier on the other side of the Bay of Guanabara.

At last, after months of backstage bargaining, intraparty strife and mutual recriminations, the UDN had a candidate. The campaign had officially begun.

NOTES

[1]"Lacerda Luta Pelo Contrôle da UDN," O Cruzeiro, May 1, 1965, p. 86. The article was written before the UDN convention.

[2]Ibid.

[3]"The candidate of President Castelo Branco for the Presidency of the UDN is Deputy Guilherme Machado," reported political writer Pedro Gomes in the Jornal do Brasil (April 1, 1965, p. 10). Machado was not considered pro-Lacerda and his election would have been seen as a setback for the governor. Whether or not the "leak" was a trial balloon, Machado's candidacy never got off the ground.

[4]Tribuna da Imprensa, April 1, 1965, front page editorial. The headline read "THE BETRAYALS OF THE GOVERNMENT" and an overline accused Castelo of having turned the 31st of March (date of the revolution) into April first (April Fool's Day).

[5]Entreguista, a difficult word to translate, is related to the Spanish term vende-patria (literally, one who sells his country) and is used with the same sense of opprobrium. Roughly, entreguista refers to one who gives control of resources or decisionmaking to foreign elements such as American companies, an embassy, etc. It is common usage among nationalists in Brazil.

[6]It should be noted that the UDN presidency, much like the chairmanship of the major United States parties, was more a position calling for organizational and administrative talents than a truly "political" post. Prior to 1965 it had been fundamentally an office granted as an honorific to well known and venerated party members.

[7]O Globo, April 7, 1965, p. 12.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Ibid., April 17, 1965, p. 8.

[10]Interview with Aliomar Baleeiro, April 10, 1966, in Rio de Janeiro.

[11]O Globo, April 17, 1965, p. 8.

[12]Interview with Aliomar Baleeiro, April 10, 1966, in Rio de Janeiro.

[13]O Globo, April 17, 1965, p. 8. The apparent irreconcilability of these two points was no doubt obvious to Sátiro even as he made them, though at this time hopes were high that the growing dispute between Lacerda and the Castelo administration could be resolved. As the likelihood of a rapprochement faded, feeling grew in the higher levels of the UDN that Lacerda's candidacy for president of the republic might seriously endanger the party's "privileged position" in the government.

[14]Ibid., April 7, 1965, p. 12.

[15]Correio da Manhã, April 25, 1965, p. 8.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Ibid., April 27, 1965, p. 8.

[18]Jornal do Brasil, May 1, 1965, p. 5.

[19]Ibid.

[20]Síntese Política Econômica Social, 26 (April-June, 1965), p. 82.

[21]Tribuna da Imprensa, April 29, 1965, p. 2.

[22]Jornal do Brasil, May 1, 1965, p. 3.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Ibid.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Ibid. Later, when Lacerda entered the hall, Sra. Ferreira attempted to speak with him, but according to the later account he "brusquely told her he did not have time to talk with her then." (Ibid.)

[27]Ibid.

[28]Ibid.

[29]Ibid.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Ibid.

[32]Ibid. Although there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of the rather complete account carried in the Jornal do Brasil the day after the events described, it must be added for the sake of authenticity that the present writer, seated some distance from the focus of the brouhaha, did not see Amaral Neto brandish a weapon. From my position, however, it was impossible to see him clearly for all the people gathered around the iconoclastic politician.

[33]Ibid.

[34]Ibid.

[35]Ibid., p. 5. The following month Amaral Neto was formally expelled

from the União Democrática Nacional. See Tribuna da Imprensa for May 13, 1965, p. 3.

[36]Ibid.

[37]Correio da Manhã, May 1-2, 1965, p. 2.

[38]Ibid., May 4, 1965, p. 6. It is interesting that this journal frequently printed in its signed columns and editorials the name of Amaral Neto as "Amoral Nato," a pun meaning "born amoral."

[39]Jornal do Brasil, May 1, 1965, p. 6.

[40]It should be kept in mind, however, that although interest in and discussion of politics were quite high in 1965, many were unwilling to commit themselves on political matters for purposes of citation. As has been seen, this necessitated the guarantee of anonymity for all respondents taking part in the attitudinal survey discussed in Chapter VI.

[41]The poll aroused controversy within the UDN-GB as to the exact percentages, though the overall direction of the survey was beyond dispute. Thus in interviews with high placed UDN personages I was given differing figures. Federal Deputy Adaucto Cardoso told me (April 11, 1966) that "over 80 percent" favored Lacerda's works and administration in general but only 27 percent agreed with his politics; Célio Borja, Lacerda's Secretary of the Government, declared that the first figure was true but the low score on politics was not (April 18, 1966).

[42]Coutto, O Voto e o Povo, p. 82.

[43]Jornal do Brasil, May 27, 1965, p. 4.

[44]Dados Estatísticos: 1962, p. 166. In this election, held in 1962, the proportional system allowed the election of the least voted of the six UDN federal deputies chosen, Hamilton Nogueira, with only 7,334 ballots.

[45]Jornal do Brasil, April 2, 1965, p. 3. Amaral Neto, though still officially a member of the UDN, had already demonstrated that he was a political maverick on less than optimum terms with most elements of the Lacerda wing of the party. He refused, for example, an invitation to a meeting at the Palácio Guanabara to choose the party candidate, citing as his reason his unwillingness to sit at the same table with Geraldo Ferrais or Édson Guimarães, both state deputies and closely associated with Lacerda's faction of the UDN-GB.

[46]Correio da Manhã, April 25, 1965, p. 8.

[47]Ibid., April 27, 1965, p. 8.

[48]Ibid.

[49]Tribuna da Imprensa, April 26, 1965, p. 4.

[50]Ibid.

[51]Though beyond the scope of the present work, an interesting study might be done of the role of physical appearance (certainly a major part of the conglomerate known as "image") in Brazilian politics. It would likely show no significant correlation between election to public office and possession of such traits as handsomeness, youth, physical vigor and photogeneity. Whether this is due to the proportional voting system used in Brazil or to a lesser emphasis on the mass media must remain for the present a matter of conjecture. It is undeniable, however, that such men as Getulio Vargas and Jânio Quadros, both of whom have been called charismaric in their appeal to the electorate, were physically quite unexceptional.

[52]Quoted in Correio da Manhã, May 13, 1965, p. 8.

[53]Jornal do Brasil, May 1, 1965, p. 19.

[54]Ibid.

[55]Correio da Manhã, May 13, 1965, p. 8.

[56]Ibid.

[57]Jornal do Brasil, June 3, 1965, p. 3.

[58]As events worked out, however, Raimundo de Brito was nominated in neither state.

[59]According to none other than Flexa Ribeiro himself, Brito was a third-string choice of the governor, after Hélio Beltrão and Rafael de Magalhães, but Lacerda then rejected him in favor of Cravo. (Interview of May 3, 1966, in Rio de Janeiro.)

[60]Jornal do Brasil, May 23, 1965, p. 10.

[61]Ibid.

[62]Ibid., May 25, 1965, p. 5.

[63]See below, Chapter VIII.

[64]Jornal do Brasil, May 26, 1965, p. 4.

[65]Ibid., June 3, 1965, p. 3. Fontenele's men emptied the tires of the Russian ambassador and the cars belonging to members of the Assembléia Legislativa, illegally parked outside the building, suffered a similar fate.

[66]Ibid.

[67]An example of this was her part in urging Lacerda to accept the candidacy of Flexa Ribeiro. In the beginning the governor was far from sanguine about the possibility of his education secretary running for the post he would soon vacate.

[68]Interview with Carlos Flexa Ribeiro, May 3, 1966, in Rio de Janeiro.

[69]Jornal do Brasil, June 3, 1965, p. 3. Further biographical data on Flexa appears at the beginning of Chapter VIII.

[70]Ibid., May 27, 1965, p. 4.

[71]One example was Mauro Magalhães, a state deputy and majority leader in the Assembléia Legislativa, who stated that "the name of the secretary of public works is irretractable." (Ibid.) He was mistaken.

[72]O Globo, May 28, 1965, p. 6.

[73]Jornal do Brasil, May 27, 1965, p. 4.

[74]The information in this paragraph is drawn from the column by Hélio Fernandes which appeared in the Tribuna da Imprensa for April 29, 1965, p. 3.

[75]Jornal do Brasil, May 28, 1965, p. 10.

[76]Interview with Célio Borja, April 18, 1966, in Rio de Janeiro.

[77]The regional Directorate was composed of the Executive Committee (state president, three vice presidents, secretary general, sub-secretary and treasurer) plus two or three representatives from each of the twenty-five ward (bairro) directorates. In 1965 all of the officers on the ExCom were close associates and political allies of Lacerda.

[78]Jornal do Brasil, June 3, 1965, p. 3.

[79]Ibid., p. 4.

[80]Ibid.

[81]Síntese Política Econômica Social, 27 (July-September, 1965), p. 68.

[82]Interview with Carlos Flexa Ribeiro, May 3, 1966, in Rio de Janeiro.

CHAPTER VIII

THE GUBERNATORIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1965 IN GUANABARA

Who was Carlos Otávio Flexa Ribeiro, the man chosen to head his party's ticket and lead the battle to maintain the governorship for the UDN? Because Flexa was relatively unknown outside party circles, despite his position in Lacerda's cabinet, an extensive propaganda campaign was undertaken immediately upon his nomination, its object the diffusion of Flexa's name throughout Guanabara.

Using the most modern techniques of advertising, the team charged with promoting Flexa Ribeiro made extensive use of radio and TV, public appearances and printed materials. A symbol was adopted to facilitate identification in the voter's mind--a broad-based arrow pointing upward at approximately a sixty-five degree angle with the words FLEXA 65 printed on it. This symbol was based on the linguistic happenstance that Flexa, the candidate's surname, and flecha (arrow) are pronounced identically in Portuguese.

An electoral brochure printed by "a group of friends of Flexa Ribeiro" appeared in July, 1965, outlining the qualifications which Flexa brought into the political fray. Born in Belém, Pará, in 1915, Flexa completed a law degree at the National School of Law and later received a degree in history from the University of the Federal District (then Rio de Janeiro). In 1937 he went to study in Europe, where he remained a year. In 1943 he became director of the Colégio Andrews, a

private school frequented by children of the upper levels of Rio's middle and upper classes. In 1952 Flexa took first place in a competition for the chair of history and esthetics in the National School of Architecture. In addition, before becoming part of the Lacerda administration he was director of the Museum of Modern Art, an internationally famous institution located in downtown Rio. Flexa was one of the authors of a basic reform law affecting education in Brazil and a leading figure in pedagogical ranks when Carlos Lacerda tapped him for his secretary of education, an office Flexa assumed on December 5, 1960--the first day of Lacerda's administration.

> In four and a half years he achieved an unprecedented task: he provided schools for the workers' children. Today in Rio, for the first time in the history of Brazil, the children of the people have schools which were denied them before. And they have, therefore, the opportunity of seeking their place in life on an equal footing with others.[1]

Thus the opening salvo in Flexa's electoral attack set the theme which would remain prominent throughout the campaign: the concern of the Lacerda administration and Flexa for the workers and their children. It was evident that Lacerda's original strategy was based on assuming the voting allegiance of the middle class and undertaking a full-blown offensive to win votes among the "proletarian" districts of Guanabara. While it was obviously highly optimistic to think that Flexa could take a majority of the working class votes, it was hoped that he could cut sizably into the strong showing predicted there for the PTB-PSD candidate, whoever he might eventually be. Through the process of "works as the candidate" (candidato-obra) the UDN attempted to show that the Lacerda administration had above all aided the lower socio-economic classes, and rightly or wrongly it was felt that education was the key.

Thus during the months between June and October the idea was hammered home again and again that in the four and a half years of Lacerda's government a "new Rio" had arisen, one in which the ordinary citizen enjoyed greater opportunities than ever before.

> Flexa constructed 170 elementary schools and opened 38 new junior high schools [ginásios]. He found one hundred thousand children without schools, for lack of space. He leaves the school system with an excess of openings. And he raised by 518% the opportunities for junior high school learning offered to the youth of Guanabara.[2]

In addition, Flexa organized a school lunch program which in 1965 distributed fifty million meals in Guanabara.

Flex's running mate on the UDN ticket was Danilo da Cunha Nunes, a state deputy whose personal image--he was a handsome man and by far the most attractive candidate, physically, in the race--was perhaps felt to be an added inducement to the feminine vote. Of greater importance, however, was Nunes' record. A military man by profession, Nunes was a member of the General Staff (Estado Maior) and served as adjunct to the National Security Council. He was elected to the Constituent Assembly which wrote Guanabara's constitution in 1960, running on the ticket of the small National Labor Party (PTN), and during the next two years served as head of the economic commission of that legislative body. In 1962, representing the UDN, he was elected once again to the Assembléia Legislativa, Guanabara's unicameral legislature, where he occupied the posts of leader of the udenista delegation and leader of the government. Holding the rank of general, Nunes had had several positions of authority in the army before entering politics. He had commanded the 7th Independent Cavalry Regiment, the Cadet Preparatory School and the School of Motor Mechanization. In

addition, he had taught in several army schools and been director of the Division of Political Police of the Federal Department of Public Security. He had also been director of the Northeast Brazilian Railway, as well as secretary-general of the federal executive organ known as the Coordinating Council of Supply (Abastecimento). Under Carlos Lacerda he had occupied the post of secretary of agriculture, industry and commerce. Along with Flexa Ribeiro he had represented Brazil in the Organization of American States, and shortly before the campaign began, Nunes was chosen president of the Assembléia Legislativa. Finally, he was author of several books, including Hunger and Undernourishment in Latin America and The Soviet Economic Offensive.[3] Despite these impressive credentials, Nunes was selected as Flexa's running mate perhaps more on the basis of physical appearance than anything else. One comment on Danilo Nunes' striking physiogomy was made by Enaldo Cravo Peixoto. In a reference to his own less than extraordinary features, Cravo remarked, "Beauty doesn't count. If it did, Danilo Nunes should be the candidate, and never Flexa Ribeiro, who's uglier than I am."[4] Whatever one's own interpretation of the political "sex appeal" generated by Danilo Nunes, it was undeniable that in this department, at least, the Flexa-Danilo ticket was well balanced.

A sample of the tack taken by the UDN in the Guanabara race was seen in an electoral flyer distributed primarily in the lower socio-economic districts of Rio. "With FLEXA and DANILO Rio will not stop. Homes for everyone in Guanabara" proclaimed the sheet, continuing with the claim that Lacerda's government had given homes to 14,000 families formerly had dwelling in the favelas. The four-point program outlined

included one provision of especial interest: "To provide conditions for work in the neighborhood and good transportation: the worker can not spend more time en route than at home." This was an evident attempt to counter charges made by Lacerda's opponents that the ex-favelados who now lived in distant Vila Kennedy and Vila Esperança spent an average of four hours a day going to and returning from work. Lacerda's enemies never tired of accusing him of indifference towards the slums. One of his more extreme critics went so far as to depict the governor in a helicopter appraising the favelas with a dramatic solution in mind (see below).

As its parent organization had done in 1945, the UDN-GB in 1965 made an effort to gain votes from all sources, a characteristic of a

"Yes, but what about the radioactivity afterwards?"

LACERDA'S ONE-SECOND SLUM CLEARANCE PLAN
(as seen by cartoonist Claudius)

FIGURE IV

"comprehensive" political party. The working class districts were considered solidly in the Labor Party camp, but the UDN-GB nevertheless tried to draw away as many as possible of those who might be undecided. It was not an easy task. Throughout the campaign the UDN candidate was to fight an uphill battle in his effort to win support in the working class districts of Guanabara. His chances were greatly lessened during the final pre-election phase when the PTB finally fielded an opponent and the almost inevitable polarization of the electorate took place.

The PTB Selection Process

In a democracy no political campaign takes place in a vacuum, and the actions of one party are often affected radically by the moves of its opponents. Such was the case in Guanabara in 1965, when the UDN acted in the knowledge that its only significant opposition would be the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), joined in coalition with the weak Social Democratic Party (PSD). The nomination of Flexa Ribeiro was in part an attempt to present a semi-apolitical candidate who hopefully would not arouse the rancors associated with Carlos Lacerda, his political protector. If successful, this gambit would delay or minimize the otherwise unavoidable polarization of the Guanabara electorate. As will be seen below, however, such polarization did take place, repercussing as expected to the detriment of the UDN ticket.

It would have been impossible to predict in early June, when Flexa's nomination was virtually assured, that the PTB-PSD would not bring forth a definitive candidate until less than a month before the election. Even had the UDN been forearmed with this knowledge, however, it is unlikely the party would have acted differently, for

within the broad "disengagement" strategy outlined above, Flexa was ideally suited to represent his party and the Lacerda administration. As will be shown, Flexa assumed a much less prominent role in the campaign than was common for major party gubernatorial candidates, thereby reducing chances of a disastrous polarization around the figure of Carlos Lacerda. That such a polarization did occur can not be charged against Flexa Ribeiro.[5]

The PTB's difficulties were compounded by the existence of division in the party centering around the question of choosing an "ideological" candidate--i.e., one closely associated with the Labor Party and its left-of-center position--or a "unity" candidate. The latter would more likely come from the ranks of the PSD or the centrist elements of the PTB-GB. This controversy was to prevent the final selection of a candidate until a mere three weeks before the election.

The PTB's difficulties began when the party chieftains showed a strong preference for Hélio de Almeida, an engineer of known leftist sympathies. Almeida's name aroused strong opposition among the military sectors of the Castelo Branco government and in a right-wing politico-military organization called LIDER (later abolished by the government, which apparently perceived it as a threat). Almeida was an ideological candidate of the first order, but he was ruled ineligible through a special law.[6] This was but the first application of what many felt were discriminatory laws by the Castelo government designed to interfere directly in the political process of Guanabara.

After the Almeida episode, opinion within the PTB-GB split into two groups. The first, slightly larger, favored a candidate such as former Rio mayor Francisco Negrão de Lima. The second preferred

Marshal Henrique Teixeira Lott, who had been minister of war under President Juscelino Kubitschek. Lott, however, "in order not to be a candidate, transferred his voting registration to Teresópolis [in the State of Rio de Janeiro]."[7] Teresópolis is a small resort town popular as a vacation spot among cariocas, and because of its location in another state it made Lott ineligible to run for governor of Guanabara. The election laws then in force specified that the candidates for governor must be residents of the state in which they were seeking office. Obviously a strict interpretation of the statute would preclude Lott as a viable candidate.

But Lott changed his mind shortly before the state PTB convention of July 30-31, offering himself as candidate "providing it united around him all the opposition forces."[8] In a scene unusual even for Brazil's colorful politics, the PTB convention was invaded by pro-Lott forces consisting of students and "popular" elements who literally carried off the ballot box and destroyed it.[9] This in effect nullified the vote and obliged the PTB to declare itself in permanent convention until a new vote could be taken on August 3. In the view of most observers the destruction of the ballot box was undertaken in an effort to prevent the delegates from nominating Negrão de Lima, who had been gaining steadily in strength since the marshal had apparently disqualified himself by his transfer of registration out of Guanabara.[10]

Nevertheless, at the vote held on August 3 Lott emerged with a total of sixty-four votes against the sixty for Negrão de Lima--far from the unanimous endorsement he had previously stipulated as prerequisite to his acceptance. Negrão, who had been through many a political war, immediately pledged his support to the party nominee

and awaited the further developments Lott's candidacy was certain to foment. In his acceptance speech Lott promised to "fight for the re-democratization of Brazil and for the restoration of the political rights of the cassados."[11]

Lott's statement was equivalent to a declaration of war on the "revolutionary" government which ruled Brazil, and it was patently apparent that should he run and win in Guanabara, the Revolution of 1964 would lose tremendous face both at home and abroad. The position of the administration in Brasília was made clear the day before Lott was officially nominated when presidential spokesmen were quoted as saying that

> . . . there is no way not to consider Marshal Henrique Teixeira Lott as anti-revolutionary, he that on the first of April, 1964, published a manifesto supporting Sr. João Goulart. . . .[12]

The Lott candidacy was, in that word so popular in Brazilian politics, "unviable." The upper echelons of the military would never accept a man irrevocably linked in the public mind with figures of the pre-1964 past.[13] Obviously, a "veto" of Lott's candidacy was in order, but equally obviously the Castelo Branco government wished to avoid furthering the serious decline in civil liberties which followed the military takeover of 1964. Fortunately for those anti-Lott elements desirous of maintaining at least the formalities of democratic procedure, Lott himself had provided the means of his own exclusion when he had changed his voting registration to Teresópolis.

Within a week of Lott's victory the question of his eligibility was raised before the Regional Electoral Court (TRE), the highest electoral body in Guanabara, but by then the affair was already a cause celèbre.

Lott as a candidate would inevitably have had the effect of giving the October 3 elections "truly national dimensions, making [local] problems . . . disappear and pass into a secondary plane."[14]

The Lott candidacy, while failing to "unite all opposition elements" behind it, did lead to unification--of the anti-Lott forces. Pedro Gomes, political columnist for one of Rio's leading newspapers, stated just after Lott's triumph that:

> The speculations about [Lott's nomination] were enough to cause elements of LIDER, until just recently unhappy with the Government, to begin soundings on the launching of a manifesto of unrestricted support for President Castelo Branco. . . .[15]

Just three days after the nomination, Carlos Castello Branco (no relation to the president), a usually well informed political writer, headlined his column "Lott Never. Reform of Regime in Offing." According to the writer:

> The veto of . . . Lott's candidacy for governor of Guanabara is unanimous, tranquil and pacific in the area of the Government and the military command posts. It is hoped, however, there will be no necessity of . . . a pronouncement with the force of a revolutionary dictate, whether because of . . . Marshal [Lott's] renouncing his candidacy in the next few hours, or because of the Electoral Court's decision which would automatically apply . . . the legal measure pertaining to voting residence.
>
> Marshal Teixeira Lott is viewed in official circles as an inconstant man, unstable and [one who] can be maneuvered by influences which he himself is unaware of. To [Lott] is attributed a preponderant role in the lowering of military discipline, which produced its most dramatic fruits in the last months of the João Goulart government. By the encouragement which he gave to the claims of the sergeants and by giving positions of command to officers felt to be communists, [Lott] is said to have undermined national security, bringing about a rapid drop in discipline. His electoral campaign, carried out by the left, would set a precedent which present circumstances can not allow. . . .[16]

As further evidence of the expansive power of the Lott candidacy, which turned what was purely a state matter into one of national repurcussion, even the mayor of São Paulo, whose interest in the Guanabara

election could be marginal at best, attacked Lott. Gen. Faria Lima, mayor of Brazil's largest city, argued that Lott's candidacy "does not serve the interests of the Brazilian people, who desire and demand, above all, consolidation of the democratic regime."[17]

But Lott was not without sympathizers, and "support" came from one of the least likely sources--Governor Carlos Lacerda. Teixeira Lott, Lacerda stated,

> . . . would be a terrible governor, but he is not a thief, he is an honorable and true man. I hope that President Castelo Branco will see to it that Marshal Lott's right to run is respected, for we want to defeat him at the polls and not with hypcritical sophisms, just as we desire him to be considered vanquished and not victim.[18]

From a standpoint of Realpolitik Lacerda had much to gain and nothing to lose from the Lott candidacy, and therefore his arguments in favor of the marshal's eligibility were no doubt sincere. First, the inacceptability of Lott in armed forces circles would lessen the chances of his being allowed to take office if elected, thereby leading some undecided voters to cast ballots for Flexa as the more "practical" choice. Second, Lott's candidacy would force the Castelo government to lend its support to Flexa and therefore to Lacerda's overall plan of gaining the presidency for himself.[19] Third, and very important, Lott represented a divisive force even within the PTB, as evidenced by the narrow vote which won him the party nomination. If Lott were to remain the candidate of the Labor Party, a split with the PSD would be made much more likely. Such a situation--identical to that which prevailed in 1960 when Lacerda was elected governor with barely one-third of the total vote--would virtually assure the election of Flexa Ribeiro.[20] Fourth, as Lacerda himself pointed out, the UDN had no

interest in seeing the PTB--which had already suffered exclusion of Hélio de Almeida through a federal veto--further its "martyr" image; this would certainly be the case if Lott were declared ineligible.

That Lacerda was especially cognizant of the third of the above factors is seen in his oblique reference to PTB-PSD differences in his press conference defending Lott's candidacy:

> If the PSD doesn't want to support him [Lott], it has every right to launch party candidates, like Sr. Negrão de Lima, who is a faithful reflection of his party.
>
> What is not possible is for the PSD to pull its coals from the fire . . . with the Army's hand. [Lacerda was apparently referring to the armed forces "veto" of Lott's candidacy.][21]

Sources close to the governor were quoted as saying that the Lott nomination was a political maneuver "designed to bring the PTB to choose . . . Negrão de Lima."[22] Throughout the period preceding the final selection itself, Negrão comported himself in exemplary fashion insofar as maintaining PTB-PSD friction at a minimum is concerned. From the beginning Negrão had contended that the strongest of the opposition parties in Guanabara--namely the PTB and not Negrão's own PSD--should decide who would be the candidate, whether or not he came from the ranks of the Labor Party itself.[23] During the months of PTB uncertainty--from April till September, when a candidate was finally named and found "viable"--Negrão's actions were always conciliatory and low-key, from his endorsement of the first party nominee (Hélio de Almeida), through his calm acceptance of Lott's narrow victory after the ballot-kidnaping incident, up to the time just three weeks before the elections when he himself was finally selected to head the PTB ticket. More will be said below about the importance of Negrão's personality as a factor in his nomination.

Press reaction to Lott's nomination was emphatic. O Globo, one of Rio's widely circulating newspapers and a vehement anti-Lacerda organ, denounced the candidacy in the strongest possible terms in a front-page editorial which made several interesting points.

> The Lott candidacy is conspiracy itself on the march. It is not a candidacy in the normal democratic sense. It is a challenge to the leadership of the Revolution [and] the Armed Forces. Therefore it is less an electoral or political opposition than an . . . open military opposition to the power of the Revolution. . . . [This] leads us to give our firmest support to the revolutionary military veto.
>
> Sr. Carlos Lacerda, by defending the Lott candidacy, hopes to confuse the Armed Forces by characterizing [Lott] as candidate of subversion while at the same time admitting the idea of defeating subversion at the polls. Since when does a democracy propose to face subversion at the polls? Subversion must be defeated by the security organs of the State and by the permanent institutions of the regime. It is not for the electorate to defeat subversives. The electorate should be called upon to choose between non-subversive citizens. . . .
>
> If Lott's candidacy were to be maintained and allowed . . . the 1965 election in Guanabara would be handcuffed by the dilemma of the RETURN. And that is why Sr. Lacerda defends Lott's right to be a candidate . . . so there may be the strong black-and-white contrast, the sharp definition and counterrevolutionary authenticity which he exalts in the Lott candidacy--in opposition to [Lacerda's] candidacy and that of his candidate in Guanabara, which only in this way could be called "revolutionary."
>
> [Lacerda] sees in Lott's candidacy a resurgence of hate and fear; he defends it with tooth and nail, with all the force of his ambitious personalism, even if the price of his ambition be national misfortune.[24]

Thus it was evident to all what Lacerda's ploy was in supporting the Lott candidacy--he obviously felt Lott would be the easiest opponent to defeat. Lott would have polarized the campaign even more than was to prove the case when a less controversial figure headed the PTB ticket, and the polarization would have directly involved the national government and the highest echelons of the armed forces, all of whom perceived Lott as a harbinger of the "return," the reintroduction into the political process of those elements which the 1964 revolution had

displaced. From the UDN standpoint, Lott was the potential opponent most vulnerable to charges of "subversion," "revanchism," "communism" and the like. The fear that could be aroused in the voters' minds by such accusations could only redound to the UDN's benefit at the polls. Failing that, there seemed little likelihood that the leaders of the armed forces would tolerate Teixeira Lott in the Palácio Guanabara. Small wonder that the anti-Lacerdist O Globo attacked Lott's candidacy in such trenchant terms. Even to Lacerda's supporters it was clear that it was political motivation rather than a deep-seated devotion to democracy that guided his actions, and Lacerda's detractors readily called to mind the fact that the man now clamoring for Lott's rights was the selfsame individual who in 1955 had demanded a military coup to prevent President-elect Juscelino Kubitschek from assuming office.[25]

The crisis arising from Lott's candidacy seems, in retrospect, more sound than substance, for the outcome was preordained: "There was no one who was unaware . . . that Lott was ineligible."[26] On August 11 the PTB-GB requested registration of Henrique Teixeira Lott as party candidate before the Regional Electoral Court (TRE), and the state electoral attorney, Eduardo Bahout, announced his intention to contest Lott's eligibility on the grounds that he was no longer a voting resident of the state of Guanabara.

Under the election laws governing state balloting, candidates for governor must show continuous residence in the state in which they were running for a minimum of four years immediately prior to the election. In his petition for registration as PTB candidate, Lott listed his address as Teresópolis, and as the scenario ran its inevitable course it became increasingly evident that Lott would not be the Labor Party candidate when all the formalities had been carried out.

The TRE ruled that Lott was ineligible for reason of "electoral domicile"; the Labor Party appealed to the Supreme Electoral Court (TSE), which upheld the lower court's ruling. The Lott episode was closed, the Castelo government had not found it necessary to use more direct methods to achieve its will, and the PTB-GB was without a gubernatorial candidate with the election slightly more than a month away.

The PTB had nominated two men and both had been declared ineligible. The hour of Negrão de Lima had arrived at last. Negrão would in all likelihood have been nominated earlier had pro-Lott forces not destroyed the ballot box, for most observers agreed that he enjoyed majority support at that time. Negrão's major drawback was that he was not a PTB member, having served as mayor of Rio under the PSD legend. For this reason the more ideologically oriented petebistas preferred a candidate such as Hélio de Almeida or an anti-Castelo figure such as Lott. But the ground was laid for Negrão's selection when Lutero Vargas, leader of the PTB-GB and an important figure in the national Labor ranks, made his political peace with Amaral Peixoto, national head of the PSD, thus closing a long-standing political enmity between the two.[27] When Lott was ruled ineligible, the PTB turned to the man who had been waiting in the wings all along--Francisco Negrão de Lima.

On September 8, 1965, just twenty-three days before the elections were to be held, the Brazilian Labor Party held its third and final convention to choose a gubernatorial candidate. Negrão was elected easily, receiving one hundred of the 113 votes cast; ten

delegates cast blank ballots and three votes were disallowed. Negrão's running mate was Rubens Berardo, a federal deputy. Ratification of the Negrão candidacy was quickly forthcoming from the PSD, a foregone conclusion, and the political cast was now complete as the curtain rose of the final act of the campaign.

The Role of Minor Parties

Although the political process was dominated, in electoral terms, by the two largest parties in Guanabara--the UDN and the PTB--smaller parties could play important roles in a given election, especially the PSD. Whenever the PSD formed a coalition with the PTB, the resultant electoral clout was considerable and with few exceptions always emerged victorious.[28] Generally, the smaller parties joined one coalition or another formed around the UDN or the PTB, this being the only manner in which they might realistically expect to exert perceptible influence on the outcome of the so-called "majoritary" races. The proportional system allowed such small parties as the Christian Democrats (PDC) and the Socialists (PSB) to win occasional seats in state or national elections, but the political makeup of the Guanabara electorate obviated their having any but a minor role in non-proportional races.

As the race for governor took final form, five candidates and ten parties were represented on the ballot. Unlike previous campaigns in which the União Democrática Nacional had joined with various smaller parties to offer a candidate, in 1965 it ran alone. Negrão de Lima, on the other hand, headed the ticket of a five-party coalition of PSD-PTB-PSP-PR-PST. Of the three lesser known parties, none

carried much electoral weight. The Partido Social Progressista (PSP), a party of major impact in the state of São Paulo, in Guanabara had minimal penetration; the PSP was "always the personal instrument of Adhemar de Barros,"[29] and as such its support for the Negrão candidacy was at best a small plus factor. The Partido Republicano (PR) was a center-right party with decidedly circumscribed appeal in Guanabara, as evidenced by the three places it won in the fifty-five member Assembléia Legislativa in 1962. The Social Labor Party (PST) was a mildly left-of-center group separated from the PTB less by ideological differences than by personality factors; in 1962 it had elected four members to the Assembléia.

The remaining small parties of Guanabara chose to bring forward their own candidates. As previously noted, Amaral Neto was selected to head the ticket of the Partido Libertador (PL), which in 1962 had elected two candidates to the Assembléia. No serious student of politics conceded Amaral anything more than a "spoiler" role in the gubernatorial contest, though his vehement anti-Lacerda position offered the possibility of drawing votes from Negrão.

The Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), ideologically closer to the PTB than to either the UDN or PSD, was unable to accept the candidacy of Negrão and launched Aurélio Viana, who in 1962 had been elected federal senator from Guanabara on the PTB ticket. Aurélio Viana's candidacy drove still another wedge into the ranks of the Labor Party and created deep bitterness among some leading petebistas. Lutero Vargas, head of the PTB-GB and son of Getúlio Vargas, commented on the day of Negrão's nomination, "The name of Aurélio won't get a single vote from the PTB."[30] The PSB had previously nominated Marshal

Lott but was forced, like the Labor Party, to reassess its position after Lott was ruled ineligible. As one commentator said, Aurélio Viana's candidacy "signified nothing, in terms of votes, without the Labor Party legend."[31] Nevertheless, his name was launched by a coalition consisting of the PSB and the equally minor Christian Democratic Party (PDC), which like the PSB had elected three men to the Assembléia in its last electoral test.

The fifth candidate was Hélio Damasceno, running on the ticket of the National Labor Party (PTN). The PTN had elected two members to the Assembléia in 1962, and ideologically it appealed to the same segment of the electorate--the "proletariat"--as did the other parties which included the word trabalhista (worker) in their names. The PTN had originally nominated Alziro Zarur as its candidate, a politician who "counted on the massive support of the so-called Legion of Good Will, with a total estimated at 60,000 voters fascinated by the mellifluous messianism of the charismatic [Zarur]."[32] Zarur had become something of a household word in Rio thanks to the free soup kitchens which he maintained to hand out food to the poor. Many felt that Lacerda and his advisors had been behind his quixotic candidacy, for "Zarur's strength, based on mystic conditions, was designed principally to reach a large part of those in the lower poor class."[33] Zarur's eligibility was questioned, however, and the electoral courts ruled that, as owner of a radio station (which broadcast religious messages to the people of Rio), Zarur was excluded under Law #4.738 of July 15, 1965. Article I, I, (m) reads in part that among the ineligible are "those who have exercised, up to three months prior to the election, a position in directing . . . concessionary public service enterprises. . . ."[34]

As holder of a radio franchise, Zarur was disqualified from running for governor of Guanabara. The PTN therefore nominated Hélio Damasceno, who had been Zarur's vice-gubernatorial running mate, in order to give Damasceno useful public exposure should he run for a legislative seat in the future.[35] Zarur, his personal ambitions frustrated, announced his support of Flexa Ribeiro.

Final Stages of the Campaign

As was previously noted, political races in Guanabara have traditionally been marked by hard-fought, acrimonious campaigns, and this became especially true after 1960, when Carlos Lacerda assumed the governorship and polarization of the electorate coalesced in unmistakable form. In the words of the political commentator of the Correio da Manhã:

> The 1960 elections marked the beginning of the process of ideological polarization and accentuated the radicalization of the Guanabara electorate in terms of Lacerda and anti-Lacerda, for this was the first time Lacerda's position was directly at stake in a majoritary election.[36]

By 1965 it was apparent to even the casual observer that the real issues in the campaign for governor centered around the controversial figure of Carlos Lacerda. Other issues were to be raised, but the extreme degree of polarization was to prevent such questions from occupying public attention more than momentarily.

In one sense it can be argued that the campaign truly began the day Negrão de Lima was nominated on the PTB ticket. Until that time the UDN candidate, while running hard, was working in a vacuum, stressing naturally the works of the Lacerda administration and his intent to continue them, but without a focal point for attacks of a frontal nature. When Negrão became Flexa Ribeiro's opponent, the situation

changed and for the first time a confrontation was possible. It was not long in arising.

In several ways Francisco Negrão de Lima was an ideal candidate for the united opposition. As ex-mayor of Rio--when it was still the Federal District--his name and face were well known throughout the city-state. Negrão had been responsible for the creation of SURSAN, an entity charged with planning and directing construction and many-faceted services for Rio de Janeiro; it was SURSAN which Lacerda was to employ during his tenure as governor to erect the "New Rio." Negrão had also originated the Seus Talões contest, which had as its slogan "Your Receipt Slips Are Worth Millions"[37] and was an indirect method of checking gross receipts of merchants and commercial enterprises. Shoppers were encouraged to save their slips until they accumulated a certain amount, which they then turned over to the city in exchange for a number, a lottery then determining the winners. The idea proved extremely popular with the public, albeit less so with the businessmen; it is still in existence. Negrão, a native of Minas Gerais, was a founder of the PSD and a longtime friend of Juscelino Kubitschek, in whose administration Negrão served as Minister of Foreign Relations. Negrão received his law degree in Belo Horizonte, in the state of Minas Gerais, in 1924 and immediately began his political career by winning a seat in the Constituent Assembly in his home state. During the next decade he held other political offices and directed the Belo Horizonte branch office of the Estado de São Paulo, one of Brazil's leading journals. In 1941 he was invited by his friend Getulio Vargas to head the Ministry of Justice, which he accepted. Negrão de

Lima was Brazil's first ambassador to Paraguay, and later represented his country in Belgium and Portugal, resigning from the latter position in 1963 in order to head the national committee to elect Juscelino Kubitschek president.[38] Popular, smiling and quick with a quip, Negrão de Lima was representative of the PSD in many ways, but the most outstanding was his basically non-ideological image, and this was to make him much more acceptable to the Rio middle class than either Hélio de Almeida or Teixeira Lott would have been.

Besides his very satisfactory public service credentials, Negrão possessed another quality, more intangible but just as important to the opposition strategy: he was a perfect individual for the role of anti-Lacerda. The impact of this can not be overemphasized, for if the PTB-PSD coalition was to overcome the lead Flexa Ribeiro had built up in the weeks while the PTB searched for a candidate, it would be necessary to bring about immediate polarization of the voters around a Lacerda/anti-Lacerda axis. Negrão fitted the role admirably, for he and Lacerda had been obdurate enemies since Negrão had served as mayor of Rio and been subject to Lacerda's unrelenting attacks in his newspaper Tribuna da Imprensa. All the rancors of that period were to be reborn in the short campaign of three weeks' duration, to the eventual disadvantage of the UDN candidate.

Negrão entered the race with the serious handicap of his late start, driven perhaps less by personal ambition than by a desire to defeat at the polls his enemy, Lacerda, whom he was known to detest with a visceral passion.[39] Opinion polls showed Flexa Ribeiro with a commanding lead when Negrão was nominated, and Flexa himself later stated that "until two weeks before the election I had an absolute

majority."[40] But there were also several factors acting in Negrão's favor which were to enable him to draw even within the last days before the election.

First was the fact that Negrão already enjoyed "celebrity appeal." As ex-mayor of Rio, as former ambassador to Portugal and other countries, he was well known and therefore needed less of a publicity buildup, than the extensive--and expensive--treatment which had been afforded Flexa since his nomination. Subjectively, one might say that the name of Negrão was as well known on the day of his nomination as Flexa's was two months after he was chosen to head the UDN ticket.

Second, and a direct corollary of the first, was the smallness of Guanabara, making it a state which could be rapidly saturated with publicity and electoral propaganda, employing radio, television, printed literature and sound trucks. Such saturation could be achieved in time, however, if and only if the candidate possessed a name already known to the public, which Negrão did. In this context it is interesting to note that after Hélio de Almeida was vetoed as PTB candidate, a boomlet occurred among the more radical petebistas to nominate Osvaldo Aranha Filho, one of Brazil's few industrialists of leftist persuasion. This rather romantic idea was deflated rapidly, however, by the hard reality that "by the time the name of Aranha Filho became known in the state the elections would already be over."[41] The difference between a little-known industrialist and an ex-mayor of Rio is, in political terms, immeasurable.

Third, Negrão was the PTB candidate most likely to make inroads into the normally udenista vote centering in the middle and upper classes of Guanabara, located for the most part in the Zona Sul areas of

Copacabana, Ipanema, Leblon and environs. Negrão, a known quantity, was apparently less anxiety-producing to these classes than another candidate bearing the PTB label might have been. The zone-by-zone breakdown of election results were to lend support to this view.

These factors, added to the extreme politization of Guanabara, combined with the capacity for radicalization and polarization known to exist in Rio--these gave Negrão a chance to overcome the UDN lead and inflict a crippling blow on Carlos Lacerda's presidential ambitions.

The last three weeks of the campaign were the most intense, and Guanabara was crisscrossed by candidates holding rallies, by sound trucks blaring forth their views, by all the merchandising techniques known to a modern society. Newspapers dealt with politics to the virtual exclusion of all other topics, except soccer. Candidates appeared on television daily, and newsreels--which still exist in Brazil--carried numerous items dealing with the two major candidates.[42]

Seen in retrospect, the campaign can be said to have divided itself into two sharply divergent halves, roughly (but not totally) corresponding to the period before and after Negrão's nomination. The first period, as already noted, was marked by a relatively high-level campaign on the part of the UDN candidate, running at that time without major opposition. (Amaral Neto, however, had already mounted his campaign fully when Flexa Ribeiro was nominated, and he pitched his tactics in a vitriolic anti-Lacerda vein throughout, both before and after the PTB chose its final candidate.) During this initial phase both Lacerda and Flexa stressed the candidato-obra aspect of their appeal to the voters, and the UDN-GB carefully avoided taking the

first step toward polarization. This was the period during which Lacerda defended the right of Lott to be a candidate.[43]

Indications were seen even before Negrão's nomination which implied that the first phase was drawing to a close and radicalization was quickly approaching. But during the six-week period after the launching of the Flexa candidacy the UDN adopted a conciliatory stance, as a few examples will illustrate.

July 16: Flexa Ribeiro meets with several leading figures of the Brazil theater, including playwright Nélson Rodrigues and such prominent performers as Maria Fernanda and Fernanda Montenegro, a session which lasts until five a.m. The "theater class," not normally noted as pro-UDN, reportedly had a "frank and cordial" discussion with Flexa, who requested their help in formulating a program to revive the Brazilian theater by attracting more people to the productions. No mention was made of the PTB or its probable candidate, and no direct appeal for votes was evident.[44]

August 2: Flexa visits President Castelo Branco for twenty minutes and in a press statement denies that he can now be considered the "candidate of the Revolution." According to Flexa, "the Revolution has no candidates," but he adds that his own candidacy is the one which most closely coincides with the objectives of the Revolution.[45]

August 11: Flexa celebrates his fifty-first birthday by opening a five-day campaign in the predominantly lower class Zona Norte area of Guanabara. In a period of several hours he appears before a group of merchants in São Cristóvão, talks with residents of a favela known as Parque Alegre, goes to a ceremony marking the installation of lights along Couto Magalhães Street, participates in a round table discussion

with teachers at a private school, and attends a symposium for doctors at a maternity clinic.[46] The candidato-obra is still the objective, and Flexa's public appearances become more numerous and are associated wherever possible with the administrative achievements of Lacerda's government; thus the unending rounds of dedication ceremonies for schools, clinics, viaducts, a reservoir, sewage treatment plants, roads, et al.

On September 8 Negrão de Lima was chosen the nominee of the PTB, and almost immediately the campaign took on an entirely different complexion. As remarked earlier, if Negrão was to have a chance at overcoming the heavy lead built up by his opponent during June, July and August, the electorate would have to be polarized at once. The process was begun immediately, and in the most heated and personal terms, by the reissuing of a missive already famous throughout Brazil as the "Negrão Letter."

This letter, published (or republished) a month before Negrão won his nomination, appeared in O Globo and had been written by Negrão to Carlos Lacerda in 1958, when the former was mayor and the latter was owner of the newspaper Tribuna da Imprensa. At that time Negrão, tiring of the frequent attacks Lacerda directed at him in the pages of his journal, replied with a counterattack which made the affair a public matter in all the nation. As an example of the heights--or depths--to which the 1965 gubernatorial campaign aspired, the letter is reproduced in part below.

> The thief [known for] his triplex, . . . his generators and farms bought with author's royalties, attributed to me, on television, the authorship of a letter which was said to have insulted his mother. This is one more lie and defamation of this criminal.

I appeared at once on television to prove that in the letter which I sent to him on June 4, 1958, I limited myself to sketching his moral portrait, directing myself exclusively at him and not at his family. I reproduce it here, confirming all its terms. [This preface was written in 1965 and served to reintroduce the letter written seven years earlier.]

Rio de Janeiro, June 4, 1958.

Lacerda,

I have tried to treat you, and your yellow rag, as if they were things worthy of a minimum of respect. Now, however, I am going to give you the answer you deserve; I am going to satisfy your morbid desire and descend to the swamp where you live. . . . This, therefore, will be of a personal nature, in the language which you appreciate so much and use and understand so well. Who is writing you now is just Francisco Negrão de Lima and not the mayor of the Federal District.

Listen, Lacerda, all your furor and resentment come from the certainty that from now on something real and positive is going to be done to lessen the misfortunes of this city, and this is not to your interests . . . because you, politically, are now and always have been nothing but a pimp living off the misfortunes of others.

The moment has come to tell you, in reply to your repeated attacks, that you are a lowlife [cafajeste], and not merely a lowlife but a despicable liar, a barefaced slanderer, whose political conduct is less that of a public man than that of a public woman of the most sordid breed, and above all a vile coward. . . .

I shall have nothing further to say to a degenerate who, under the guise of hysterical exhibitionism, attempts to hide his irremediable physical and moral cowardice. . . .

Your fate, you poor devil, is to . . . slander, denigrate, lie about, injure and defame your fellow man. . . . This is what you were made for. This is your sad and painful fate.

All your perverse repressions, all your unspeakable resentments, all your nuances of infamy and human debasement combined to constitute your monstruous moral makeup.

This is my last reply to the miserable man who did not draw the line at dragging his own father's name in the mud and was therefore considered unworthy to be called human; to the thief (for that's what you are) who, according to a public accusation still unanswered, stole in his youth money from the magazine which he edited; to the traitor who informed on his Bolshevik companions and called himself scum, driven by unbearable remorse; to the shameless wretch who, according to another public accusation also unanswered, tried to cut his wrists to escape from military service; to the blackmailer and mercenary who organized an industry of defamation in order to reap political and social benefits. . . .

In conclusion, listen, you coward disguised as a brave man, you ignoble perjurer posing as the Quixote of national honor, only once

> have you succeeded in reaching me to do me ill: it was now, by obliging me to say of anyone the things I have just written.
>
> Francisco Negrão de Lima[47]

In translation many of the subtleties of phraseology are lost, but the main thrust of the letter nonetheless comes through. It is doubtful that any politician before or since had vented his spleen in so articulate and public a manner as Negrão de Lima did in 1958, but 1965 was to outstrip the previous encounters in intensity, vitriol and volume. Once Negrão had entered the race, even the most apolitical cariocas began watching the campaign with an avidity usually reserved for important soccer matches. The voters in Rio like a heated campaign,[48] and in this respect the final weeks of the 1965 contest were all anyone could ask for.

Thus with the republication of the Negrão Letter the stage was set, a full month before the ex-mayor won the PTB nomination, for a rekindling of the flames of personal vilification, ad hominem attacks and outraged invective which were to mark the closing weeks of the 1965 campaign.

Once Negrão was officially in the race it became a foregone conclusion that the PTB would adopt the only tactic which offered a chance of victory, mounting a frontal attack on Carlos Lacerda and all he stood for. The only question remaining in the minds of political observers was whether Lacerda and the UDN-GB would accept the challenge and reply in kind, or choose to ignore it and continue the candidato-obra approach. Within days of Negrão's entry it was apparent that Flexa's percentage of the vote was diminishing in direct proportion to the growth of Negrão's strength. Lacerda began to appear more and more

prominently in the campaign, and his attacks on the opposition became increasingly violent. As will be seen, the week before the election marked a period during which no holds were barred and the dispute reached its climax of mutual recrimination.

In terms of ideology there were no new issues in the 1965 campaign, although certain long-standing issues received somewhat revised forms. As will be seen below, the ghost of Getulio Vargas cast a long shadow over the final weeks of the election, but the Vargas legend had been growing since his suicide in 1954 and was not an innovation in political campaigns centering around the political figure of Carlos Lacerda.

The Revolution of 1964 was an issue in the campaign, but despite efforts of the UDN to brand the opposition as "subversive" and "counter-revolutionary," the PTB candidate did not present himself as the antithesis of all the coup of the previous year represented. To be sure, Negrão made every effort to present an image of a candidate with no ties or compromises with the military movement, and attacked policies of the Castelo government, but at no time did he attempt to fill the role that Lott would perforce have assumed had he been the candidate--i.e., a direct challenge to the prestige and authority of the military government. From examples to be presented below, it will become apparent that the Revolution did serve as an issue in the Guanabara campaign, but because of the unpopularity of the Castelo regime, neither side wished to become identified with it in the public mind, especially during the last three weeks of the race. Both UDN and PTB attacked certain aspects of Castelo Branco's policies, but neither mounted an assault on the government itself; the theme was more "revolution betrayed" or "unfulfilled revolution" than "a return to the past."

Therefore, from one standpoint the Revolution was a non-issue, for both sides approached it from the same direction.[49]

Surprisingly, the administrative record of Carlos Lacerda was much less of an issue than might be expected. Lacerda's achievements as governor were generally recognized as highly significant and of benefit to Guanabara, which made this part of his record less open to attack than his mercurial personality. As implied by the previous analysis, the PTB's hopes lay in polarizing the voters into pro- and anti-Lacerda factions, and obviously this could be done only in terms of attacking Lacerda the politician, not Lacerda the administrator. As seen in the Negrão Letter, Lacerda the man also came within the Labor Party target area. Therefore, with the exception of one or two minor issues (e.g., Lage--or Laje--Park, and the so-called triplex) which aroused opposition newspapers but not the voters, Lacerda's record as governor was either largely ignored by his opponents or assailed in rather vague and general terms. From a practical standpoint this can be understood by bearing in mind that (1) in a three-week campaign only the most penetrating--and elemental--charges had any chance of swaying the electoral balance in Negrão's favor; (2) the voters of Rio, as previously noted, enjoy an earthy, visceral campaign, and even had the pre-election period been longer they would have been little disposed to sift complicated facts of the sort necessary to reach an evaluation of Lacerda's overall record as governor.

The two mini-issues mentioned above received newspaper space out of all proportion to their importance in the campaign. Both are rather complicated questions involving legal-juridical proceedings which had dragged out for years. I shall summarize both affairs as

succinctly as possible, and readers who wish further details are urged to consult the two major opposition journals--O Globo and Correio da Manhã--for the period covered by the campaign.

The Lage Park incident predated Lacerda's election as governor. The area had been purchased from the estate of Henrique Lage by Comércio e Indústria Mauá, S. A., a company among whose stockholders was Roberto Marinho, editor of O Globo, one of Rio's largest and most influential newspapers.[50] Because the land was declared part of the National Historical and Artistic Patrimony, the buyers were able to acquire it for ten per cent of the value it had previously possessed, for patrimony lands could be neither developed nor subdivided, which rendered their commercial value nil. However, Mauá managed to persuade the president of the republic--at that time Juscelino Kubitschek--to rescind the order which made Lage Park part of the national patrimony, whereupon the value of the land returned to its former level. Interestingly enough, a similar petition had been denied the heirs of Henrique Lage, which prompted them to sell the land for a fraction of its worth. Lacerda called this the biggest land grab in Brazilian history and campaigned for governor in 1960 on a platform which included expropriation of Lage Park under laws of eminent domain, the site to be used in an urbanization project. Despite this, O Globo endorsed Lacerda in 1960 and the question of expropriation lay dormant for four years after Lacerda's election. According to charges made by O Globo, Lacerda as governor began to take an active interest in redeeming his campaign pledge to take over the land only when the newspaper began adopting a line criticizing Lacerda's attacks on the government of

Castelo Branco.[51] In September of 1964 Lacerda requested authorization from the Assembléia to take action regarding the large area. On November 11 he sent a decree to the Assembléia expropriating the land on the ground that it was needed for festivities in connection with the quadricentennial of Rio which would run throughout 1965. The controversy was submitted to the courts to decide, but no outcome was reached by the October, 1965, elections. One source claimed that Negrão de Lima had promised to return the land to Mauá if he won the election.[52] The issue itself had no perceptible effect on the outcome and in the final analysis was hardly one designed to awaken a groundswell of public outrage. The Mauá stockholders were for the most part individuals in the upper socio-economic levels and therefore scant public indignation was likely to result as a reaction to their allegedly unjust treatment.

The second minor issue to which much newsprint was devoted--this time mostly in the morning daily Correio da Manhã--was the triplex. In Portugese "triplex" does not mean a house or building where three families reside; rather it denotes three stories of a building, all belonging to a single owner. Lacerda's triplex, in a building in Flamengo overlooking the Bay of Guanabara, had long been a source of controversy, for his enemies cited it as evidence that Lacerda had a life style superior to any that his income would allow. As early as 1955 one newspaper had brought up Lacerda's triplex, his several cars, his yacht and his farm in Petrópolis and made pointed contrasts with his arrival in Rio in 1941 as a poor man: "How did this economic miracle take place, greater than the reconstruction of Germany after wartime destruction?"[53] In response Lacerda mentioned royalties from his books, his translation of How to Succeed in Business Without Really Trying into

Portuguese, and income from Tribuna da Imprensa. Disdaining the explanation, his critics replied that "Lacerda is the best paid author in Brazil and the author of Brazil's greatest disasters."[54] The 1965 controversy arose when Lacerda, who owned the upper two stories of the building plus the "terrace" or roof area, decided to close off the roof in order to convert it into an extension of the living areas below, which meant in effect adding another story to the building. According to his critics, Lacerda in so doing violated Decrees #12,881 and 1,734, for the modifications were not set back five meters (approximately sixteen feet, five inches) from the face of the building.[55] A board of inquiry was set up in the Assembléia to look into the matter and the upshot of the affair was that Enaldo Cravo Peixoto testified to the board that as Lacerda's secretary of public works he personally had authorized the remodeling under a law (decreed by Lacerda at an earlier date) which gave the works secretary authority to dispense with the five-meter requirement. Cravo admitted under questioning that the Lacerda triplex was the only case where he had been called upon to waive the building code requirements. Seen from the vantage point of a detached viewer, the triplex controversy seems somewhat of a tempest in a teapot, and it is extremely doubtful that the incident served to separate any sizable number of UDN-leaning voters from the Flexa-Danilo ticket.

As the campaign entered its final stages, it became apparent from almost daily public opinion polls conducted for the UDN that the PTB candidate was closing fast and that the real issues in the race were emotional: a frustrated public was ready to express at the polls its outrage with the austerity measures imposed by the military government,

and any candidate linked with the regime would be marked for defeat. During the last fortnight of the campaign, both sides made every effort--short of issuing a direct challenge to the military forces which bolstered the Castelo government--to disassociate themselves from the unpopular administration. The UDN was, quite naturally, to find the task more difficult than its adversaries. We now turn our attention to the crucial final period of the gubernatorial race in order to examine in some detail the tactics adopted by both sides during pivotal month of September.

After Negrão de Lima was selected as the PTB-PSD candidate, an immediate intensification of effort by both sides marked the campaign. The Labor Party, of course, had to achieve in three weeks what the UDN had been striving for since June--to convince the voters of the worth of its candidate. The União, on the other hand, could not allow itself a letup--much to the contrary, it too was obliged to augment its attack--because it was now faced, for the first time, with something more than a problematic opponent. As a result, the Guanabara public, already saturated with propaganda from four candidates, was to become supersaturated during the twenty-three days before the balloting itself.

With the publication of the Negrão Letter, the handwriting was on the wall for any political observer to see, and with the entrance of the ex-mayor into the fray, polarization was preordained. Although Flexa had begun the month with a comfortable margin--an "absolute majority" in his own words--the gap between the two major contenders began to narrow rapidly, thanks in no small part to the radicalization of "debate" around Lacerda. Two weeks before the election Flexa still

was the choice of 41 per cent of the electorate, according to an IBOPE poll, with 26 per cent preferring Negrão. But just five days later--ten days from the voting date--Negrão had pulled even and showed a narrow lead, 39 to 38 per cent.[56] Flexa had peaked out at slightly less than 40 per cent of the electorate.

It was at this point that Lacerda adopted--in desperation, some would contend--a policy of open attack on the Castelo Branco government, abandoning any hope of support from revolutionary quarters (either for Flexa's candidacy or his own presidential aspirations) and accepting the challenge thrust at him by the opposition.[57] Radicalization and polarization, Lacerda must have reasoned, were inevitable, but there was no reason that the processes must work only in behalf of his political enemies. In the last two weeks before the election, Lacerda and Flexa were to take the battle to their opponents, and polarization became a two-edged sword; not only were voters asked to choose between Lacerda and anti-Lacerda, but between order and chaos, stability and revanchism, democracy and communism.

In these last crucial days both sides called in their heavy artillery. Negrão, gaining rapidly, appealed to the myth of Getulio Vargas, still a powerful force within the working classes, and the "pai do povo" served him well. Signs sprang up throughout working class sections of the state which read NEGRÃO NEVER BETRAYED GETULIO, an obvious appeal to rancors which went back more than a decade and linked Vargas' apparent suicide directly to Lacerda's vehement attacks on him. LACERDA GOLPISTA was another slogan seen scrawled on walls throughout Rio. Opposition newspapers, including O Globo, Correio da Manhã and several smaller, more sensational journals, daily published

articles recalling unfavorable aspects of Lacerda's past, including such unresolved questions as the time, early in Lacerda's administration, when policemen of Guanabara were charged with drowning beggars, supposedly at the governor's orders. The UDN, on the other hand, was not without support. Among major newspapers only the Jornal do Brasil and Tribuna da Imprensa endorsed Flexa Ribeiro, but there was no lack of publicity designed to present Flexa and Lacerda in a favorable light, heightened by the contrast of events unearthed from Negrão's record while in public office. The usually moderate Jornal do Brasil, a newspaper of international reputation, descended to the level of its rivals and for the last two weeks was "more udenista than the UDN." Lacerda, faced with the emergence of the ghost of Vargas, called forth a spectre of his own during this climactic phase--the communism scare. Attacking the revolutionary government on one hand and Negrão and his companions on the other, the governor was fighting opponents whose combined strength was insuperable.

The period was not without its lighter moments. Col. Américo Fontenele, director of traffic, issued on September 25 a statement asking any person to contact his office should his car tires be emptied while parked legally. This was in response to a rumor that

> . . . beginning Monday several groups supporting one of the gubernatorial candidates will go around emptying tires of cars parked in legal locations, to give the impression of arbitrariness on the part of traffic police.[58]

If such underhanded tactics were indeed employed, the news went unreported in the Rio press. Another interesting experiment designed to get Flexa's campaign off the ground was chronicled in detail by the Jornal do Brasil in a two-column story which informed its readers that

a three-meter kite would be launched that day at ten a.m., bearing the denomination Victory Kite. According to the breathless account, Flexa'a photograph was to be dropped by parachute from a hovering plane at the instant the kite reached an altitude of one hundred meters (approximately 325 feet) above its launching place in Flamengo Park, at which point the kite would simultaneously release fireworks and hundreds of flyers urging the public to vote for Flexa.[59] Unfortunately no follow-up story could be located relating to the fate of the Victory Kite, presumably launched as scheduled.

A week before the balloting, Pedro Gomes, columnist for the Jornal do Brasil, reported what was already apparent to all:

> From now on Flexa's Ribeiro's candidacy will become a critical part of the political anti-revanchism apparatus. . . . Governor Carlos Lacerda . . . and Professor Flexa Ribeiro have had proof that . . . many of the effects of their governmental program have been lost within a framework of political radicalization. Therefore the hour of tunnels, viaducts, gardens and beaches is for practical purposes at an end. Now comes the chapter of the menace of revanchism and communism, faced with which the undecided, the indifferent and the complacent will perhaps wake up.[60]

On that same date the Jornal do Brasil headlined "Communists Announce Their Support for Negrão," quoting Giocondo Dias, spokesman for Luis Carlos Prestes, as having said that Negrão de Lima stood for the rights of the people against the "Fascist Lacerdist dictatorship."[61] Beneath the scare headline, the aritcle itself was cool and dispassionate and left the reader with the impression that the PCB--illegal in Brazil--had aligned itself with the other leftist parties in hopes of gaining certain political goals such as general amnesty, legalization of the Communist Party, re-establishment of the political rights of the cassados, and freedom of assembly.

The Red scare was driven home constantly during the week before the vote, dovetailing nicely with the anti-revanchism theme. Thus pro-Lacerda newspapers ran eight-column photos under the banner THIS MUST NOT HAPPEN AGAIN which depicted various of the evils represented by a Negrão victory. One such ad showed Negrão chatting amiably with Fidel Castro; another was of João Goulart and Lionel Brizola. The Jornal do Brasil ran a story alleging that the Communist Party was applying pressure to the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) in order to persuade the PSB to withdraw the candidacy of Aurélio Viana, which it was feared would split the working class vote. The story went on to claim that the PCB had taken over the directing of Negrão's campaign.[62] Whatever the involvement of the PCB in Negrão's drive for victory at the polls, it is worthy of note that he did not at any time during the campaign disavow the support of the communists. The ultimate tie-in of bolsheviks and banished came when the Jornal do Brasil published a story on September 30 carrying the headline "CP Unites Around Negrão the Forces Banned by the Revolution." Nevertheless, as further analysis will show, all the efforts to link Negrão de Lima with the two-headed monster of communism and revanchism did not prevent him from making very significant inroads into the middle class vote in Guanabara. Although Negrão would doubtlessly have been frontrunner even without this vote, he would not have achieved an absolute majority.

The appeal to middle- and upper-class anxieties about communism and revanchism was not the only way in which the Flexa-Lacerda forces attempted to win votes. On television and radio, in newspaper ads and from rallies and sound trucks came a second theme: Negrão was corrupt. The Jornal do Brasil, by this time hardly distinguishable from a UDN

party organ, published during the final week a series entitled "Clear Memory" which dealt with Negrão's term as mayor of Rio. Two headlines which accompanied the articles will suffice to illustrate their theme: "Negrão as Mayor had His Scandals and Faced Inquiry Board"; "The Negrão Era: Hunger Strike, Excess of Garbage and Lack of Water." On September 30 the same newspaper reinforced the theme with a story under the headline "Public Employees Think Negrão Corrupt," an article which provided a perfect counterpoint to an eight-column story in the same edition--"State Employees Launch Manifesto of Support for Flexa Ribeiro."[63]

During the final three weeks, although themes of radicalization prevailed, the earlier UDN points of attack were not entirely neglected, despite their having been assigned a secondary role in the campaign. The candidato-obra was alive in Rio, although in the heat of charges and countercharges works became much less of an issue than before Negrão was nominated. The last ten days before the election saw Flexa undertake a whirlwind round of dedication ceremonies of schools, viaducts, parks and other public projects; the pace was so hectic that dedication duties were divided between Flexa and Governor Lacerda. Thus on September 28 the two politicians jointly or individually inaugurated a new annex to a hospital in the Zona Sul, a canal and street extension in Botafogo, a medical center in Copacabana, and a public school in Maracanã Stadium; at the last of these the governor christened the building Friedenreich School after a noted Brazilian soccer player of the 1920's and exhorted the public to join "our team" for the "second half" in order to "defend our championship in Guanabara and win the national championship to be held next year in Brasília."[64] Because of their crowded

schedule of inaugurations, neither Flexa nor Lacerda was able to participate in the March of the Families of Guanabara Against the Threat of the Return of Communism and Corruption, held that day.

As the campaign drew to its official close, forty-eight hours before the actual balloting,[65] polls showed that all but a handful of voters had made up their minds, but nonetheless full-page ads and television broadcasts dominated the press and air waves as both sides attempted to wring the last possible vote from the undecided few. As might be expected, the appeals made during the last day were designed to reach the lowest common denominator--rancor, prejudice and fear. This was true of both sides.

The crescendo of invective was reached by both UDN and PTB during that last twenty-four hours, leaving an exhausted public to mull its decision at the polls. The Correio da Manhã matched the Jornal do Brasil one-for-one by reprinting a series of defamatory articles which the former had first published in 1955 about Lacerda. Called "A Poor Devil," the editorials painted an extremely unflattering character sketch of the then-federal deputy.

> Here is his portrait. It can be seen as it is in fact: the beneficiary of the Bank of Brazil . . . paying back monetary favors with political favors; the exploiter of thousands of stockholders in a journalistic enterprise [i.e., Lacerda's Tribuna da Imprensa] which is worth a little bit because of its title and whose title is in his own pocket; the coward who runs and flees during an assassination attempt, while his defender was lying dead on the sidewalk; . . . the deputy who degrades his mandate and becomes unworthy of his peers by presenting in the speaker's stand of the Chamber machine guns furnished by a weapons thief; . . . the agitator who preaches the crime of subversion of the regime and of civil war from paranoic vanity and neurotic resentment.[66]

The same journal ran on its front page that day a brief notice in which it stated:

> We were, are and shall be against Sr. Carlos Lacerda for the simple reason that we were, are and shall be against the transformation of Brazil into a squalid little Fascist republic.

As the candidates brought their campaigns to a close it was apparent that Flexa Ribeiro had become something of a forgotten man. Despite his presence since June at over forty inaugurations, his visits to better than 100 schools, his more then 500 formal and informal speeches, his trips to some fifty of Rio's estimated 175 favelas, his tours of seventy districts in the Zona Norte and ten in the Zona Sul, his appearance at thirty rallies and his 180,000 handshakes--despite all this, in the last days Flexa Ribeiro was far less the focal figure in the UDN campaign than was Lacerda himself. As seen above, the vilifications and personal attacks were aimed at the governor, not at the ex-secretary of education. During the entire campaign the worst insult hurled at Flexa was "stooge" or "puppet." At no time was his personal or administrative record brought into the campaign. The prominent role that Lacerda assumed in the campaign led the opposition to comment on election eve:

> Some people believe that the Lacerdist candidate for governor of Guanabara is Sr. Flexa Ribeiro. They are mistaken. Sr. Flexa Ribeiro is not the candidate.
>
> Throughout the political and electoral campaign he has been content to remain a secondary figure, a shade that smiles. The candidate is Sr. Carlos Lacerda.[67]

If Flexa Ribeiro was the forgotten man, the União Democrática Nacional was the forgotten party. Because "udenista" and "UDN" were dirty words among much of the working class of Guanabara, the party affiliation of Flexa was conspicuously absent from his campaign literature, and in his speeches scant reference was made to the party of "lawyers and white handkerchiefs." While Negrão's progaganda displayed in large

letters the PTB insignia, Flexa's posters and flyers stressed in effect, "the man, not the party." As the Correio da Manhã said:

> In all the rallies of Sr. Flexa Ribeiro, in all the speeches of Sr. Carlos Lacerda, in all the manifestations of Guanabaran would-be Fascism one notes a great absence: there is never any talk of the party to which the two demagogues allegedly belong. The UDN is totally missing from their propaganda. . . . But the omission is understandable. No one likes to expose himself to the extreme unpopularity which the UDN inevitably brings with it. What aid could the Lacerdas and Flexas hope for from citing a party emblem whose popular appeal is zero? Therefore there is lacking in their speeches a zero: the UDN.[68]

Finally, on Sunday, October 3, 1965, the voters of Guanabara went to the polls to elect a governor, climaxing the costliest, noisiest and most vehemently contested election in the history of Rio de Janeiro. The weather was clear--it was spring in Brazil--and a large turnout was expected for the first sampling of public sentiment since the military takeover of eighteen months earlier.

Analysis of the Election Results

When the votes had been counted and the result officially ratified by the Regional Electoral Court (TRE) of Guanabara, the voting totals emerged:

Negrão de Lima	582,026
Flexa Ribeiro	442,363
Amaral Neto	40,403
Aurélio Viana	25,841
Hélio Damasceno	14,140
Blank votes	5,283
Null votes	65,958

In percentages, counting only those votes cast for one of the candidates (i.e., excluding blank and null votes), the figures were:

Negrão de Lima	52.63
Flexa Ribeiro	40.04
Amaral Neto	3.66
Aurélio Viana	2.33
Hélio Damasceno	1.29

Of all votes cast, including blank ballots and those disallowed for various reasons, Negrão gained 49.49 per cent, followed by Flexa's 37.62 per cent.[69]

The insignificant number of blank votes (less than one-half of one per cent) testifies to the extreme state of polarization which marked the election. Also noteworthy is the poor showing made by the "third party" candidates owing to the same radicalization process. The intense degree of politization in Guanabara in 1965 can be seen by the fact that 86 per cent of all eligible voters cast ballots in the election.[70] There was no statistically significant difference in voter turnout between the predominantly "proletarian" districts and the "upper class" areas, both showing a turnout level of better than 85 per cent. Given the socio-economic structure of Guanabara, however, a large turnout tended to favor Negrão, assuming the validity of studies which have shown that--all other factors held constant--affluent persons tend to vote with greater frequency than the poor.[71] All told, the combined efforts of the five gubernatorial contenders brought 1,176,014 voters to the polls.

The results could not be termed surprising except in the intensity of pro-Negrão (or anti-Lacerda) sentiment. An unemotional analysis of the political reality existing in Rio in 1965 would have led inevitably to the conclusion that Flexa Ribeiro was definitely the underdog and that the PTB-PSD coalition supporting the ex-mayor would be very difficult to overcome.

Few observers, however, foresaw Negrão's winning an absolute majority. Even the Correio da Manhã hedged on election day by running the headline "Negrão to Win by Wide Margin," without predicting that he

would get 50 per cent of the total.[72] It was the general feeling that the five-way race would result in no candidate receiving an absolute majority (i.e., 50 per cent, plus one, of the valid votes--which excluded null and blank votes). In such a case the Assembléia would decide whether to ratify the candidate with a plurality or schedule a runoff election between the two leading candidates. The latter proposal would ultimately have favored Negrão, who would of necessity benefit from being the candidate of a united opposition.

In order to understand the dimension of the opposition victory in Guanabara one must examine the zone-by-zone returns from the twenty-five electoral divisions which comprised the state in 1965.[73] In general the zones can be considered, in socio-economic make-up, to be either middle- and upper-class, working class, or mixed.

The zones of concentration of middle-class and upper-class families are mainly in the Zona Sul and Tijuca areas. These are the 3rd zone, which includes Catete, Flamengo and Glória; the 4th composed of Urca and Botafogo; the 5th, Leme and Copacabana; the 6th, Rio Comprido and Engenho Velho; the 7th, Tijuca; the 16th, made up of Laranjeiras, Santa Teresa and Fátima; the 17th, taking in Gávea, Leblon and the Lagoa environs; the 18th, which has part of Copacabana as well as Ipanema and some sections of Leblon; and lastly the 19th, with Vila Isabel, Grajaú, Andaraí and Aldeia Campista.

The bairros with predominantly proletarian characteristics are: the 8th (São Francisco Xavier, Rocha, Mangueira, Riachuelo, Sampaio, Engenho Novo, Benfica), the 11th (Bonsucesso, Ramos, Olaria, Penha, Brás de Pina, Cordovil, Lucas), the 12th (Bento Ribeiro, Cascadura,

Cavalcânti, Coelho Neto, Colégio, Engenheiro Leal, Honório Gurgel, Madureira, Osvaldo Cruz, Rocha Miranda, Tomás Coalho, Turiassu, Vaz Lôbo, Vicente Carvalho, Irajá), the 13th (Jacarepaguá, Cascadura, Madureira, Osvaldo Cruz, Marechal Hermes, Realengo), the 15th (Bento Ribeiro, Marechal Hermes, Deodoro, Vila Militar, Magalhães Bastos, Realengo), the 21st (Manguinhos, Bonsucesso, Ramos, Olaria, Penha, Vicente Carvalho, Vila Cosmos, Inhaúma), the 22nd (Penha Circular, Brás de Pina, Vila da Penha, Cordovil, Lucas, Vigário Geral, Irajá, Pavuna, Acari), the 23rd (Marechal Hermes, Anchieta, Richardo de Albuquerque, Deodoro, Costa Barros, Barros Filho, Pavuna), the 24th (Padre Miguel, Bangu, Senador Camará, Santíssimo, Augusto Vasconcelos), and the 25th (Campo Grande, Inhoaíba, Cosmos, Paciência, Santa Cruz, Sepetiba, Pedra da Guaratiba, Barra da Guaratiba, Guaratiba). There bairros are concentrated in the Zona Norte.

The "mixed" areas include the 1st zone (São José, Candelária, Santa Rita, São Domingos, Sacramento, Ajuda, Gamboa, Ilhas), the 2nd (Santo Antônio, Santa Ana, Espírito Santo), the 9th (São Cristóvão), the 10th (Piedade, Quintino, Cascadura, Encantado, Cavalcânti, Tomás Coelho, Terra Nova, Pilares, Abolição), the 14th (Méier, Cachambi, Piedade, Maria da Graça, Del Castillo, Inhaúma, Pilares, Engenho de Dentro, Encantado, Engenho Novo, Todos os Santos), and the 20th (Lins de Vasconcelos, Méier, Todos os Santos, Engenho de Dentro, Encantado, Boca do Mato). These zones are designated as mixed either because they encompass bairros which have large elements of both working class and middle class families, or because predominantly homogeneous bairros of both classes fall within their confines.

The correspondence between the voting of the several zones and the predominant socio-economic level of its inhabitants is striking. In a contest that was strictly two-way (none of the other candidates captured a single electoral zone), Flexa Ribeiro won in nine zones--all of them areas of middle- and upper-class concentration. Thus Flexa took the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 16th, 17th, 18th, and 19th zones, while Negrão carried the remaining sixteen zones, all of which are working class or mixed areas.

The results showed clearly that the Lacerda-Flexa strategy of wooing votes in the Zona Norte had failed. In such zones as the 23rd and 24th Negrão's total ran 3-1 over Flexa's, and in other zones of working class character such as the 12th, 13th, 15th, 22nd and 25th, Negrão gained a 2-1 edge or greater. This was not offset by the 4-3 margin in Flexa's favor in such UDN strongholds as the 5th zone (Copacabana). An analysis by the Jornal do Brasil showed that Flexa Ribeiro had run behind the vote totals garnered five years before by Carlos Lacerda in every zone but the 15th.[74]

The conclusions were clear. Flexa Ribeiro did not have the charismatic appeal to voters of any class that Carlos Lacerda had exhibited in his various campaigns for elective office, and the popularity of Lacerda among his adherents was not transferable. The attempt to present a compromise candidate who would offend no portion of the UDN resulted in a candidate about whom no sector of the party was truly enthusiastic. The constant appearance of Lacerda at the side of his would-be successor most likely lost more votes than it won, for in a culture which prizes machismo (he-man virility), the plump little professor came to be regarded as Lacerda's hand puppet by many unaffiliated

voters. The radicalization of the campaign also tended to hurt the cause of the UDN candidate, for in any clash of personalities, Carlos Lacerda could count on arousing more enemies than the number he could muster against his foe.[75] Lacerda's decision not to ask for the aid of the bancada federal may be considered another factor in the loss; the UDN federal deputies representing Guanabara played virtually no role in the campaign, although the influence they might have had on uncommitted voters is highly problematic. In any case, their absence helped create in the public mind the impression of a divided party. The role, if any, of the federal government in influencing the outcome of the election is another debatable matter. It seems indisputable that the interests of Castelo Branco would be furthered by the defeat of his most viciferous critic, Carlos Lacerda, but whether the national government actively intervened to help bring about this result is questionable. The defeated candidate himself told me several months after the election that

> . . . the federal government did not intervene; it did attempt to avoid polarization of the electorate around a dangerous military man like Lott or in a figure linked with the João Goulart crowd, like Hélio de Almeida.[76]

The half-hearted support given Flexa by the middle class, traditional source of UDN strength in Guanabara, must be accorded a high place in the list of causes of the opposition victory in 1965; while the subúrbios, home of major parts of the working class, were turning in 2-1 and 3-1 margins for Negrão de Lima, Copacabana and other centers of UDN support were voting for Flexa by mere 4-3 and 3-2 differentials. In the 17th zone (Laranjeiras, Santa Teresa and Fátima), out of 37,463 votes Flexa led his opponent by a mere 729.[77] There were several reasons for the middle class defection.

First, the figure of Negrão de Lima did not alienate or frighten middle class voters as Lott or a more radical name would have. Negrão had served as mayor of Rio when that city was the Federal District and had later been ambassador to Paraguay; he thus was perceived as a familiar figure and one who represented neither an abrupt break with the present nor a return to the past of Jango and his followers. Further, the fact of Negrão's being associated with the PSD rather than the PTB--although he enjoyed the support of both parties in 1965--served to reinforce his acceptability among many who would have voted for the UDN standard-bearer had they been faced with a clearly Leftist alternative. Despite the efforts of the pro-Flexa Jornal do Brasil to remind readers of the alleged abuses of the ex-mayor during his term of office, despite the scare propaganda which showed Negrão chatting with João Goulart and bearing the headline "THIS MUST NOT HAPPEN AGAIN," despite the virulent personal attacks made on Negrão by the governor of Guanabara--despite these things, the middle class apparently found Negrão de Lima an acceptable alternative to Flexa Ribeiro. Polarization, where it occurred, was much more marked among the working class voters than among those of the middle and upper class.

Second, the civil servants split and thereby took many votes that ordinarily would have swelled the UDN totals. As the defeated candidate himself put it later:

> Twenty thousand civil servants--and the government [of Guanabara] was late with salaries because of excessive works beyond the budgetary capacity. The works were good but more than we could handle. The federal government had no obligation to give advance funds to Guanabara.78

Schoolteachers were especially distressed at the delay in payments, since

the government candidate had been secretary of education and the entire campaign had stressed an education theme.

Third, the "radicalization" or polarization of the campaign, inevitable in Guanabara under most circumstances and furthered by Lacerda himself in the 1965 election,[79] repercussed to the advantage of the opposition because the numerically larger working class responded much more strongly to the polarization than did the middle and upper classes, which gave only a small majority to the UDN candidate. As has been evident throughout the present work, the figure of Carlos Lacerda tended to inspire powerful reasctions in the minds of the Guanabara electorate. One political commentator opined that Lacerda's participation in the campaign was actually counterproductive:

> . . . The aggressiveness of Sr. Lacerda became electorally negative, principally because it awoke and aggravated anew old hatreds and rancors about his person. By entering fully the campaign and directing violent insults at Sr. Negrão de Lima, the governor of Guanabara took the State back to the climate which reigned in the elections of 1954 and 1955. . . .[80]

As to the question of why the middle class felt less powerfully moved by the polarizing tendencies of the campaign, besides the reasons adduced above, one can but speculate. Beyond a doubt, the programs of the federal government--and especially the austerity drive which held salaries down but could do little to contain prices--had a more immediate and upsetting effect on the lower classes than on the middle and upper levels, and their overwhelming support for the opposition candidate was in all likelihood their way of registering dissatisfaction with the in-party at all levels. This is the tack that Lacerda took after the defeat, claiming that "the people voted correctly for the wrong candidate."[81]

In summary, the factors most directly leading to the UDN defeat in 1965 were: polarization of the electorate through the PTB-PSD coalition and the violent personal nature of attacks made on behalf of both major candidates; the lukewarm support accorded Flexa's candidacy by the middle and upper classes, including the civil servants; and the factionalism within the UDN which prevented the bancada federal from using its popularity--however effective it might have been--in behalf of the party candidate.[82]

The UDN strategy of concentrating on the working class electoral zones proved singularly unsuccessful and in all likelihood cost the ticket votes which might have been wooed from the middle class areas. Further, the attempt to stress works in the early part of the campaign may have been a serious tactical mistake. As one pragmatist put it after the results were counted, "People don't eat viaducts and parks."

Whether the UDN might have won with another candidate is a matter on which party leaders themselves disagreed. Aliomar Baleeiro told me after the elections that "Carlos Lacerda lost in Guanabara, not Flexa Ribeiro."[83] He went on to assert that the party might indeed have won with a different man to head the ticket. Adaucto Lúcio Cardoso, another member of the bancada federal, took a divergent view. While agreeing that it was Lacerda who lost, the deputy argued that the outcome might have been otherwise "if Lacerda hadn't waged such a delirious campaign in the last few days." Sr. Cardoso, who had been under consideration as a possible nominee of his party before Flexa was selected, said frankly, "I don't think I would have won the election. . . . I would have lost, but not as dramatically."[84] A realistic appraisal from a state-level politician was the admission of Célio Borja, who

served as secretary of government under Lacerda, that "any UDN candidate would have lost; once the civil servant vote was split, the UDN was sunk."[85] The consensus, therefore, of these top-ranking party officials would seem to substantiate the contention made above that political conditions prevailing in Guanabara in 1965 were not conducive to victory for Flexa Ribeiro, certainly, and that--barring a split between the elements of the PTB-PSD coalition--*any* UDN candidate would have encountered extreme difficulty in achieving electoral success.

NOTES

[1]"Flexa 65," pamphlet published in 1965 by "a group of friends of Flexa Ribeiro" [n.p., n.d.].

[2]Ibid.

[3]The above data are taken from a biography of Danilo Nunes in the Jornal do Brasil, September 30, 1965, p. 3.

[4]Jornal do Brasil, May 28, 1965, p. 10.

[5]As will be seen, the PTB made the first moves in radicalizing the campaign, and Lacerda picked up the guantlet and responded in kind. See below, pp. 292-294.

[6]Coutto, O Voto e o Povo, p. 84.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Síntese Política Econômica Social, 27 (July-September, 1965), p. 68.

[9]Jornal do Brasil, August 1-2, 1965, p. 1.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Síntese Política Econômica Social, 27 (July-September, 1965), p. 68. The cassados were those individuals whose political rights, including the right to vote, hold public office or campaign for a candidate, had been suspended for ten years in the aftermath of the 1964 revolution. The two major offenses so punished were "subversion" and "abuses of economic power" (graft). Among the cassados were three ex-presidents (Goulart, Quadros and Kubitschek).

[12]O Globo, August 2, 1965, p. 12.

[13]Lott was especially associated with ex-President Juscelino Kubitschek, under whom he had served as minister of war and who was allowed to take office only after Lott had staged a "preventive coup" to remove the acting president. For details of this complicated affair, see Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, pp. 149-158.

[14]Jornal do Brasil, August 3, 1965, p. 4.

[15]Ibid., August 4, 1965, p. 10.

[16]Ibid., August 6, 1965, p. 4.

[17]Ibid., p. 3.

[18]Ibid.

[19]This point was raised by Pedro Gomes in his column of August 6, 1965, in the Jornal do Brasil, p. 10.

[20]Actually, under the election laws then in effect, if no candidate received a simple majority of the votes cast, the Assembléia Legislativa would decide whether to ratify the most-voted candidate or hold a run-off election between the two highest contenders. In practical terms the UDN plurality in the Assembléia would have fought for the former had Flexa been the frontrunner in a three-way race.

[21]Jornal do Brasil, August 6, 1965, p. 3.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Ibid., April 18, 1965, p. 10.

[24]O Globo, August 10, 1965, p. 1.

[25]Lacerda was constantly called a golpista by his political enemies, and this was one of the recurring vilifications which marked the 1965 campaign, making it more difficult for him to assume a position as unrestrained advocate of democratic procedure in cases such as the Lott affair. Throughout his political career Lacerda was prey to charges of opportunism, as in his later willingness to reach agreements with such former foes as Goulart, Kubitschek and Quadros in his attempt to undermine the military government.

[26]Síntese Política Econômica Social, 27 (July-September, 1965), p. 68.

[27]A further cause of ill feeling between the PTB and the PSD was the sentiment common to many petebistas that the PSD had "sold out" the chances of Hélio de Almeida by not opposing in the federal congress sections of the ineligibilities law pertaining directly to Almeida. For the text of the laws on electoral eligibility, including the revisions of June, 1965, which ruled out Almeida, see Estados Unidos do Brasil, Ineligibilidades (n.p., Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1965).

[28]For an excellent analysis of the PSD role in indirectly giving the 1960 gubernatorial victory to Lacerda through its unwillingness to form a coalition with the PTB, see Coutto, O Voto e o Povo, pp. 57-68.

[29]Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, p. 76.

[30]Jornal do Brasil, September 9, 1965, p. 3.

[31]Coutto, O Voto e o Povo, p. 86.

[32]Síntese Política Econômica Social, 27 (July-September, 1965), p. 69.

[33]Coutto, O Voto e o Povo, p. 86.

[34]Ineligibilidades, p. 7.

[35]Síntese Política Econômica Social, 27 (July-September, 1965), p. 69.

[36]Coutto, O Voto e o Povo, p. 57.

[37]When it began, the contest was known as "Your Receipt Slip Is Worth a Million"; since that time inflation has forced the use of the plural.

[38]The above information comes from a biographical sketch in the Jornal do Brasil, July 28, 1965, p. 4.

[39]Coutto, O Voto e o Povo, p. 84.

[40]Interview with Carlos Flexa Ribeiro, May 3, 1966, in Rio de Janeiro.

[41]Coutto, O Voto e o Povo, p. 84.

[42]It was the subjective impression of this observer that the newsreels, owned by a partisan of the government candidate, devoted by far the greater amount of coverage to Flexa's campaign.

[43]Of course, had Teixeira Lott been the Labor candidate, polarization would have occurred, just as it did when Negrão headed the PTB ticket. But, as Lacerda was well aware, the type of polarization generated by Lott would have been characterized, rightly or wrongly, as the forces of "revolution" against those of "revanchism," and such a division would have ultimately redounded to the benefit of the UDN and Flexa.

[44]Jornal do Brasil, July 17, 1965, p. 10.

[45]Ibid., August 3, 1965, p. 4.

[46]Ibid., August 12, 1965, p. 4.

[47]O Globo, August 9, 1965, p. 3.

[48]According to Coutto, the Guanabara electorate "despite showing itself very sensitive to ideological debate, votes much more because of the degree of radicalization which the candidate reaches than on the basis of his ideas and political platform." (Correio da Manhã, July 11, 1965, p. 7.)

[49]To be sure, the more ideological wings of the PTB-GB raised from time to time the question of revision of the suspension of political rights for Goulart and others, but within juridical frameworks and without provoking the anger of higher ranking circles of the military. Despite this caution, however, there were still rumors both before and after the election that Negrão would not be allowed to assume office.

[50]Jornal do Brasil, September 26, 1965, p. 3.

[51]O Globo, July 12, 1965, p. 1.

[52]Jornal do Brasil, September 26, 1965, p. 3.

[53]Correio da Manhã, September 30, 1965, p. 6.

[54]Ibid.

[55]Ibid., July 30, 1965, p. 3.

[56]Coutto, O Voto e o Povo, p. 90.

[57]Note, however, that Lacerda and not Flexa attacked the Castelo regime. Flexa himself was careful to avoid a position of overt opposition to the military government.

[58]Jornal do Brasil, September 26, 1965, p. 13.

[59]Ibid.

[60]Ibid., p. 10.

[61]Ibid., p. 13.

[62]Ibid., September 29, 1965, p. 3.

[63]Ibid., September 30, 1965, pp. 3, 11.

[64]Ibid., September 29, 1965, p. 17.

[65]Under prevailing election laws, all campaigning had to cease two days before the election, which in Brazil is held on a Sunday. Infraction of this law could result in disqualification of a candidate.

[66]Correio da Manhã, September 30, 1965, p. 3.

[67]Ibid., p. 6.

[68]Ibid.

[69]All of the figures in this paragraph are from Estado da Guanabara, Diário Oficial, Parte III (Poder Judiciário), Suplemento ao No. 202 (October 25, 1965), p. 8. Hereafter cited as Diário Oficial, III.

[70]Ibid.

[71]Of course such studies have limited application to a situation where compulsory voting is the rule, as in Brazil. Furthermore, the highly politicized nature of the Guanabara electorate has historically resulted in a large turnout. A better indication of the impact of the campaign on the public awareness can be seen in the very small number of blank votes in the 1965 election.

[72]Correio da Manhã, October 3, 1965, p. 13.

[73]Previously the state--and old Federal District--had only fifteen electoral zones, redistricting taking place between the plebescite of January, 1963, and the 1965 elections. This redistricting had no measurable effect on the outcome of the gubernatorial race and was more an administrative measure than a political one.

[74]Jornal do Brasil, October 6, 1965, p. 2.

[75]It is noteworthy that throughout the campaign, which must be considered one of the most heated in Rio's history, attacks were always directed at Lacerda, not at his candidate, Flexa Ribeiro. Flexa was dealt with, if at all, as the front man for the outgoing governor and was generally characterized as well meaning but not a man to run the state. There were no attacks upon him as an individual--of the sort, for instance, which abounded around Lacerda--nor of his overall record as secretary of education.

[76]Interview with Carlos Flexa Ribeiro, May 3, 1966, in Rio de Janeiro.

[77]Diário Oficial, III, p. 7.

[78]Interview with Carlos Flexa Ribeiro, May 3, 1966, in Rio de Janeiro.

[79]According to Flexa Ribeiro, although he felt his candidacy united the UDN-GB, no candidate could have beaten the solid-front opposition. Lacerda, he said, "accepted this polarization and even advanced it. Many people voted against Lacerda." (Interview, May 3, 1966, in Rio de Janeiro.)

[80]Coutto, O Voto e o Povo, p. 13.

[81]See Appendix I for excerpts from Lacerda's press conference following the tabulation of election results.

[82]Afonso Arinos, senator from Guanabara elected on the UDN slate and one of the founders of the party, announced just before the election his intention to vote for Negrão. See Correio da Manhã, September 30, 1965, p. 14.

[83]Interview with Aliomar Baleeiro, April 10, 1966, in Rio de Janeiro.

[84]Interview with Adaucto Lúcio Cardoso, April 11, 1966, in Rio de Janeiro.

[85]Interview with Célio Borja, April 18, 1966, in Rio de Janeiro.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS

During their two decades of corporate life, the national UDN and its state affiliates, in addition to the vicissitudes common to most political parties, confronted some problems unique to their own circumstances which complicated their efforts to win a permanent place in the Establishment or "system" which dominated Brazilian politics after 1945. In this final chapter an evaluation and analysis will be made of the record of the UDN nationally and the UDN-GB locally in coping with these difficulties and some conclusions will be offered concerning the future which the party might have reasonably been expected to have had the Second Institutional Act not intervened.

Chief among problems facing the UDN as a national party was that of coordinating the conflicting demands between the national command and the various state parties theoretically subordinate to it. As has been seen previously, this obstacle was all but insurmountable, despite the legal weapons which the Electoral Code placed in the hands of the national party. In the UDN, as in most other parties, these arms were seldom if ever employed, with the result that state parties enjoyed virtual autonomy. In the case of a large and important state party like the UDN-GB, the tail could often wag the dog, as evidenced by the crucial role played by Carlos Lacerda and his allies (e.g., Ernâni Sátiro) in the decisionmaking apparatus of the national party. As already shown, there were at least three currents which divided the UDN state parties--four if one includes the Magalhães Pinto/nationalist-progressive wing--

and the national party was called upon to mediate and reconcile the various desires and demands of the several state affiliates. Faced with what was in fact an impossible task, the national party largely abdicated its responsibility and allowed the state groups to act virtually independently.[1] As was shown in Chapters V and VI, the Guanabara UDN did not look to the national UDN for assistance of either an ideological or a financial nature, and national UDN figures ventured into the political arena in that state at their own risk.

The result of the lack of coordination between national and state levels was a breakdown of communication between the party members which the national UDN purported to represent and the organization itself.[2] As shown in the survey reported in Chapter VII, rank-and-file udenistas in Guanabara had scant understanding of the position taken ideologically by "their" party and little appreciation of its history or value system vis-à-vis that of other parties. Furthermore, the fact that udenistas at all levels in the Guanabara party tended to identify with the state organization rather than the national party reinforces the lack of coordination and/or identity of ideals and attitudes between the lowest ranking udenistas and the highest echelons of the party. Whatever the reason--and without further research, causes can merely be conjectured--udenistas in Guanabara perceived their state party as more representative of their own goals and attitudes than the national UDN. Although the Guanabara microcosm was not necessarily typical (indeed, many factors combined to make it anything but typical of other Brazilian states), it may be supposed that the national party was far from perfect in its congruency with the constituents belonging to any of its state affiliates. This becomes a matter of practical rather than theoretical importance

when one recalls that national parties in Brazil--as in the United States--were in reality an amalgam of some twenty-odd state parties all bearing the same denomination (UDN, PSD, etc.) but in practice coordinating their efforts and combining their resources only once every five years when the national presidency was at stake. In the case of the UDN, its failure to maintain channels of communication from rank-and-file to national party headquarters--as indicated by the frequent intraparty disputes--can only have hampered the overall electoral efficiency of the organization, though of course no quantifiable data can be brought to bear on this question. The second of LaPalombara and Weiner's criteria, presented in the first chapter of the present work, included "regularized communications . . . between local and national units." In this, the UDN left much to be desired. As has been noted previously, the links between state and national units of all Brazilian parties of the period were tenuous, but the UDN was known above any of the others for its fratricidal battles, a luxury even a dominant party can ill afford--and the UDN never gained a position of dominance.

In attempting to harmonize often contradictory state interests while maintaining its role as a "party of national scope," the UDN faced problems which it shared in greater or lesser degree with the other major parties. But it stood alone in its incessant struggle to win a partnership in the national administration--to break, in effect, the strangehold on parliamentary power which the PSD-PTB alliance enjoyed. Even in 1960, despite the overwhelming proportions of the Quadros victory, the UDN discovered that having backed a winner did not automatically gain the party access to the corridors of power.

As a party deriving its major electoral strength from the middle

class the UDN began with a handicap. In the several states the middle class was a minority, albeit a sizable one in such areas as Guanabara and São Paulo. On a national scale, however, the middle class was inundated in a sea of lower class votes, even with the literacy requirement for exercise of the franchise. Because the PSD had already staked out its own electoral claim on conservative, traditionally oriented voters in many states, and because the PTB garnered the lion's share of the working class votes, the UDN's support centered on conservative landowners in those states which for various reasons did not lean toward the PSD[3] and on the urban middle class. Given the fact that the PSD had begun in 1945 working from a solid power base established on its position as a quasi-official "government party," the UDN was doomed to a secondary position in parliamentary jockeying for power.

Given its built-in "second best" position in the national congress, the UDN would have profited from a greater emphasis on presidential politics, but the party seemed singularly unable to present a candidate who fired the public imagination in sufficient numbers to insure his election. Gomes was nominated in 1950 in order to heal a split in the party, and neither its 1955 standard-bearer nor its 1960 nominee was a member of the UDN. In fact, in its twenty years of life the UDN nominated one man--Eduardo Gomes--from its own ranks. The nomination of Jânio Quadros in 1960 can be interpreted in two ways: either it was a UDN accommodation to political exigencies, or it was a desperate attempt to enter the presidential palace through the back door. Any endeavor to choose between these two viewpoints falls into the realm of value judgment.

It is interesting to speculate whether Carlos Lacerda could have won the presidency if elections had been held as scheduled.[4] In 1965

he was certainly the best known politician still in possession of his political rights, and contenders such as Juscelino Kubitschek and Miguel Arraes had been removed through cassação. The delicate tightrope which Lacerda as candidate would have had to traverse might have proved his undoing, for he would have had to show himself acceptable to the revolutionary government while simultaneously attacking it! It seems undeniable that the mood of the public, first seen in the gubernatorial elections of October, 1965, was such that any candidate perceived by the electorate as representing the revolution would have been defeated in a direct election.[5] It was presumably for this reason that the revolutionary government opted after 1965 for indirect elections, preferring to deal with legislators than the populace as a whole. The question of Lacerda's fate at the polls was rendered moot by the actions of the Costa e Silva government which stripped from him his right to vote, campaign or hold public office for a period of ten years.

The UDN could have survived without Lacerda, but its own political demise predated that of its presidential candidate. In late October, 1965, the Second Institutional Act abolished all existing political parties.[6] This drastic solution to the continuing party crisis in Brazil put an end to the UDN's agony of self-appraisal and its long history of internal dissent, but it left unanswered the question of the party's probable future had not the Second Institutional Act occurred.

Carlos Lacerda was for many Brazilians a shining knight, the one true hope of democracy, the "incorruptible" who had given the people of Rio an outstanding administration. But for countless others he was the bête noir, an opportunist who trimmed his ideological sails whenever the political winds changed, a man who would denounce Goulart and

Kubitschek before the revolution and make common cause with them when the military regime thwarted his own ambitions. The power of Lacerda to polarize the national electorate as he had done locally in Guanabara is obvious, but could he have won?

This question must remain forever relegated to the if-clauses of history, but some observations can be made with a degree of certainty. First, Lacerda enjoyed a clear field in 1965, the only officially declared presidential candidate, but it is likely that in a free election an anti-Lacerda would have arisen to challenge him, invoking the legend of Getulio Vargas which was used so successfully in the campaign in Guanabara in 1965. In a totally open election--one in which even the purged like Kubitschek were eligible--Lacerda's chances of defeating the popular ex-president would have been slight, but in the constricted political arena of 1966 the rules of the game had changed. Paradoxically, Lacerda probably could have won had he been allowed to run, but the political situation after October, 1965, was such that the controversial UDN leader was effectively disqualified, even before his cassação.

To put it in another way, if the revolutionary government had allowed Lacerda to compete in a direct election, it would have signified the regime's willingness to accept him if elected. In the absence of other strong contenders--and virtually all leaders of the opposition had been eliminated through cancellation of their mandate--Lacerda would have been the favorite, backed by a major party and facing scattered and disorganized opposition, tacitly the choice of the revolutionary government while at the same time declaring his independence of it. It would have been a hard combination to beat.[7]

Indeed, had Lacerda been allowed to run, it would have been tant-

amount to endorsement by the military government, for it may be supposed that no individual would be allowed to seek the presidency if his victory would mean the dismantling of the policies which had been constructed since 1964. In such a case there would have been no need for Lacerda to put himself to the electoral test at all; he could have been chosen by the congress, indirectly. The very fact that Lacerda--shrewd politician that he was--favored direct elections points to the unviability of his ambitions without public intervention.

In short, it seems in retrospect that from the moment of victory of the revolution which he had helped set in motion--first by his denunciations of Quadros, later by his conspiring against Goulart--Lacerda sealed his own fate. Thereafter events were to move rapidly out of the hands of the governor of Guanabara and take a direction which he could not have foreseen in early 1964. It can be fairly said that Carlos Lacerda and the UDN met their political end together.

Had the events of March 31 never taken place, and had Goulart made way for a successor in 1965 as scheduled, what might have been the expectation for the UDN in the 1970's? It seems likely that in terms of overall national parliamentary representation the party had reached a plateau, for the PTB was already challenging it seriously for the position of second largest party, having surpassed the UDN in number of members in both chamber of deputies and senate in the 1962 elections. In parliamentary representation the UDN in 1964 was a party either recovering from an electoral setback or one on the decline, before the military takeover of March 31 "overturned the table" and drastically changed the rules of the game by eliminating many of the party's rivals.

The PTB suffered the most in the initial round of purges.

As the twin forces of industrialization and urbanization--the latter always flourishing in the wake of the former--continued to gain in impact and importance in a Brazil undergoing rapid social change, the UDN would have faced formidable challenges in its power base, the cities. Under proportional representation the party would have continued to elect federal deputies, but the number would diminish as the working class began to find its political strength. Even though the ranks of the middle class might be expected to grow, the numbers of the lower socio-economic groups can be shown demographically to grow even faster. Thus even in its electoral redoubts such as Guanabara the UDN would have found the tide of the times running against it. The experience of 1965, when the UDN was defeated badly by a powerful opposition, could reasonably be expected to have occurred with greater frequency in the face of PSD-PTB domination.

In brief, the prognosis for the 1970's--with the possible exception of Carlos Lacerda's chances of winning the presidency--would have been rather dim had the revolution never taken place. As events turned out, however, the revolutionary regime "saved" the UDN but had to destroy it to do so.[8]

NOTES

[1] The parties in the less populous, politically minor states such as those in the North obviously did not enjoy as great a latitude to exercise this autonomy as did a powerful and relatively well financed state party such as the UDN-GB. Nevertheless, the freedom did exist--electoral statutes to the contrary notwithstanding--whether or not the various state parties chose to make use of it.

[2] This is not to imply that a more perfect chain of interest articulation necessarily existed in parties like the PSD or PTB, for in all likelihood it did not. But a party like the PTB had the advantage of a more consistent ideology which varied little from state to state, principally because PTB strength was concentrated in the urban industrial centers, while the UDN had to juggle sometimes conflicting interests in conservative agrarian states and those in mature and developed states such as São Paulo or "take-off" states like Guanabara.

[3] As has been pointed out earlier in this study, in the traditional agrarian and cattle-raising states where coronelismo was common the ruling families tended to divide into PSD or UDN factions on the basis not of ideology but whether they were pro- or anti-Vargas.

[4] Elections to choose the successor to Jânio Quadros, whose term would have expired in early 1966, were scheduled for 1965 and postponed till 1966 after the revolution and subsequent extension of Castelo Branco's mandate for one year.

[5] Although results in nine of the eleven states did not hinge on the issue of the revolution, it is safe to say that in Minas Gerais and Guanabara--the two most populous--the electorate did emphatically reject the military government and those candidates associated, correctly or incorrectly, with it. In the aftermath of these elections the Second Institutional Act was handed down, reinstating many of the punitive powers which the government had possessed immediately after taking power, packing the supreme court (an apparent reaction to that body's having released several political prisoners for reasons of habeas corpus), and initiating indirect election of both the president and governors. This last provision would seem to point to a mistrust of the electorate on the part of the military leaders.

[6] A recounting of the complex maneuverings leading to the Second Institutional Act is beyond the scope of this work, but accounts can be found in Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, and in Rowe, "System," Part II.

[7] However, the PSD still boasted some candidates with popular following and a considerable power base, such as Carvalho Pinto in São Paulo.

[8] Despite much rhetoric and effusive declarations of party loyalty, the abolition of political parties caused scarcely a ripple among either veteran politicians or the public at large. Most admitted when asked

that the existing system was sorely in need of reform, and the alacrity with which políticos of all colorations hastened to join ARENA, the government party, shows that loyalty to the defunct organizations and grief over their death had not affected their good judgment.

APPENDIX I

The "Farewell Address" of Carlos Lacerda
October 9, 1965

Following are excerpts from a press conference held by the governor of Guanabara after the elections to choose his successor. The interview appeared in its entirety in the Jornal do Brasil for October 10, 1965, p. 3.

"I have not renounced my candidacy to the Presidency of the Republic. I handed back my candidacy to the party which proposed it. . . . I did not resign from anything. It is for the UDN to desist from my candidacy. I can not desist from something which it proposed, and not I."

"I feel that there is a vacuum of leadership in this country. President Castelo Branco no longer leads anything. Not even his own government. President Castelo Branco betrayed the Revolution."

"Once again, the army is going to guarantee that those elected by direct vote take office, in order to guarantee to the President of the Republic the right to rob the people of the direct vote next year. I am saying this [as] one who plans, when my mandate ends, to go home. . . . And I'll come out only when it's worthwhile to come out. I will not leave my home to help put an incapable general in power."

"The Revolution does not exist anymore. And it does not exist because it was betrayed. That is the word: betrayal."

"The election of Sr. Negrão de Lima was planned by President Castelo Branco, who had an understanding with [him] throughout the process of elaboration of his campaign. Sr. Negrão de Lima sought out the Communist Party, he gave it money, he gave it a vehicle with the full knowledge of the government. . . . The President of the Republic prohibited the army from

informing the people of the connections between Sr. Negrão de Lima and the CP. . . . I am closing out my administration and with it my patience with traitors. Enough."

"The President of the Republic wanted to name me head of the delegation to the UN, on the condition that I agree to postpone the convention of the UDN. And he had the . . . inelegance to insinuate that one of the advantages of my accepting would be that of [medically] treating my wife in the United States, at the government's expense. After I refused, he never again asked about my wife's health. . . ."

"The President of the Republic did everything to divide the UDN in Guanabara. Everything. He stimulated the candidacy of Raimundo de Brito. He stimulated the candidacy of Adaucto Cardoso. I accepted the candidacy of Flexa Ribeiro, proposed by [these two] in the name of the President of the Republic. . . . And after that candidacy united the UDN he tried to unite the opposition against that candidate."

"I have no ambition to be President of the Republic. If anyone has given proof of lack of ambition in this country, it is I, among others. Every post I ever obtained in public life was through election."

"The Revolution does not exist anymore even as a subject of jokes. It's not even good to laugh at. The people were prepared to vote against it and did vote against it. And it is a duty of conscience to recognize that the people voted right for the wrong candidates. The people voted for a revolution which is against the people. . . . How can one condemn the people who at their first opportunity to say that they are against that, said so, by an X on a ballot?"

"When the real wages of the people were reduced by half in one year, how can one ask the people of Vila Kennedy to vote just because they have

a house to buy? What are they going to put in the kitchen of that house? What are they going to cook in that kitchen--speeches of the President of the Republic? They're no good even for lighting the fire. Bulletins of General Golberi? They don't fill anyone's stomach."

"I do not believe that he [Castelo Branco] betrayed [the Revolution] consciously. I believe it was through political incapacity and lack of preparation for the exercise of power. I believe it was because he fell prisoner of a group which has another type of interest to defend--the group which is striving to destroy what Brazil has succeeded in doing in terms of industry, the group which is striving to create in Brazil a kind of tame fascism, the group which lives on crisis, taking advantage of every crisis to further its domination."

APPENDIX II

ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF INTERVIEW FORM USED
IN QUESTIONING RESPONDENTS

1. I.D. number (leave blank) _____

2. Age: _____ 18-30 _____ 31-50 _____ 50 and older

3. Profession: I II III IV V VI VII (circle)

4. Family income (in salários mínimos): 1 2 3 4 5 or more (circle)

5. Highest office held in UDN _____

6. Area of residence: _____ Zona Sul _____Zona Norte _____ Other

7. Education: ___ Some primary ___ Completed primary ___ Some ginásio
___Completed ginásio ___ Some secondary ___ Completed secondary
___Some university ___ Completed university

8. Do you consider yourself (very interested, interested, rather uninterested, very uninterested) in politics in general?

9. Perhaps you have heard the name Suplicy de Lacerda mentioned recently in the news. Does the name mean anything to you? If so, what?
____ Identified correctly ____ Did not identify; no answer

10. Given the present political situation in the country, do you favor direct or indirect election of congress and the President of the Republic?
____ Both direct ____ Congress direct, president indirect
____ Both indirect ____ President direct, congress indirect

11. Do you happen to recall for whom you voted in the 1960 presidential election? If so, what is his name? _____
IF RESPONDENT DID NOT VOTE, ASK QUESTION 12, OTHERWISE GO TO 13.

12. If for some reason you were unable to vote in 1960, with which candidate if any, did you sympathize? _____

13. Do you happen to recall for whom you voted in the last election for federal deputies? If so, what is his name? _____
IF RESPONDENT DID NOT VOTE, ASK QUESTION 14, OTHERWISE GO TO 15.

14. If for some reason you were unable to vote in that election, with which candidate, if any, did you sympathize? _____

15. Do you happen to recall the name of the candidate for whom you voted in the last election to the Legislative Assembly, or his party? If so, what is it? _____
IF RESPONDENT DID NOT VOTE, ASK QUESTION 16, OTHERWISE GO TO 17.

16. If for some reason you were unable to vote in that election, with which candidate or party did you sympathize? _____

17. There has been much discussion lately about allowing illiterates to vote. Do you personally favor such a proposal?
____ Yes ____ Yes, with restrictions ____ No

18. Do you happen to remember the name of one or more members of the Guanabara bancada federal from the UDN? If so, what are their names? _____ Names one or more _____Does not name any

19. Several persons have been mentioned as possible candidates of the UDN to the gubernatorial succession in Guanabara this year. Whom do you personally prefer as the party nominee? _____

20. Do you feel that Carlos Lacerda has done a satisfactory job as governor of the State of Guanabara? _____ Yes _____ No

21. Why? (Why not?)

22. Do you personally feel that your interests, desires and ideals are more often represented by the UDN of Guanabara or by the national UDN?
_____ UDN-GB _____ National UDN

23. In your opinion what are some of the ideals for which the UDN as a party stands? (Open end)

24. In general, do you feel the government of Marshal Castelo Branco has done a satisfactory job?
_____ Yes _____ No

25. Which of the following political figures do you associate most closely with the goals and ideals of the UDN as you personally would like to see them achieved? Is there perhaps some other political figure who more closely approaches such ideals? If so, who? (Lacerda, Milton Campos, Magalhães Pinto, Prado Kelly, Quadros, Juracy, other)
_____

26. Turning to the question of foreign policy, do you feel that Brazil should ( ) continue with much the same policy it now has
( ) seek closer ties with the United States
( ) seek closer ties with the Soviet Union
( ) seek independence of both blocs?

27. Do you happen to recall the names of any of the founders of the UDN? If so, what are their names?
_____ Names at least one founder _____ Does not name

28. Here is a drawing. (HAND SKETCH TO RESPONDENT.) In it you will see the UDN marked and spaces for placing the initials of other political parties. Excluding the PCB, please write in the initials of as many other parties as you desire, showing by your placement the closeness or distance which you feel exists between the UDN and the other parties.

UDN

. . . . . .
Liberal Conservative

29. Here is a drawing of a scale with numbers 1 to 10. (HAND LADDER SKETCH TO RESPONDENT.) I would like you to place several political figures on the ladder in relation to one another in such a way as to show your personal evaluation of them. For example, if you feel that Fulano in general ranks higher than Sicrano in your esteem, then you would place Fulano on a higher "step" than Sicrano. Please rank the following persons: Carlos Lacerda, Castelo Branco, Jânio Quadros, José Magalhães Pinto, Juscelino Kubitschek.

30. In general, would you consider your own situation at present better or worse than five years ago? ( ) Better ( ) Worse ( ) Same

31. Would you say that your personal situation will improve or worsen in the next five years? ( ) Improve ( ) Worsen ( ) Remain the Same

32. In general, do you expect the conditions of the country to improve, remain the same, or worsen by 1970? ( ) Improve ( ) Worsen ( ) Remain the Same

33. Do you feel that conditions in the country have improved, worsened or remained the same since 1960? ( ) Improved ( ) Worsened ( ) Remained the same

34. If you did not sympathize with the UDN, with which party do you think you would most likely sympathize? ( ) PSD ( ) PTB ( ) PSP ( ) PDC ( ) PSB ( ) PL ( ) other: _____( ) Don't know

35. In general, how would you characterize Governor Carlos Lacerda as a man and as a political figure? (Open end)

36. In your opinion, what type of person generally supports the UDN? (Open end)

37. Do you feel the revolution of 1964 was necessary?
_____ Yes _____ No

38. Have you ever donated funds to the UDN, exclusive of dues?
_____ Yes _____ No

39. What are the major criticisms you have, if any, of the manner in which the present administration is running the country? (Open end)

40. During the past few years the question of strikes has often arisen. Do you favor workers' use of the strike as a means of achieving political or economic objectives?
( ) Favors for political ends but not economic
( ) Favors for economic ends but not political
( ) Favors for both
( ) Favors for neither

41. Do you feel that foreign investment in Brazil brings with it generally beneficial results or generally undesirable results?
_____ Beneficial _____ Undesirable _____ Both; Don't know

42. The present Minister of Planning has been in the news recently. Do you happen to recall his name? If so, what is it?
_____ Correctly identified _____ Did not identify

END OF INTERVIEW: THANK THE RESPONDENT FOR HIS KINDNESS IN HELPING WITH THIS RESEARCH AND MAKE SURE YOU HAVE COLLECTED BOTH SKETCHES FROM HIM AND THAT ALL QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN ANSWERED.

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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Professor of Political Science

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